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l)EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE STOCK RETURNS, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
LIQUIDITY CREATION OF BANKS
This thesis consists of three studies that respectively investigate the stock returns, risk
management, and liquidity creation of banks. Chapter 2 focuses on the cross-section of
expected bank stock returns and shows that leverage and beta are important for pricing
bank stocks in the United States. During the two decades prior to the subprime crisis,
banks with high leverage have high stock returns. Beta appears to have a convex
relationship with bank stock returns. This chapter generally suggests that bank stocks
seem to respond to a different set of pricing factors than other industries. 
Chapter 3 examines the drivers behind banks’ use of derivatives for hedging. Covering
virtually all banks in the U.S. that have used derivatives, one key finding of this chapter is
that off-balance sheet loan commitment contracts, rather than on-balance sheet loans,
determines the use of derivatives for hedging. Since loan commitment contracts are the
primary channel of bank financing for commercial and industrial borrowers, the
implication of this finding is that the illiquidity of the financial market would make it
difficult for firms to refinance their existing loans, which is consistent with the
observation during the subprime crisis.
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the liquidity creation of banks in the European Union (EU)
and its relationship with equity capital, market power, and institutional context. Using a
unique and comprehensive sample of EU banks, this chapter shows that the impact of
stronger capital base on bank liquidity creation is significantly negative. This means that
capital regulations such as the Basel II Accord are likely to curtail banking activities and
slow down economic recovery and growth in EU. Next, this chapter shows that stronger
creditor rights coupled with stronger market power reduces bank liquidity creation in
developing EU countries, and vice versa for developed EU countries. This finding suggests
that due to less developed legal infrastructure, stronger creditor rights could be
counterproductive in facilitating bank liquidity creation in developing countries.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
At the time of this writing, the global economy is in the middle or hopefully at the end of the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In many aspects, the financial institutions, 
particularly the commercial banks, are at the center of this financial epidemic. Loosely 
speaking, the cause of the crisis is typically attributed to three, possibly intertwined, problems 
in many banks: high leverage fueled by cheap credits, involvement in complex derivative 
products, and low capital cushion against unexpected losses. Inadvertently, or perhaps 
inevitably when writing about banks, the chapters in this thesis are connected to the current 
financial crisis and its attributes. In this introduction, I briefly discuss the contents of each 
chapter of this dissertation and put them in the context of the existing banking literature and 
the current economic situation. 
To start with, readers may agree that commercial banks are indispensable in everyday 
life. It is inconceivable that anyone in the modern society can live without the interaction with 
banks for a prolonged period of time. From the purchase of groceries using various types of 
bank cards, the withdrawal of cash from the ATMs, to the purchase of cars or housing facilities 
using mortgages or other types of bank loans, the daily activities of individuals are intertwined 
with banks. Companies of various industries, structures, and sizes are used to the frequent and 
routine interactions with banks in many different aspects of business operations in the whole 
cycle of their existence, from establishment to the disappearance due to merger or acquisition 
or bankruptcy.  
The existence of banks seems so mundane that I wonder how many people really think 
about the risks they are taking on when depositing their savings into certain banks or think 
about the risks the banks are taking on when granting a mortgage loan. Of course, as happened 
in many countries during the current and past financial crises, all this comfort and familiarity 
can instantly become fear and panic when facing an (expected) outburst of financial crisis or 
the prospect of bank failure. In such a situation, individual depositors may withdraw their 
deposits as quickly as they can, or refuse to pay their loan obligations. Companies would also 
become reluctant to continue their otherwise routine interactions with those troubled banks. 
Therefore, it all seems that banks are crucial to the well-being of our societies and the 
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individuals therein. But at the same time the economic health of our society seems all too 
vulnerable to the problems in the commercial banks. 
It then may sound shocking that banks or financial institutions in general are of little 
relevance in financial theories. Indeed, Franklin Allen in his presidential address to the 
American Finance Association in 2000 suggest that “…people might be surprised to learning 
that institutions play little role in financial theory”, and that “financial institutions…would be 
ignored” (Allen 2001). As it turns out, as Allen (2001) concludes, financial institutions matter 
a lot in reality because of the agency problems between the ultimate owners of financial assets 
and the managers of the institutions that maintain these assets.  
In addition, the agency problems associated with banks are somehow more 
complicated because not only are the direct investors in banking products, e.g., depositors or 
shareholders, affected, but the general public and the overall economy may be in jeopardy if 
the banks collectively encounter troubles. The problems are further exacerbated by the fact 
that banks are opaque enterprises, which means it is very difficult for outsiders to accurately 
assess the true level of risks of a bank. As a consequence, the public tends to extrapolate the 
surfaced problem of one bank to all other banks assuming that the proven problem of a typical 
bank is very likely to exist in other similarly opaque institutions as well. Therefore, as during 
the Great Depression and sub-prime crisis, depositors tend to simultaneously withdraw their 
bank deposits after the observation of financial distress of one bank even though there is no 
direct sign of insolvency in other banks.  
This thesis addresses three issues closely related to the special issues of banks. Each of 
these issues is particularly relevant to a certain audience. I also discuss the relevance of the 
chapters in this thesis to the current financial crisis. The next section summarizes Chapter 2, 
which analyzes the stock returns of banks listed in the major U.S. stock markets and hence it is 
an interesting read for bank stock investors or analyst covering the financial sectors. Section 
1.3 briefly covers Chapter 3, which discusses the use of interest rate and credit derivatives for 
hedging purposes by all U.S. banks that participate in the derivative market. For regulators and 
other stakeholders of banks’ lending activities and their use of derivatives for risk mitigation, 
this chapter provides some evidence on the impact of derivatives that may deserve more 
attention. Section 1.4 summarizes Chapter 4 that investigates the real effect of bank capital 
regulation on bank liquidity creation. For regulators that try to improve banking stability by 
requiring banks to hold more capital, this chapter demonstrates the downside of such 
requirements. This chapter also examines the effect of competition on bank liquidity creation. 
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1.2 The Pricing of Banks Stocks 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is devoted to the investigation of bank stock returns. The focus of this 
chapter is motivated by the shortfall in the existing asset pricing literature regarding the 
attention paid to financial sectors in general and banks in particular. For example, in a widely 
cited paper on the cross-section of stock returns by Fama and French (1992), financial stocks 
are deliberately excluded because the authors intend to investigate the pricing implication of 
leverage and stock returns and do not want to mix industrial sectors with financial sectors 
where the leverage ratio is typically much higher. Most subsequent efforts in asset pricing also 
exclude financial stocks in order to be comparable with the earlier results.  
Even in the rare cases where financial stocks are investigated, the starting assumption 
is usually that the pricing factors found in the non-financial sectors also apply to the financial 
stocks. Examples of these contributions include Barber and Lyon (1997) and Cooper et al 
(2003). These papers typically build on the pricing factors suggested by Fama and French 
(1992) in the context of non-financial sectors and apply these factors directly to banks or other 
financial institutions. Intentionally or inadvertently, the applicability of these factors in a new 
environment has never been questioned.  
Considering the special nature of financial institutions, such as high leverage and being 
heavily regulated, it is conceivable that the traditional pricing factor may not have the same 
relationship with bank stocks as in other industries. The rich body of theories of financial 
intermediation and banking economics may also provide the foundation for hypothesizing 
some relationship between bank-specific characteristics and bank stocks that could be 
unorthodox in the existing asset pricing literature. Yet such possibilities have not been 
rigorously examined in the existing literature. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis takes the first step in filling in the gap in the existing asset 
pricing literature regarding the banking industry by trying to address the question if there are 
sector-specific variables that may help explain bank stock returns. As will be shown in this 
chapter, the theories of financial intermediation and banking economics seem to suggest that 
some variables, shown to be negligible in non-financial stocks, are likely to be relevant to the 
performance of bank stocks. Therefore, it seems necessary to explore the empirical 
implications of these bank specific variables and see if they have a stronger relationship with 
bank stock returns than do the existing prominent pricing factors. 
Based on an extensive review of the banking literature, I examine the effect of bank 
leverage and bank size on bank stock excess returns. While leverage has been shown to be 
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inconsequential in the context of nonfinancial stocks, my results suggest a consistent and 
statistically strong and positive relationship between leverage and future bank stock excess 
returns. Banks that are highly leveraged, or have lower equity, have higher returns. This 
relationship is strong in both univariate models and in multivariate models that control for 
other bank characteristics and risk profile. This suggests that the investors of bank equity may 
have inadvertently exacerbated the buildup of high leverage in banks prior to the 2008/2009 
financial crisis by giving the signal through bank stock returns that high leverage is more 
desirable. Bank size measured by total assets, on the other hand, has a significantly negative 
impact on bank stock returns. This could be seen as evidence for the diversification discount 
observed by Laeven and Levine (2007) where large and diversified financial conglomerates 
are worth less as a whole than the sum of their components if torn apart.  
In addition, the existing asset pricing literature for banks or financial firms typically 
neglects beta as a pricing factor because it has been shown in the non-financial firms that beta 
seems irrelevant. My results in the banking sector demonstrate a strong and convex non-linear 
relationship between bank stocks returns and beta. Bank stock excess returns initially 
decreases with the increase of beta, but picks up again once beta becomes sufficiently small. 
Therefore, unlike in the non-financial world where beta is shown to be negligible, the 
performance of bank stocks is likely to bear a close relationship with beta. 
All in all, the central message of this chapter is that some established asset pricing 
factors in the non-financial industries do not seem to directly apply to the banking industry. 
The meaningful decomposition or prediction of expected bank stock returns may benefit from 
the theories of financial intermediation and banking economics and from the inclusion of some 
bank-specific pricing factors.  
 In the context of the current financial crisis, the findings in this chapter that leverage 
may play an important role the pricing of bank stocks seems justifiable. One of the causes for 
the troubles at many banks during the subprime crisis is the dangerously low level of capital 
many banks had prior to the crisis. As a consequence, many banks became insolvent or, in the 
case of some major U.S. banks and many European banks, had to rely on government capital 
injection to stay away from bankruptcy. The high excess stock returns associated with high 
leverage during the twenty years prior to the subprime crisis shown in Chapter 2 suggest that 
investors of bank equities may have inadvertently signaled that high leverage is a virtue which 
makes banks more valuable. During the subprime crisis, such a virtue instantly turned sour as 
many investors dumped stocks of high leveraged banks. Should future research investigate the 
relationship between bank stock returns and leverage during the crisis period, my suspicion is 
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that a strong but negative relationship is conceivable. What the nature of this relationship will 
be after the dust of the current crisis has settled remains to be seen. Nonetheless, one important 
message from chapter 2 is that bank leverage is crucial to the welfare of bank equity investors. 
1.3 Hedging with derivatives 
 
The explosive growth of the derivative market and the promulgation of the use of derivative 
products by banks have been the center of debate for both policy-makers and practitioners for 
many years. The debate has intensified especially after the bankruptcy of Barings Bank, the 
debacle of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and, more recently, the subprime crisis. 
The concern regarding derivatives has mainly been with their complexity and the fact that 
derivative users are very much intertwined, which increased the likelihood of systemic risks. 
Systemic risks mean that the failure of one counterparty of derivatives leads to a cascade of 
bank failures because the derivative contracts that connect these banks cannot be paid out by 
the failed bank.  
A more fundamental question that has received less attention is why banks use 
derivatives in the first place and what the relationship is between the use of derivatives and the 
day-to-day operations of banks. This is a more fundamental question because if there is a close 
relationship between derivatives and basic bank functions such as loan initiation, then the 
impact of derivatives on the economy will not only be visible during crises but in normal times 
as well. 
 Chapter 3 of this thesis examines the use of interest rate and credit derivatives for 
hedging by U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). One emphasis of this chapter is on the 
contribution of banks’ loan making activities, both on- and off- balance sheet, to the likelihood 
of use of derivatives for hedging purposes. It is shown that while the on-balance sheet loans 
have little to do with banks engagement in interest rate and credit derivative, the off-balance 
sheet loan commitment appears to significantly increase the likelihood of a bank to become a 
user of interest rate derivative for hedging. In addition, there is a significantly negative 
relationship between interest rates and term spread and the likelihood of hedging with interest 
rate derivatives. This phenomenon should be explained by the effect of interest rate 
movements on maturity gap. As interest rate rises, the market value of any maturity gap, 
positive or negative, becomes smaller which reduces interest rate risk exposure and the need 
for hedging. This explanation is supported by the evidence that the relationship between 
interest rate and the likelihood of hedging with interest rate derivative is significantly negative 
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for banks with both positive and negative maturity gap.  
The use of credit derivatives is mainly associated with banks’ engagement in the 
trading of credit derivatives. Large banks are more likely to be users of credit derivatives. 
More profitable banks, as measured by interest margin, are less likely to be a derivative user 
for hedging. When it comes to the adjustments of credit derivatives, banks that have increased 
use of securitization are also more likely to use more credit derivatives. In other words, 
different off-balance sheet hedging instruments are likely to coexist. 
 In the context of the current financial crisis, the findings of this chapter add to the 
evidence on the impact of derivatives on the real economy. Warren Buffet once labeled 
derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction”. In essence, the danger of derivatives lies 
in their potential to cause a chain reaction of default among all involved parties. The findings 
in this paper imply that the negative spillover from the insolvency of the derivative market can 
easily cause the financing to other industries to dry up, since banks’ ability to roll over their 
existing loans to companies greatly depends on derivatives. In hindsight at the time of this 
writing, such findings may sound obvious or even outdated. However, when the first version 
of chapter 3 was completed in late 2006, the idea that derivatives, the feat of financial 
engineering that is creating massive profit and liquidity at the time for banks and borrowers, 
could cause the financial market to dry up sounded suspicious at the best.  
1.4 Bank liquidity creation 
 
For a number of reasons, the European banking industry is an interesting area for empirical 
banking research. First, the European financial markets are considered bank-based systems 
where banks are the major liquidity providers for business. Whether or not such a bank-
oriented financial market translates into stronger capability of European banks in liquidity 
creation is an interesting empirical question. Second, the European banking sector has been 
remarkably transformed in the past couple of decades by regulatory developments. For 
example, the Second Banking Directive adopted by European Union (EU) in 1995 allowed 
banks to freely operate in other EU countries by setting up branches or directly offering a full 
range of banking services. These regulations have implications on both the level of 
competition of the banking sector as a whole and the competitive position of individual banks 
in particular. It is of great policy relevance to investigate how the liquidity creation activities 
of banks are affected by the policy developments and the resulting competition issues. Next, 
the attitudes towards banking stability held by European and the U.S. governments are quite 
different. While it is a firm belief in Europe that banks in Europe will not be allowed to fail so 
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that depositors would suffer losses, across the Atlantic, bank failures in the U.S. take place 
more often. Such a contrast in regulatory ideologies raises the question regarding the role of 
banks’ own equity capital as a cushion against bank failures or banking risks in general. Given 
the debate currently undergoing that aims at requiring banks to hold more capital, the 
empirical substantiation of this issue has profound policy implications.  
In Chapter 4, we investigate the above issues using a unique and comprehensive 
dataset that covers the majority of banks in EU for the period between 1998 and 2004. The 
most important questions we address include how much liquidity European banks create, what 
is the relationship between bank equity capital and liquidity creation in Europe, and how bank 
liquidity creation relates to the competitive environment of the banking industry.  
The results can be summarized as follows. First, our liquidity creation measurement 
corroborates with the literature on financial system comparison that suggests European 
economies rely more on bank financing. The amount of liquidity created by European banks as 
a percentage of GDP is much higher than banks in the U.S.  
Next, we investigate the relationship between bank equity and liquidity creation and 
thereby shed light on the potential impact of the recent shift in regulatory focus on 
strengthening bank capital base. Our results show that increased bank equity capital would 
substantially reduce bank liquidity creation by all banks across Europe. Such a conclusion 
could be understood in the context of consistent government interventions and protections 
during banking crisis by European governments. Such a regulatory environment results in an 
ideology that banks will never be allowed to fail, which in turn reduces the (perceived) 
necessity to hold equity capital. 
Additionally, we show that the market share of individual banks has a significantly 
positive relationship with liquidity creation. We take this as evidence on the stronger ability 
possessed by banks with larger market share to retain customers and inter-temporally smooth 
interest charges so that risky and illiquid loans can find financing (Petersen and Rajan 1995). 
More investments in these loans in turn increase bank liquidity creation. 
 In view of the current financial crisis, the most relevant connection with Chapter 4 
concerns the relationship between equity capital and liquidity creation. As the subprime crisis 
unfolds, central banks around the globe and international organizations such as Bank for 
International Settlements have been arguing for the importance of bank equity capital and 
formulating new regulatory frameworks that aim at strengthening the capital structure of banks. 
Even though Chapter 4 does not negate the merit in the new regulatory emphasis, it points to a 
potentially undesirable side effect at least in Europe. Specifically, we show that in Europe 
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there is a significantly negative association between equity capital and liquidity creation, 
which might be caused by the perception that European governments are more protective of 
their banks and would not allow banks to fail and depositors to suffer losses. Such a belief has 
also been substantiated by the many rescues of failing banks led by European governments in 
the past. Requiring banks to hold more capital of their own may not be credible and effective 
in such an environment because banks expect the government to bail them out during crisis. 
Forcing banks to hold more capital may reduce their liquidity creation and slow down 
economic growth and recovery.  
Ironically, during the aftermath of the subprime crisis, almost all major European 
governments yet again provided support of various kinds to prevent their banks from failing, 
which may further strengthen banks’ future reliance on the government and reduce their 
incentive to hold capital. Forcing banks to hold more capital may become even more 
counterproductive during the recovery from the current crisis. It will be interesting to observe 
the future development of the European banking industry and the regulatory response. 
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Chapter 2 
The Cross-Section of Expected Bank Stock Returns 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature on the cross-sectional determination of bank stock returns is relatively limited. 
Banks or financial sectors in general are excluded by most studies of stock returns because the 
values of some pricing factors for these firms are very different from other firms traded in the 
stock market. For example, Fama and French (1992) exclude financial firms because “…the 
high leverage that is normal for these firms probably does not have the same meaning as for 
nonfinancial firms…”.  Yet the financial sector, in particular banking firms, forms a vital part 
of the economy and their shares also occupy a large percentage of the total market 
capitalization of most stock markets in the developed economies. The total omission of these 
firms cannot be justified.  
The highly limited amount of literature that focuses on the stock returns of banks has to 
some extent contributed to the remedy of such an omission. Barber and Lyon (1997) use 
financial firms’ stock returns as a hold-out sample to validate the findings by Fama and French 
(1992) that size and book-to-market ratios have significant relation with stock returns. 
However, this paper did not attempt to tap into the vast literature on financial intermediation 
and banking economics in order to discover independently the relevant or additional pricing 
factors for financial firms. Rather, it is an exercise that takes for granted the existing pricing 
factors found in nonfinancial sectors and applies them in the financial sectors. Therefore, it is 
likely that some important pricing factors relevant for bank stocks have been overlooked.  
Cooper et al (2003) take further steps by investigating a variety of bank-specific 
variables in their study of bank stock returns. Their primary focus however is not on the 
examination or determination of pricing factors that underlie bank stock returns. Rather, the 
paper is targeted at the source of variation of bank stock returns. As a result, the authors apply 
the changes of several potential pricing factors to their study of the variation of stock returns 
and thereby try to determine if the cause of banks stock return predictability is due to over- or 
under- reaction by investors to the variation of the pricing factors.  
Therefore there seems to be a gap in the study of bank stock returns. On the one hand, 
we have evidence showing that the pricing factors found to be useful in the study of 
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nonfinancial stock returns also seem to apply to bank stock returns (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
On the other hand, Cooper et al (2003) directly go to the study of investors’ reaction to the 
variations of certain pricing factors. What is missing in between is the exploration and 
documentation of the bank-specific variables that could contribute to the explanations of 
expected bank stock returns.  
This paper takes the first step to fill in this gap. We start by reviewing the literature on 
financial intermediation and banking economics to summarize the special features of financial 
institutions. We pay special attention to the literature that relates to bank equity capital and its 
association with other bank balance sheet items and thereby hypothesize the existence and 
direction of pricing relationships. Next we empirically investigate if indeed the hypothesized 
pricing relationship can be verified with real data. To this end, we collect comprehensive bank 
balance sheet data for all publicly traded banks in the U.S., which are also within the scope of 
the Bank Holding Company database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Our empirical approach follows closely the classical style of Fama and French (1992). 
Specifically, we form portfolios based on the intersections of the ranking of hypothesized 
pricing factors in the universe of U.S. banks and calculate the average stock returns of the 
portfolios. This approach allows us to see the effect of a particular pricing factor on stock 
prices individually or conditional on other potentially compounding factors. The next step is to 
more rigorously determine the sensitivity of stock prices to the pricing factors by means of 
regression analysis. The findings in the ranking-based portfolio approach are herein 
corroborated by regressing the stock returns on the hypothesized pricing factors in a univariate 
or multivariate context. 
At the minimum, our results point out a few abnormalities compared with literature in 
non-financial stocks. We found that a simple measurement of bank leverage calculated from 
bank total assets and total equity capital is monotonically related to future bank stock excess 
returns. In the context of regression analysis, leverage is a strong explanatory variable that 
consistently has positive signs in both univariate and multivariate settings and remains robust 
across different model specifications. We also examined other conceivable measurements for 
leverage, such as one that includes illiquid liabilities, and risk adjusted leverage ratios that 
weigh the components of equity and assets according to the Basel II framework. These 
alternative leverage ratios do have consistent signs with the simple total assets-total equity 
based leverage ratio, but the later one has the highest level of statistical significance. The 
implication of this finding is that investors may have rewarded banks with high levels of 
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leverage and thereby signal to the banks to hold less equity capital1.  
Next, unlike the existing literature that assumes the irrelevance of beta based on the 
findings in the non-financial sectors (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon 1997, Cooper et al 2003, and 
Viale et al 2009), our results show that beta seems to be an important pricing factor for bank 
stocks. Beta by itself seems to be a strong and negative predictor of future bank stock returns. 
Furthermore, we find that the relationship between beta and bank stock returns appear to be 
nonlinear and convex. Returns initially fall with the rise of beta. But after beta has reached a 
certain threshold, stock returns begin to increase together with beta. Regression analyses 
validate this convex relationship. Beta itself always has a strong and negative sign in both 
univariate and multivariate settings and across different model specifications. The square of 
beta however consistently has positive and significant sign, signaling a nonlinear and convex 
function.  
Finally, we investigate the pricing effect of bank size. Unlike the existing literature for 
both non-financial and financial stocks that mostly measure size by market capitalization, we 
also take into account the size of a banks total balance sheet. We find a consistently negative 
relationship between bank total assets and future stock returns. The link between market 
capitalization and stock returns however is negligible. We interpret such a finding as a 
supporting evidence for the diversification discount theory maintained by Laeven and Levine 
(2007) stating that large and more diversified banks are worth less than the sum of their 
constituent parts if separated. This relationship between size and bank stock returns seems to 
differ from what Fama and French (1992) document in the non-financial sectors, which 
absorbs the relationship between beta and stock returns. In other words, in the sample of Fama 
and French (1992), size substitutes beta. In our study however, the relationship between size 
and bank stock returns is persistently strong irrespective of beta.  
By and large, one central message of this paper is that bank stocks very likely have 
their special characteristics and underlying determinants that fundamentally differ from non-
financial stocks. Therefore, the treatment of bank stocks in the same way as non-financials 
may be questionable. More specifically, the pricing factors relevant to nonfinancial stocks are 
not necessarily crucial to bank stocks. The reverse is also true, as indicated by the 
aforementioned importance of leverage and bank stock returns, that important pricing factors 
for banks may not be relevant to non-financials. Therefore, the main contribution of this paper 
                                                        
1
 One example of such tales is the takeover of ABN AMRO by a consortium led by Royal Bank of Scotland. 
In the annual shareholder assembly in 2007 prior to the takeover, 95% of RBS shareholders gave their 
favorite vote to the highly leveraged bid, which eventually brought the bank into government ownership 
during the financial crisis of 2008/2009. 
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is our systematic discovery and documentation of asset pricing factors specific to banks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
existing literature on financial intermediation and banking economics that may be relevant for 
the study of bank stocks. In the meantime we also hypothesize the direction of the impact of 
the potential pricing factors extracted from the theories. In Section 2.3, we describe the data 
sources, data collection and cleansing criteria, and procedures for portfolio formation. Section 
2.4 shows the results of the summary statistics of the portfolios and the outcome of some 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between bank stock returns and the pricing factors. 
The regression results are shown in Section 2.5. The results from robustness tests are shown in 
Section 2.6. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
In this section, we extract from the existing banking literature the fundamental variables that 
may have implications on the performance and riskiness of banks and hence can be conceived 
as potential pricing factors in our later study of the cross-section of bank stock returns. In 
contrast to Fama and French (1992, 1993) who focus on the pricing factors primarily rooted 
from the non-financial sectors, our search for the fundamental variables pay close attention to 
the financial sector in general and the banking industry in particular. Also in contrast to 
Cooper et al (2003) who devoted considerable attention to such “exotic” variables as 
derivatives, loan commitments that are mostly present and relevant to a very limited number 
of banks (Minton et al 2008 and Chapter 3 of this thesis), we stick to the most basic balance 
sheet variables that are easy to find and construct and also relevant to all banks. After all, it is 
our goal to shed light on the relationship between bank fundamentals and the cross-section of 
bank stock returns and thereby fill in the gap in the current literature in this regard. 
The first fundamental variable we extract is the leverage of banks. In the context of the 
banking industry, leverage, i.e., the extent to which the bank is financed by borrowed funds 
instead of equity capital, has considerably different implications than in other industries. 
Diamond (1984) suggests that the optimal capital structure for banks is to be financed with 
primarily deposits and very little equity capital. This is because of the incentive problems 
between depositors and banks as the intermediary between the borrowers and the depositors. 
This incentive problem relates to the profit sharing between banks, who closely monitor the 
behavior of the borrowers regarding their observations of the loan contract and ensure their 
repayment, and the depositors, who ultimately provide the funds the borrowers receive 
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through the banks. Deposit as a form of debt is the optimal financing source because it ensures 
banks to pass on the profits from the borrowers to the depositors. If the bank refuses to comply, 
the depositors would withdraw their funds from the bank and force the bank to liquidate 
otherwise profitable loans prematurely and end up with zero or negative returns. Diamond and 
Rajan (2000) further show that a fragile bank capital structure that primarily consists of 
deposit is beneficial for the liquidity creation function of banks as financial intermediaries. 
The intuition is that deposits are subject to runs, which can be triggered if banks hold off their 
monitoring or collection effort with regard to the loans made to borrowers or if banks withhold 
profits earned from the loans. Therefore, a fragile bank balance sheet alleviates the incentive 
related agency problems between depositors and the bank, and in turn helps maintain the 
viability of banks. All these suggest that a highly leveraged bank balance sheet should be 
helpful for the role of banks as financial intermediaries and liquidity providers in the economy.  
However, the equity capital of banks is also recognized as an important resource when 
it comes to absorbing risks, in particular the idiosyncratic type of risks (see, e.g., Froot and 
Stein 1998 and Diamond and Rajan 2000). Banking theories posit that the risks associated 
with the loans to borrowers consist of two parts, systematic risks such as interest rate risks and 
idiosyncratic risks such as credit risks. The former is thought to be well understood by the 
market and therefore can easily be laid off by the available financial instruments such as 
futures or other types of hedging products. These products are also considered fairly priced 
since the markets these instruments are traded in are fairly liquid in general. The result on 
capital structure is that no equity capital is necessary to absorb this kind of risks. The 
idiosyncratic type of risks however cannot be easily communicated to the general market. 
Within this category are the risks of a borrower to default or to be downgraded. The 
knowledge about these risks can only be accumulated by banks in the course of interacting 
with the borrowers for issuing and monitoring loan contracts. Consequently, no fairly priced 
hedging instrument is available in the market that allows banks to lay off this type of risk as 
outsiders have no access to the knowledge about the borrowers that the bank privately 
acquired over time. The market for credit risk-related derivatives is also considerably less 
liquid in that most such derivatives are custom-made contracts (OCC 2005). It is worth 
noticing that these outsiders also include the depositors who are not involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the banks and hence also have no knowledge about the (change in) quality of the 
borrowers. As a result, the bank must hold capital of its own to prepare for the event, for 
example, when the borrowers have temporary difficulties in meeting the loan repayment but 
are expected to improve and be able to repay the loan and interests in the future. In such an 
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event, the loan has positive net present value to the bank, but the depositors, with no 
knowledge about the quality of the borrower or/and nature of its business, would not be able to 
judge the viability of the borrower and hence will withdraw their deposits. The bank would 
only be able to exploits its experience and realize the benefits thereby if it has capital of its 
own. Here the role of equity capital is crucial in keeping the borrowers afloat and in allowing 
the bank to benefit from its knowledge about the borrowers. However, as maintained by 
Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Rajan (2000), equity capital should be kept at the 
minimum level mainly for two reasons. First, idiosyncratic risks can be substantially reduced 
by diversification. Second, excessive amount of equity capital will allow the bank to withhold 
profit it earns from the borrower or to ask a bigger share of the profit ex post from the 
depositors, thereby giving rise to the agency problem between the bank and the depositors. 
The bottom line is that equity capital is beneficial, but too much of it would be counter-
productive. 
Equity capital also has the function in mitigating the liquidity risks intrinsic in the 
banking operation. Here liquidity risk arises when the borrowers and the depositors need 
funding at the same time and consequently cannot be both honored had the bank been financed 
entirely by deposits, in which situation, the depositors will get their deposits back but the 
borrower will lose its funding. Equity capital can serve as a buffer in situations like this and 
satisfies the liquidity needs on both sides of the balance sheet. It is worth mentioning that 
liquidity risk differs from the idiosyncratic risk sketched above as it does not involve any 
difference in opinion regarding the unobservable risks of the borrower. Liquidity risk merely 
arises as a consequence of the timing of the liquidity needs by both the borrowers and the 
depositors. Kashyap et al (2002) and Gatev and Strahen (2005) show that banks can utilize 
their equity capital, among other instruments, in fulfilling the liquidity needs on both sides of 
their balance sheet. 
To summarize the above, leverage has some direct implications on the performance of 
banks. On the one hand, from the perspective of the depositors and the economy in general, a 
highly leveraged bank capital structure, or a bank capital structure that is primarily composed 
with deposits, is beneficial to the profit appropriation by depositors and the liquidity creation 
and financial intermediation functions of banks. In this aspect, a fragile bank capital structure 
ensures the relevance of banks in the economy and in turn their long term viability. On the 
other hand, from the perspective of the owners or shareholders of banks, equity capital creates 
buffers against unexpected credit or liquidity risks and also enhances the bargaining power of 
the shareholders in profit sharing. All these advantages however come at the cost of 
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heightened agency problem with the depositors, which makes it more likely for depositors to 
run on the bank every time the bank attempts to withhold effort or profit. The asset pricing 
implication of these competing roles of equity capital in banking theories remains an empirical 
question. How desirable bank shares are to investors conditioning on the leverage of banks 
could conceivably depend on how necessary the equity capital is to risk mitigation and profit 
appropriation. In this sense there may be a negative relationship between bank stock returns 
and leverage as higher leverage increases bank risks and reduces bank’s bargaining power in 
profit sharing. On the flip side, equity capital not only is a more expensive source of financing 
than deposits but may trigger the run by depositors. As shareholders can benefit from lower 
equity capital ratio in this argument, there would be a positive relationship between bank stock 
returns and leverage. Finally, a non-linear relationship is also conceivable with bank stock 
returns being optimized at certain levels of leverage. 
In this paper, we will use several alternative measures to proxy leverage. First, we use 
as the most straightforward form of leverage the ratio of total equity to total assets2. The 
assumption here is that all non-equity claims on the bank constitute to leverage. Second, we 
take into account the Basel II capital regulation framework that also treats time deposits as 
qualified cushion against risks (see, e.g., Saunders and Cornett 2005). The rationale is that 
time deposits cannot be withdrawn quickly and in many cases without penalty charge by the 
depositors. Such restrictions substantially reduce the willingness of the owners of time 
deposits to run on the bank. In our second leverage measurement, we exclude time deposits 
from total liability and calculate the ratio of the remaining amount of liabilities to total assets. 
Next, we take the consideration of the Basel II capital regulation framework one step further 
and measure leverage as the ratio of tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets (RWA). In so 
doing, we explicitly take into account the risk profiles of the components of balance sheet as 
specified by Basel II regulation. In the spirit of Basel II, the gross ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets is not sufficiently informative once the different levels of risk associated with 
different financial claims are considered. In the asset part of bank balance sheet holdings such 
as U.S. government bills carry no credit and liquidity risks as they can be easily liquidated at 
fair prices. Hence, banks’ holding of these securities do not add to the burden on equity capital 
when anticipating the unexpected needs for cash due to liquidity or credit risks. Therefore, U.S. 
government securities do not contribute to RWA. On the other hand, loans to small-medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) and certain derivative products expose the banks to at least the 
                                                        
2
 Strictly speaking, our proxy for leverage is in fact a measure for capital strength. But a high capital ratio is 
the same as a low leveraged balance sheet, and vice versa. 
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outstanding amount. These assets carry 100% or more weight in calculating RWA. The same 
principle is also used when considering the equity part of bank balance sheets. In this third 
leverage measurement, we include only Tier 1 capital in considering the degree of leverage of 
a bank. Equity capital including preferred shares and retained earnings are the primary 
component of Tier 1 capital as they are the least senior claims against the bank and their 
holders are the first to be wiped out in case of insolvency. Hence Tier 1 capital is usually 
thought of as the core capital of banks. In our last leverage measurement, we also consider 
RWA but use total risk capital, which in addition to Tier 1 core capital also includes qualified 
liabilities such as the time deposits mentioned above. As it turned out and will be discussed 
more in depth later, it is the most straightforward measurement of leverage, i.e., the simple 
ratio of total equity to total assets, that demonstrate the most visible and monotonic 
relationship with bank stock returns. There is a clear positive (negative) association between 
bank stock returns and leverage (level of equity capital). This implies that the shareholders of 
bank stocks value a more fragile bank capital structure or they dislike the use of more equity 
as a more expensive source of financing. 
The second pricing factor we analyze is beta. In the framework of Fama and French 
(1992), beta, though finally shown to be negligible in pricing the stocks of non-financial firms, 
is considered a fundamental pricing factor to start with and receives extensive treatment and 
examination. Probably because beta is shown to have indiscernible implications for asset 
pricing in non-financial sectors, later efforts in the financial sectors generally exclude beta 
from their radar (see e.g., Barber and Lyon 1997, Cooper et al 2003, and Viale 2009). 
Therefore, there has not been any evidence that substantiates or documents the relationship 
between beta and bank stock returns, existent or otherwise. In this paper, we follow the 
procedures of Fama and French (1992) to systematically investigate the relationship between 
beta and bank stock returns. We document a wide spectrum of betas among bank stocks 
ranging from much higher than one to negative. Correspondingly there is a convex 
relationship between beta and bank stock returns with the stock returns initially dropping as 
beta decreases but picking up again when beta approaches zero and becomes negative3. Our 
findings complement Fama and French in the banking sector and suggest the classical 
relationship between beta and stock returns may be relevant to bank stocks. 
                                                        
3
 This evidence to some extents supports the classical asset pricing theories of Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), and Black (1972) that beta is an important determinant of the cross-section of stock returns. 
However, unlike these theories that predict a positive and linear relationship between beta and stock 
returns our finding suggests a convex relationship. In a sense, our finding is consistent with Markowitz 
(1959) in that stocks with negative beta offer stronger diversification potential and therefore are more 
valuable to the investors. 
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Size is the third variable we investigate. In the non-financial context of Fama and 
French (1992), size is shown to have important asset pricing implications. From the banking 
theories reviewed above, it is conceivable that size has some implications on bank 
performance that is different from non-financial firms. In particular, Diamond (1984) and 
Froot and Stein (1998) point out the importance of diversification in bank capital management 
as well as risk management. In these theories, banks should hedge their exposures to 
systematic risks such as interest rate or exchange risks by means of financial instruments such 
as derivatives. As to idiosyncratic risks that no derivatives can perfectly eliminate, banks 
should resort to diversification for minimizing these risks. Intuitively, the source of 
diversification can come from expanding the scope of bank operation in terms of geography, 
demography and/or offered product/services. All these possible sources of diversification 
naturally lead to a larger bank balance sheet and thereby increase the size of the banks.  
Therefore, it may be straightforward to hypothesize that larger banks are more 
advantageous than their smaller counterparts to weather unexpected losses from those 
idiosyncratic risks. If so, the size premium observed by Fama and French (1992 and 1993) 
would be reversed in the banking industry as larger banks benefits from stronger 
diversification capabilities while holding all else equal. However, Laeven and Levine (2007) 
cast doubt on the benefit of diversification by banks. They empirically demonstrate that there 
is actually a diversification discount in financial conglomerates meaning that the sum of 
multiple activities in one such conglomerate is worth less than the sum of these individual 
activities left alone. The implication of this finding on bank stock returns would then be the 
opposite of the size premium hypothesis based on the diversification theory. We would expect 
a size discount that penalizes banks with bigger size. In this paper, we try to clarify the 
contradictory hypotheses from these different streams of literature.  
We investigate the relationship between bank size and their stock returns and 
considered two alternative measures of size, total market capitalization and total assets. The 
use of former is meant to compare with the findings by Fama and French (1992) in the non-
financial sectors and Barber and Lyon (1997) in the financial sectors even though we have no 
prior reason to believe that market capitalization is a better proxy for a bank’s capability of 
diversification then total assets. We therefore also use total assets in our analysis. A 
measurement such as total assets that signals the overall level of activities might be a better 
proxy for the level of diversification by banks. As it turned out, total assets is a much stronger 
explanatory variable than market capitalization in predicting bank stock returns and the 
predicting relationship is significantly negative, in favor of the diversification discount 
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hypothesis. 
In addition to the aforementioned potential pricing factors, we also investigate the ratio 
of book equity to market equity (BE/ME) and earnings per share (E/P). These variables have 
been documented in the earlier literature as having important asset pricing implications for 
both non-financial firms and financial firms (see, e.g., Fama and French 1992 and 1993, 
Barber and Lyon 1997, and Cooper et al 2003). However we must admit that we are not aware 
of a solid theoretical foundation in the banking literature on which these variables could be 
expected to play a role on the performance of banks. Therefore, these variables are treated as 
control variables in our regressions. 
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that our aim in this paper is to find potential 
pricing factors for bank stocks from existing banking theories and to empirically test their 
performance with real data using a well-established methodology for studying the cross-
section of stock returns. This aim obliges us to focus our attention on two major areas. First, 
we focus on those variables that are central in the banking literature and have conceivable 
implications on bank performance. Leverage and size fall into this group while BE/ME, E/P 
and even beta do not. Second, we focus on those variables that are likely to be relevant to a 
majority of banks rather than a limited subset. In other words, the chosen variables should be 
available for most banks and years in our sample. The reason for this focus is our desire to 
draw some conclusions on the pricing of the banking sector in general rather than a selected 
group. The implication of this focus is that we do not include such variables as the use of 
derivatives, off-balance sheet assets or income, and hedging related instruments. These 
activities are likely to be present in and relevant for a small subset of banks, most likely the 
largest banks, and can hardly be considered universal pricing factors for all (listed) banks.  
 
2.3 Portfolio formation 
 
In this section, we describe the procedures we use for forming the portfolios of bank stocks. 
We collect the stock holding period return data from CRSP for non-governmental depository 
institutions only, i.e., companies whose first three digits of SIC code are 602, 603, 606, 608 , 
609 and 671. From CRSP we also retrieve the number of shares outstanding and the per share 
price in order to calculate market capitalization. We collect from Compustat the data of such 
variables as total assets, total equity, and E/P. To complement Compustat, we also add the data 
related to risk-adjusted variables such as tier 1 capital, total risk capital and RWA found in the 
Y9-C report database for bank holding companies maintained by the Federal Bank of Chicago. 
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With these three data sources, we also face three different data frequencies. While CRSP and 
Compustat data items are available on a monthly and annual frequency respectively, the Y9-C 
report data is updated every quarter. As a result, we must form and reconstruct portfolios based 
on potential pricing factors that have different frequency of observations.   
We essentially form and reconstruct the portfolios on a monthly basis. In a given month, 
whether or not the portfolios are reassembled based on certain bank characteristics depend on 
the source of data of those characteristics. Variables from CRSP are available monthly and 
hence allow us to reconstruct the portfolios every month based on the variables available there. 
Every month, all pricing factors that have CRSP’s monthly data element are updated using the 
value of the previous month and the portfolios are reconstructed using this updated value. For 
example, the BE/ME ratio has two elements, the BE part is retrieved from Compustat and 
therefore remains the same for a year. The ME part however is updated monthly to reflect the 
new stock price and number of shares outstanding in the last month. In turn the portfolios are 
reconstructed according to this updated BE/ME ratio. The variables from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago only have quarterly frequency. Therefore, the reconstruction of the portfolio 
based on variables from the Y9-C Report is carried out every quarter based on the value of the 
previous quarter. This means if in a month both Compustat/CRSP and Federal Reserve updates 
are available, the reconstruction of the portfolios takes into account all variables. If however in 
a month only the Compustat/CRSP update is available, the portfolios are reconstructed based 
only on the Compustat/CRSP update.  
As far as Compustat data is concerned, like Fama and French (1992) we allow for six 
months between the construction of the portfolio and the recording of the bank stock returns 
so that our procedures resemble real-time portfolio constructions. For the Y9-C report data, we 
allow an interval of a quarter between forming the portfolio and the recording of the stock 
holding period return. In other words, in a give month the stock return is associated with the 
Compustat data six month ago, CRSP data of the previous month, and the Y9-C report data of 
the previous quarter. In the same quarter the value of the variables from the Y9-C report 
remain the same. In the first month of the quarter, the portfolios are reconstructed using the 
previous quarterly Y9-C Report. The six month lag applied to Compustat data is known to be 
reasonable and conservative enough in terms of data availability for real-time portfolio 
formation. The quarterly lag for using the Y9-C report should also be sensible because the 
update normally happens in the second month of a quarter.  
Unlike Barber and Lyon (1997) who form portfolios based on the cutoff points created 
from the nonfinancial firms and then place both financial and non-financial stocks in these 
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portfolios and then keep only the financial stocks in the final dataset, we form portfolios 
purely based the cutoff points created from the selected banking firms. The rationale behind 
this procedure is that the financial analysts who follow these stocks are more likely to do so in 
the context of this particular industry or sector. It is a standard practice in the financial analysis 
industry that firms or stocks of a particular industry are assigned to specialized analyst, which 
implies banking stocks are followed and analyzed with other banking stocks. Therefore, 
portfolios formed on the basis of banking stocks alone should be more reasonable and closer 
to actual business practice for the analysis of bank stock returns. 
 
2.4 Preliminary analysis on bank stock returns and bank characteristics: one-way sort 
 
In this section we describe the pattern of bank stock returns over the rankings of bank 
characteristics. We form five portfolios based on the chosen bank characteristics of the 
previous month and calculate the average excess return of the portfolios in the following 
month. The number of portfolios we form is less than Fama and French (1992) and Barber and 
Lyon (1997). This choice is justified by our much smaller sample than the earlier studies. To 
maintain a reasonably sizable sample size within each portfolio, we inevitably must opt for a 
smaller number of portfolios (see, e.g., Viale et al 2009 for the same choice). The average 
returns of the rank-based portfolios are then calculated month by month and for all available 
months.  Similar to Fama and French (1992) the bank stocks in a characteristics-rank 
portfolio in a given month are not necessarily the same as in other months. The ranking of the 
stocks based on the chosen characteristics can vary from month to month, which may move 
certain stocks among portfolios.  
 
2.4.1 Leverage 
 
Table I reports the average excess returns of portfolios of bank stocks formed on four 
measures of leverage. The first two nominal leverage measures are calculated directly from 
bank balance sheet value of total equity, time deposits and total assets. A smaller ratio of total 
equity to total assets implies a high leverage, and vice versa. The second nominal leverage 
measure treats time deposits as equity and thereby producing a series of smaller leverage 
measure compared with the first leverage measure that consists of only equity.  
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Table I 
Average bank stock returns for portfolios formed on nominal or risk-adjusted leverage measures: 
January 1987 to December 2007 
Portfolios are formed every month based on the most recently available information for each of the leverage 
ratios. The mean excess stock return is calculated by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill ratio from the 
monthly holding period return from CRSP; Total equity, time deposit and Total assets are collected from 
Compustat; all data items for the two risk adjusted leverage ratios are from the Y-9C Report of bank holding 
companies maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The sample period is from January 1987 
till December 2007. Leverage 1 is the ratio of total equity to total asset with a high ratio signaling low 
leverage and vice versa. Leverage 2 is similar with Leverage 1 but treats time deposits as equity. Risk 
adjusted leverage 1 and 2 use Tier 1 capital and total riskcap (total risk capital) divided by RWA (risk 
weighted assets) respectively to measure the degree of bank leverage. 
 
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Leverage 1 Risk adjusted leverage 1
Total equity/Total assets 0.12      0.10     0.09      0.08      0.06        Tier1/RWA 0.19       0.13       0.12       0.10      0.09       
Mean excess return (%) 0.46      0.48     0.56      0.62      1.00        Mean excess return (%) 0.49       0.67       0.51       0.94      0.48       
Beta 0.69      0.56     0.49      0.46      0.38        Beta 0.63       0.54       0.49       0.48      0.44       
Size:Ln(TA) 19.53    19.94   19.57    19.52    19.19      Size:Ln(TA) 20.77     19.76     19.33     19.17    18.75     
BE/ME 0.49      0.48     0.54      0.56      0.61        BE/ME 0.49       0.46       0.50       0.56      0.67       
ROA 0.01      0.01     0.01      0.01      0.01        ROA 0.01       0.01       0.01       0.01      0.01       
E/P 0.05      0.06     0.06      0.06      0.06        E/P 0.05       0.06       0.06       0.06      0.07       
Number of observations 4,129    4,119   4,126    4,071    4,064      Number of observations 4,133     4,110     4,087     4,108    4,064     
Number of banks 176       206      225       203       171         Number of banks 161        207        224        212       168        
Leverage 2 Risk adjusted leverage 2
(Total equity+time deposit)/Total assets 0.57      0.47     0.41      0.35      0.24        Total riskcap/RWA 0.20       0.15       0.13       0.12      0.11       
Mean excess return (%) 0.43      0.57     0.73      0.73      0.64        Mean excess return (%) 0.48       0.64       0.54       0.57      0.87       
Beta 0.69      0.56     0.49      0.46      0.38        Beta 0.58       0.56       0.54       0.46      0.44       
Size:Ln(TA) 21.22    19.61   19.40    19.09    18.44      Size:Ln(TA) 19.91     20.11     19.68     19.28    18.79     
BE/ME 0.43      0.52     0.53      0.59      0.61        BE/ME 0.48       0.48       0.50       0.54      0.67       
ROA 0.01      0.01     0.01      0.01      0.01        ROA 0.01       0.01       0.01       0.01      0.01       
E/P 0.06      0.06     0.06      0.05      0.06        E/P 0.05       0.06       0.06       0.06      0.07       
Number of observations 4,095    4,080   4,078    4,077    4,043      Number of observations 4,129     4,108     4,094     4,110    4,061     
Number of banks 191       207      198       214       165         Number of banks 174        210        232        236       204        
 
 
In the risk-adjusted leverage measures, we use the risk-weighted capital or assets that 
are calculated using the Basel II weighting scheme. As explained in the literature review part, 
all these leverage ratios from different angles measure the extent to which a bank is geared up 
or, in other words, how strong the bank’s capital base is. Table I shows that there is a clear 
monotonically negative relationship between equity capital ratio and stock returns for the first 
leverage ratio. In other words, the relationship between the first leverage measurement and the 
excess stock returns is clearly positive. As banks equity ratio decreases or leverage increases, 
bank stock returns become higher, and vice versa. Such a relationship seems to suggest that 
bank stock investors consider highly leveraged banks more valuable than the banks holding 
more equity. It can also suggest that banks that use their equity capital more efficiently, 
signaled by the amount of asset they can maintain for a given amount of equity capital, are 
expected to be more profitable. Therefore, in light of the financial crisis of the 2008/2009 
period and the exploding leverage experienced by many banks prior to the crisis, our finding 
suggests the market has imprudently rewarded and in turn exacerbated banks’ use of more 
leverage. Arguably, for quite some time prior to the crisis, investors considered high leverage 
as a sign of efficiency and earning power instead of potential vulnerability in times of financial 
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distress. The second leverage measurement however does not offer a clear ordering of bank 
stock returns that follows the order of the leverage ratio. This means in the eyes of banks stock 
investors time deposits are not considered the equivalent of bank equity capital that can 
compensate or substitute bank capital base.  
If we measure leverage using the ratio of risk capital to risk weighted assets (RWA), 
the relationship with bank stock returns is not clear. The average excess stock returns do not 
rise or fall monotonically with the risk-adjusted leverage ratios. Under Basel II regulation, 
banks capital ratio is not calculated using book value directly. Instead different weights are 
applied to different assets. For example, risk free assets such as U.S. government securities 
carry zero weight and hence do not contribute to RWA. Equity investments however are 
considered risky and the whole amount is included in RWA. In the middle range, there are 
bonds from well-established and financially sound corporations and government securities 
from other countries that contribute to RWA with different percentage of scaling, which range 
between zero and one. Similar with the asset side of the balance sheet, on which RWA is 
calculated, the items on the liability side of bank balance sheet are also classified according to 
their risk profile and given different weights for calculating the amount of risk capital. The 
risk profile in this situation is to measure how senior the liability claims are. For example, 
equity capital is the most heavily weighted (100%) because equity is the least senior among all 
the financing sources of a bank, which means in times of financial distress or bankruptcy, 
equity investors are the first to absorb the losses. Next in line are the preferred stocks, which 
suffer losses after the common equity is wiped out but before creditors take the cut. Liquid 
deposits such as demand deposits are not considered banks’ capital because they can be 
withdrawn from the banks very quickly and therefore cannot be expected to absorb any losses 
the banks may incur. After weighing and summing up all balance items in this way, the risk-
adjusted leverage of a bank can be calculated by dividing risk-weighted capital by RWA. Our 
tabulation from the one-way sort shows that in general bank stock returns also increases as 
banks’ risk-weighted leverage decreases. In other words, banks that have more risky assets 
relative to their risk-weighted capital are more valuable to investors. However, as can be seen 
in the last portfolio formed on the first risk-adjusted leverage measure, when leverage 
becomes sufficiently high, which is signaled by the low risk adjusted capital ratio, stock 
returns decreased. This implies that contrary to the crude equity capital ratio investors consider 
a low risk-adjusted capital ratio a sign of weakness and vulnerability.  
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2.4.2 Beta 
 
Unlike most existent literature, we also investigate the relationship between beta and bank 
stock returns. Even though Fama and French (1992) in the context of non-financial stocks cast 
severe doubt on the traditional thoughts that there ought to be a strong and positive 
relationship between stock returns and the beta of the stock, no literature has investigated if 
the preposition still holds in bank stocks. Barber and Lyon (1997), Cooper et al (2003), and 
Viale et al (2009) all assume that the absence of beta-return association found by Fama and 
French (1992) also holds in banking or financial stocks and did not attempt to examine beta. In 
this paper, we investigate the validity of this assumption. We follow the methodology of Fama 
and French in estimating beta. Specifically, for each bank stock we regress the monthly excess 
stock returns of the past two years on the market return of the same period and with one month 
lag. The sum of the coefficients is our beta estimate of the stock. The regression on both the 
current and one-month lagged market return is meant to adjust non-synchronous trading as in 
Fama and French (1992). The beta estimate is then used for portfolio formation of the next 
month. The averages of these stock level pre-ranking betas of the portfolios are reported in 
Table II Panel A with the corresponding mean excess return of the portfolios.  
It is interesting to notice the average portfolio beta moves from 1.13, implying a very 
sensitive response to the general market returns, to -0.07, implying a negative co-movement 
with the market. In other words, there are bank stocks that move in the same direction with the 
market when some other bank stocks move almost independently with the market. In the view 
of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972), stock returns are expected to follow the 
size of their betas with high beta being accompanied with high returns and vice versa. The 
relationship between beta and bank stock returns as we show here does not follow such a 
monotonically increasing or decreasing pattern. Our finding is also distinct from Fama and 
French (1992) in the non-financial sector that stock returns do not respond to beta in the sense 
that stock returns are flat across the portfolios formed on beta. What we can observe seems to 
be a nonlinear and convex relationship between bank stock returns and their betas. 
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Table II 
Average bank stock returns for portfolios formed on Pre-ranking beta and size: January 1987 to 
December 2007 
Portfolios are formed every month based on the most recently available information for each ranking 
variable. The mean excess stock return is calculated by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill rate 
from the monthly holding period return from CRSP; pre-ranking beta is portfolio-level average sum of 
coefficients in the regressions of the excess bank stock returns on the current and past month’s excess 
market returns proxied by S&P500 index; Size portfolios 1 are based on the natural log of Total assets, 
collected from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Call Report; Size portfolios 2 are based on the natural 
log of bank market capitalization calculated by multiplying share price by number of shares 
outstanding, both of which are collected from CRSP. The sample period is from January 1987 till 
December 2007. 
 
Low 2 3 4 High
Pre-ranking Beta -0.07 0.25 0.46 0.69 1.13
Mean excess return (%) 0.75 0.51 0.48 0.57 0.80
Size:Ln(TA) 18.70 19.11 19.55 19.86 20.53
BE/ME 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.49
ROA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
E/P 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Number of observations 4,073        4,116      4,130         4,121       4,069     
Number of banks 181           206         255            240          154        
Small 2 3 4 Big
Panel B: Size portfolios 1
Ln (Total assets) 17.60        18.44      19.21         20.20       22.34     
Mean excess return (%) 0.84          0.74        0.85           0.38         0.30       
Beta -0.01        0.28        0.48           0.71         1.12       
BE/ME 0.74          0.59        0.50           0.46         0.39       
ROA 0.01          0.01        0.01           0.01         0.01       
E/P 0.05          0.07        0.06           0.06         0.06       
Number of observations 4,054        4,120      4,129         4,130       4,076     
Number of banks 161           207         224            212          168        
Panel C: Size portfolios 2
Ln (Market capitalization) 12.69        13.38      14.05         14.90       16.98     
Mean excess return (%) 0.69          0.75        0.78           0.63         0.27       
Beta 0.31          0.31        0.56           0.65         0.74       
BE/ME 0.63          0.60        0.53           0.48         0.44       
ROA 0.01          0.01        0.01           0.01         0.01       
E/P 0.05          0.06        0.06           0.06         0.06       
Number of observations 4,013        4,111      4,127         4,108       4,150     
Number of banks 174           210         232            236          204        
Panel A: Beta portfolios
 
 
As beta decreases, stock returns initially also follow the drop and in this sense partially 
comply with the prediction of Black, Sharpe and Lintner. But after beta drops to a certain level, 
in this case after the third beta portfolio, stock returns start to pick up again and end up in the 
last portfolio at a level comparable with the first beta portfolio. Such a convex pattern may 
imply that bank stocks that are very irresponsive to the general market or show negative 
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response to the market offer diversification potential for investors in their own constructions of 
portfolios.  
As a result, these stocks are traded at a premium over stocks that have only medium 
level betas. Effectively, the convex pattern between beta and bank stock returns also suggests 
that for bank stocks the positive relationship between beta and stock returns predicted by 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) seems to hold for bank stock with high to 
medium level betas. But the reverse of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) holds 
for bank stocks with medium to negative betas. 
We showed in Table I that there seems to be a strong monotonically increasing 
relationship between bank leverage and bank stock returns. To cast away the doubt that our 
finding of a convex relationship between beta and returns has something to do with bank 
leverage, we estimate post-ranking bank stock betas for each leverage portfolios. Specifically, 
after forming the portfolios based on leverage each month, we record the bank-level monthly 
excess return of the 5 leverage portfolios for the rest of the sample period. The “post-ranking” 
return series are then used in the regressions on the contemporary and lagged market excess 
returns. The sum of the coefficients becomes the post-ranking beta of the individual bank 
stocks. The individual bank betas within each leverage portfolios are then further ranked into 5 
groups and averaged. Our procedure for estimating the post-ranking beta is essentially the 
same as Fama and French (1992). These average betas are reported in Table III. As can be seen 
in Table III, the order of the pre-ranking beta is almost perfectly replicated with the post-
ranking beta portfolio formation. Within each leverage portfolio, the average post-ranking beta 
of the beta-ranked portfolios almost always follows the order of the pre-ranking betas. This 
means that the convex relationship between beta and excess bank stock returns is independent 
of any effect of leverage on the return series. Later on, we will assign these post-ranking betas 
to the individual stocks in a portfolio and use these betas in regression analysis. 
 
2.4.3 Size 
 
In Table II Panel B and C, we also report the average returns of the portfolios formed on two 
alternative size measurements, total assets and market capitalization, respectively. There seems 
to be a negative relationship between market capitalization and stock returns though the 
relationship is not completely monotonic. Excluding the third rank portfolio, there is a clear 
increasing trend in stock returns as we move from large to small banks. The third rank 
portfolio however has the highest average return of all five portfolios. This might suggest that 
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in the eyes of bank stock investors, small banks are generally more favorable while medium 
sized banks are the most attractive. More specifically, stock returns do not seem to 
monotonically increase as the average size of the banks in a portfolio, measured by market 
capitalization, decreases. Similar pattern can also be observed had we used the book value of 
total assets as size factor. What seems to be the case is that stock returns initially increase as 
we move to smaller banks, but decrease for banks that are sufficiently small.  
 
Table III 
Post-ranking betas of portfolios formed on pre-ranking beta and leverage 
This table reports the average beta of portfolios formed on pre-ranking beta and leverage. The 
portfolios are reconstructed monthly. The beta is calculated at the individual stock level, which is the 
sum of coefficients of the regression of the bank stock excess return in the month after the portfolio 
formation on the excess market return of the current and the previous month. The market return is 
proxied by the S&P500 index. 
 
Ranking by Ranking by pre-ranking beta
Leverage Low 2 3 4 High
Low 0.11 0.24 0.51 1.03 1.33
2 0.01 0.31 0.52 0.85 1.17
3 -0.05 0.26 0.44 0.79 1.01
4 -0.07 0.19 0.41 0.62 0.87
High -0.12 0.08 0.39 0.54 0.93
All -0.02 0.22 0.45 0.77 1.06
Ranking by Ranking by pre-ranking beta
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.01 0.27 0.49 0.61 0.88
2 -0.05 0.28 0.47 0.61 0.92
3 -0.04 0.29 0.47 0.79 1.07
4 0.02 0.26 0.49 0.74 1.2
Big 0.11 0.33 0.48 0.7 1.13
All 0.01 0.29 0.48 0.69 1.04
 
 
This pattern of stock returns to size may be explained by the diversification discount 
observed in large financial conglomerates by Laeven and Levine (2007) where it is shown that 
the combined value of these large financial institutions worth less than the sum of the value of 
their constituent parts. As this diversification discount is likely to decrease with bank size, 
smaller banks’ higher return than their larger counterparts may be explained by the smaller 
discount applied to them. However, as banks become too small, the concern over their 
viability during distress may dominate the decrease in diversification discount, and hence their 
stock returns are reduced by this stress related discount.  
 
2.4.4 Other pricing factors 
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Up till now, we have focused on the potential pricing factors of bank stocks that can be 
extracted from the existing banking literature. We also control for a couple of other pricing 
factor that have been found to be important for explaining the stock returns of non-financial 
firms. In particular, we include earnings per share (E/P) ratio and the ratio of book equity to 
market equity (BE/ME). Both variables can and have been interpreted as proxies for growth 
potential. High E/P ratio, or a relatively low stock price compared to the earning, implies a low 
growth potential. Conversely, a low E/P ratio, which implies that investors are willing to pay 
more for the stock than what the current earning warrants, signals a high growth potential. 
BE/ME has similar interpretations. For comparable levels of book equity, a high BE/ME ratio 
means that investors consider the firm less promising in the future and less valuable as time 
passes by, which is reflected in the low market value of the equity, than firms with low BE/ME 
ratio as the current market value should be discounted future cash flow of the firm/stock.  
Table IV demonstrates the average E/P and BE/ME ratios for the portfolios and their 
corresponding average excess stock returns. The relationship between the ranking of earnings 
per share (E/P) and average stock returns resembles very closely a monotonically positive 
relationship. This is hardly surprising as the earning power per share of stocks is part of the 
total return of the stocks and therefore highly positively correlated with the returns themselves. 
We can also interpret high (low) E/P as low (high) growth prospect. Then the positive 
relationship between E/P ratio and bank stock returns says that investors in bank stocks 
resemble those in utility industries who appreciate the value of the stocks rather than their 
growth opportunities. The positive relationship between E/P and stock returns is also strong 
and robust in Fama and French (1992) and Barber and Lyon (1997).  
The assertion that bank stocks appear to be value stocks can also be seen in the 
response of stock returns to BE/ME ratio. Even though the picture is not as monotonic as for 
E/P ratio, the general trend is that as BE/ME ratio increases, signaling less growth opportunity, 
stock returns also increase, and vice versa. However, it is worth emphasizing that the 
relationship between bank stock returns and E/P as well as BE/ME ratios have no roots in the 
banking theories. Rather they are simple extracted from the asset pricing literature originated 
from the non-financial sectors. In our later regression models, these ratios will enter the 
equations as control variables. 
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Table IV 
Average bank stock returns for portfolios formed on E/P and BE/ME ratios: January 1987 to 
December 2007 
 
Portfolios are formed every month based on the most recently available information for earnings per 
share (E/P) ratio and book value of equity to market value of equity (BE/ME) ratio. The mean excess 
stock return is calculated by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill ratio from the monthly holding 
period return collected from CRSP; market value of equity is calculated as stock prices multiplied by 
number of shares outstanding, both come from CRSP; per share earnings and book value of equity are 
collected from Compustat. All data items are of monthly frequency. The sample period is from January 
1987 till December 2007. 
 
Ranking Low 2 3 4 High
Earnings per share portfolios
E/P 0.02               0.05               0.06               0.07               0.09            
Mean excess return (%) 0.75               0.73               0.66               1.11               1.29            
Beta 0.58               0.52               0.50               0.48               0.49            
Size 19.66             19.73             19.65             19.51             19.19          
BE/ME 0.47               0.47               0.49               0.54               0.72            
ROA 0.01               0.01               0.01               0.01               0.01            
Number of observations 4,072             4,116             4,127             4,123             4,071          
Number of banks 193                214                220                181                207             
Book equity to market equity portfolios
BE/ME 0.29               0.41               0.50               0.60               0.89            
Mean excess return (%) 0.79               0.67               0.66               1.29               1.13            
Beta 0.64               0.54               0.50               0.45               0.45            
Size 20.76             20.12             19.57             19.00             18.30          
E/P 0.05               0.06               0.06               0.07               0.07            
ROA 0.01               0.01               0.01               0.01               0.01            
Number of observations 4,080             4,123             4,125             4,121             4,060          
Number of banks 189                196                235                228                211             
 
 
 
2.4.5 Summary of the above portfolio analyses 
 
The analyses presented till now have shown some quite distinct features of bank stock returns 
that were different from the existing asset pricing literature. We started with the discovery of 
the potential pricing factors for bank stocks from the banking literature rather than applying 
what has been found in the nonfinancial world. As a result we have found some pricing factors 
that were or were not relevant in the nonfinancial context. In particular, we found that the 
simple leverage ratio seems to be a useful bank characteristic that is monotonically and 
positively associated with portfolios of bank stock returns. Higher leverage is shown to be 
strongly and positively associated with bank stock returns, and vice versa. Next, most of the 
existing literature omit beta from their analysis of bank stock returns because beta was found 
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to be irrelevant as a pricing factor for non-financial stocks. We however demonstrate that beta 
seems to have a strong non-linear convex relationship with bank stock returns where the 
highest and lowest betas are associated with comparably high stock returns and mid-level beta 
portfolios have the lowest stock returns. The relationship between beta and stock returns is 
also shown to be robust conditioning on leverage and size. Third, unlike in the non-financial 
world where size is shown to give rise to abnormal stock returns, we cannot see a comparable 
relationship in bank stocks. In particular, bank stock returns do not seem to respond to the 
ranking by size, measured by either market capitalization or total assets, in a stylized pattern 
even though large banks, measured by total assets, are more often associated with lower 
returns. All these results mean that the direct application of findings in the non-financial 
sectors in banking stocks cannot be fully justified and our focus on the banking sector alone 
contributes some sector-specific insights that are likely to be more important to the analysis of 
stock returns of this particular industry. In what follows, we carry out regression analysis that 
investigates bank stock returns in a univariate and multivariate context. 
 
2.5 Regression analysis 
 
In our regression analysis, we model bank stock excess returns using a variety of model 
specifications and different combinations of explanatory variables, which as mentioned before 
are specifically extracted from the banking literature. It is a distinguishing feature of this paper 
that we do not assume the validity of the asset pricing factors found to be relevant in the non-
financial world as in, e.g., Barber and Lyon (1997), Cooper et al (2003), and Viale et al (2009). 
Instead, we investigate the pricing effect of variables that are hypothesized relevant factors for 
banks. We report below the outcome of three types of regression models, the Fama-MacBeth 
style cross-sectional regressions, panel data regressions, and non-parametric regressions that 
use the percentile ranking of the pricing factors as explanatory variables instead of their values. 
As will be clear later, our main results are robust and consistent across these different model 
specifications. In particular, consistent with the portfolio results above, leverage has a 
significantly positive relationship with bank stock returns; the effect of bank size seems to be 
significantly negative; beta has a significantly negative first-order effect on bank stock returns 
but the second-order effect is significantly positive. Despite the fact that the included 
explanatory variables are almost always statistically significant, the performance of the model 
is in general less spectacular as they explain only a small fraction of the variations of bank 
stock excess returns. But the explanatory power of our simpler models is comparable with 
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other models that include more variables and use more elaborate econometric specifications 
(see e.g., Viale et al 2009). 
Table V reports the coefficients of univariate regressions that include one explanatory 
variable at a time. We estimate four models that examine the leverage measurements we have 
constructed, two models for beta with beta itself and beta in addition to the square of beta 
respectively, and two models for size. Among the four leverage proxies, the simple ratio of 
total equity to total assets has the strongest result although all four proxies demonstrate a 
negative relationship between bank capital strength and excess stock returns. In other words, 
leverage has a significantly positive relationship with bank stock returns. This is consistent 
with what we have shown above with portfolios of bank stocks formed on the ranking of 
leverage.  
 
Table V 
Coefficients of univariate regressions 
This table reports the coefficients and their t-statistics of univariate regressions that separately regresses the 
excess bank stock returns on leverage, beta, and size. Four leverage measurements are examined: (1) 
equity/TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets, (2) the ratio of total equity capital plus time deposits to 
total assets, (3) tier 1 risk capital to risk weighted assets, (4) total risk capital to risk weighted assets. Two 
models are estimated for beta: the first model includes only pre-ranking beta itself, but the second model 
also includes the square of the pre-ranking beta. Two models are estimated for size: the first model uses the 
natural log of total assets while the second model uses the natural log of market capitalization. The level of 
significance of the coefficients is signaled by the number of stars: *** means significant at 1% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. 
Leverage measurements Beta Size
Equity/TA -1.100***
 
-0.571*** Ln(Total assets) -0.152***
(-4.959) (-5.928) (-4.715)
(Equity+time deposit)/TA -0.990**
 
-0.842*** Ln(Market value) 0.007
(-2.282) (-5.534) (0.221)
 
  0.205**
(2.298)
Tier 1 capital/RWA -1.376
(-1.129)
Total risk capital/RWA -0.239*
(-1.862)
 
 
In examining the relationship between beta and bank stock excess returns in the 
context of portfolios above, we have shown there seems to be a convex non-linear relationship 
between beta and returns. In the univariate regressions, we test the existence of this non-linear 
relationship by estimating a model with the square of stock post-ranking beta. In Table V, the 
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model that includes only beta renders a significantly negative coefficient for beta implying that 
the excess returns of bank stock would fall with the rise of beta. This is in contrast to the asset 
pricing theory of Sharpe-Lintner-Black that predicts a positive relationship. The second beta 
related model shows that the power of beta has a significantly positive relationship with bank 
stock returns, which validates our previous suspicion that there is a U-shaped convex 
relationship between beta and returns. Apparently, the relationship between beta and stock 
returns for banks is very distinct and more complicated than what has been documented in the 
non-financial sectors. What Fama and French (1992) found in the non-financial world is the 
insensitive response of stock returns to beta. For banks however, not only is the pricing 
relationship between beta and returns strong, but there is a strong non-linear pattern as well. 
Bank stock returns initially drop with the rise in beta. But the speed of the dropping decreases 
and, as can be seen in our earlier text, will eventually drive the stock returns upward and to 
rise with beta.  
Market capitalization used to be the proxy for size in the asset pricing literature, for 
both non-financial stocks (Fama and French 1992 and 1993) and financial stocks (Barber and 
Lyon 1997, Cooper et al 2003, and Viale 2009). However, in the banking literature, any 
hypothesis between bank size and bank performance can only be drawn by considering the 
overall size of the banks. Therefore, we investigate both market capitalization and total assets 
and their pricing effect on bank stocks. The univariate models in Table V show that while the 
natural log of total assets is significantly negatively associated with bank stock excess returns, 
there is virtually no response from the returns to the natural log of market capitalization. This 
is a rather surprising finding since the correlation between total assets and market 
capitalization is about 0.96. It is possible that the regressions are influenced by a few extreme 
values of total assets. However, as we will later show, the negative relationship between total 
assets and returns will remain statistically strong in the non-parametric models that use the 
percentile ranking of the bank level total assets as explanatory variables. Therefore, large 
banks are more likely to have low stock returns, and vice versa. 
The univariate regressions point out the important pricing effect of the simple leverage 
measurement, beta and its power, and total assets. In Table VI, these variables are examined 
with each other and control variables in multivariate regression models using the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) methodology.  
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Table VI 
Average Coefficients of Multivariate Month-by-Month  
Regressions of bank stock excess returns 1987-2007 
 
All models are estimated using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The reported coefficients are the 
average of monthly regression coefficients from January 1987 to December 2007. The t-statistic in the 
brackets is the average coefficients divided by their time series standard error. Equity is the total equity 
capital; TA is the total assets; ȕ is the pre-ranking beta of individual banks stocks estimated by 
regressing the excess bank stock returns over one month T-bill rate for the past two years on the excess 
market returns proxied by S&P500 index; E/P is earnings per share and is truncated at zero, i.e., 
negative earnings are assumed to be zero; BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity. All 
balance sheet variables are collected from the Federal Reserve of Chicago quarterly Y-9C report, are 
matched with CRSP stock returns of the next quarter. *** means significant at 1% level, ** significant 
at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Equity/TA -5.570** -5.043** -6.319*** -6.679*** -6.421***
(-2.21) (-2.00) (-2.55) (-2.66) (-2.49)
ȕ -0.262*** -0.419*** -0.294*** -0.283** -0.138**
(-2.51) (-2.72) (-2.62) (-2.14) (-2.24)
ȕ2 0.627*** 0.637*** 0.676** 0.440**
(2.43) (2.60) (2.01) (1.81)
Ln (Total assets) -0.150* -0.141 -0.249***
(-1.74) (-1.55) (-3.02)
E/P 0.603*** 0.434***
(9.93) (7.37)
BE/ME 0.411***
(4.67)
Intercept 1.129*** 1.179*** 3.422*** 2.094** 2.703**
(2.61) (2.83) (2.46) (1.99) (2.06)
 
 
In these regressions, we add the candidate explanatory variables one at a time so that 
the incremental contribution of the added variable can be easily judged. Clearly, the 
conclusions from the univariate regressions remain robust. The ratio of equity to total assets is 
always significantly negatively related with bank stock returns, implying a positive 
relationship between leverage and returns. The convex relationship between beta and returns 
remains strong as can be seen from the negative coefficient of beta and the positive coefficient 
of the square of beta, both of which are always statistically significant. Size is always 
negatively related to returns implying that stocks of larger banks have lower expected excess 
returns. Earnings per share and the ratio of book equity to market equity enter the equation as 
control variables. They both are significantly positively related to bank stock returns. 
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The results in Table VI show that bank stocks seem to be related to a different set of 
characteristics than non-financial stocks. Specifically, for non-financial stocks as in Fama and 
French (1992) beta becomes an irrelevant pricing factor after controlling for size. In addition, 
the relation between leverage and stock returns is absorbed by BE/ME. In our results, the 
relations between beta, leverage, size, and bank stock returns remain consistently strong 
irrespective of the conditioning set. In conclusion, beta and leverage, the pricing factors that 
have been “abandoned” by the literature in non-financial stocks, seem to be important 
considerations in the examination of bank stocks.  
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
 
2.6.1 Alternative Econometric models 
 
In this section we examine the robustness of the results found above by a few alternative 
regression frameworks. Table VII reports the estimation output from panel data regressions of 
the bank stock excess returns on various combinations of explanatory variables and bank as 
well as time fixed effects. As can be seen in Table VII, most of our previous assertions hold up 
well in panel data regressions in terms of the signs of the coefficients and their level of 
significance. In particular, the simple leverage measurement is consistently and significantly 
positively related to bank stock returns. Size is consistently negatively related to returns. The 
sign of beta is always negative, but the level of significance sometime disappears depending 
on the conditioning set; the same is also true for the power of beta, which always has positive 
coefficient and very often significant. Note that the level of significance is consistent in Panel 
A where time fixed-effects are not controlled for. In Panel B however, the inclusion of year 
dummies that control for time fixed-effects makes some of the significance disappear. This 
may imply that the parameters may be time-variant. As we will show in later robustness 
checks, some coefficients indeed behave differently in different sub-period. But our main 
results stay intact. 
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Table VII 
Panel data regressions of bank stock excess returns 1987-2007 
This table reports the estimation outcome of fixed effects panel data models. Equity is total equity 
capital; TA is total assets; ȕ is the pre-ranking beta of individual banks stocks estimated by regressing 
the excess bank stock returns over one month T-bill rate for the past two years on the excess market 
returns proxied by S&P500 index; E/P is earnings per share and is truncated at zero, i.e., negative 
earnings are assumed to be zero; BE/ME is the ratio of book equity to market equity. All balance sheet 
variables are collected from the Federal Reserve of Chicago quarterly Y-9C report, are matched with 
CRSP stock returns of the next quarter. In all models bank specific slopes are assumed to be constant 
across the sample period. In Panel A, time-fixed effects are not considered. In Panel B, year dummies 
have been used to control for time fixed effects. *** means significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, and * significant at 10% level. 
Panel A
1 2 3 4 5 6
Equity/TA -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.114*** -0.061***
(-4.783) (-4.797) (-4.843) (-5.306) (-5.091) (-2.614)
ȕ -0.698*** -0.832*** -0.717*** -0.779*** -0.825***
(-4.930) (-5.465) (-4.626) (-5.057) (-5.298)
ȕ2 0.185** 0.177** 0.198** 0.240***
(2.076) (1.981) (2.235) (2.695)
Ln (TA) -0.128*** -0.115*** -0.219***
(-3.776) (-3.435) (-5.928)
E/P 0.622*** 0.473***
(16.941) (10.277)
BE/ME 0.398***
(8.467)
Constant 1.909*** 2.255*** 1.906*** 3.798*** 2.348*** 2.862***
(6.136) (7.138) (8.916) (6.974) (4.288) (5.122)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No No No
R2 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.032 0.041
N 20439 20439 20439 20439 20439 20439
Panel B
Equity/TA -0.095*** -0.088*** -0.110** -0.152*** -0.109** -0.297***
(-3.483) (-3.235) (-2.290) (-3.253) (-2.415) (-5.703)
ȕ -0.163 -0.761* -0.696* -0.785** -0.651
(-0.982) (-1.834) (-1.775) (-1.987) (-1.628)
ȕ2 0.371 0.553** 0.557** 0.495*
(1.251) (1.978) (2.056) (1.655)
Ln (TA) -3.975*** -3.504*** -4.238***
(-14.591) (-12.050) (-15.998)
E/P 0.977*** -0.142**
(15.958) (-2.119)
BE/ME -0.851***
(-10.031)
Constant -1.392*** -0.014 0.435 5.889*** 4.978*** 6.602***
(-4.717) (-0.047) (0.978) (14.486) (11.620) (16.784)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.062 0.032 0.031 0.065 0.069 0.074
N 20439 20439 20439 20439 20439 20439
 
 
Next we estimate a few regression models with non-parametric regressors. In particular, 
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our previous results do not exclude any extreme values; nor did we apply any winsorizing on 
the data. We did not censor our data because it is well-known that the banking industry is 
dominated by a few very large banks whose size and market capitalization may be well out of 
the range of the remaining typical banks. Their exclusion would imply the overlooking of the 
most important players in the industry. However, extreme values may render the coefficients 
from the above regression models invalid if the slope of the fitted curve is severely swayed by 
a small fraction of outliers.  
In order to alleviate such suspicions, we follow Chan el al (1996) and Cooper et al 
(2003) and rank all explanatory variables into percentiles and assign to each observations the 
number of their percentile ranking. For example, all observations that fall into the 95% size 
percentile would receive the value 0.95 as the non-parametric value for a new percentile-based 
regressor to substitute the original size variable. These regressors are then used in regressions 
of bank stock excess returns. As can be seen in Table VIII, most of our previous results 
survived in these non-parametric model formulations in terms of the sign and level of 
significance of the coefficients. Only beta has lost the level of significance observed before but 
the sign is still consistent4. Therefore, our previous findings are not likely to be the results of 
outliers or extreme observations. 
 
2.6.2 Robustness check in sub-samples 
 
Our main conclusions so far include: leverage has significantly positive implications on bank 
stock excess returns; beta has a convex non-linear relationship with returns; and size is 
inversely related to returns. These conclusions are mostly consistent across a variety of model 
specifications and conditioning set in terms of signs and level of significance. Questions may 
be raised regarding the persistency and stability of the coefficients over time. After all, our 
sample period of 1987-2007 cover a few important events. In the first decade of the sample 
period, there were S&L crisis in the early 1990s and the Asian financial crisis in 1997; during 
the second decade, Russian default, the fall of LTCM, and 9.11 terrorist attacks subsequently 
took place. It therefore is a relevant issue if the conclusion we arrived so far hold up in sub-
samples of the covered time period. In Table IX, we report the results of the models run on the 
first and second decade of the sample period separately.  
 
                                                        
4
 The square of beta is omitted because its percentile ranking will highly correlate with the ranking of beta 
itself and thereby creates multicollinearity. 
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Table VIII 
Non-parametric regressions of bank stock excess returns 
All observations are ranked into percentiles based on each of the explanatory variables. Then a new set 
of variables are created that take as value the number of the percentile ranking of observations based 
one of the explanatory variables. This new set of percentile-based variables is then used in the 
regressions of bank stock excess returns. Model 1 is a Fama-MacBeth regression model; model 2 and 3 
are panel data model with or without control for time fixed-effects, respectively. For model 1, R2 is 
unavailable due to the Fama-MacBeth methodology; for model 2 and 3 R2 is the overall model R-
squared. *** means significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. 
1 2 3
Equity/TA percentile -0.089* -0.064* -0.065*
(-1.70) (-1.673) (-1.650)
Beta percentile -0.094 -0.036 -0.015
(-1.56) (-0.915) (-0.387)
Ln (TA) percentile -0.242*** -0.247*** -0.250***
(-2.92) (-5.963) (-5.605)
E/P percentile 0.458*** 0.471*** 0.498***
(7.41) (11.620) (10.467)
BE/ME percenile 0.398*** 0.385*** 0.400***
(4.56) (8.727) (8.277)
Constant -1.638*** -1.632*** -1.979***
(-2.44) (-9.808) (-8.610)
Bank fixed effects No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes
R2 na 0.049 0.055
N na 20439 20439
 
 
Two main model specifications, a Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional model and a 
panel data model controlling for both time and bank fixed-effects, are examined in these 
subsample periods. As can be seen in Table IX, the coefficients of the explanatory variables all 
have consistent signs across the subsample periods with what we have seen in the whole 
sample above implying that the conclusions we have reached so far also hold in the 
subsamples. However the level of significance can be different between the subsample periods. 
For example, in the cross-sectional specifications, the ratio of equity capital to total assets as a 
leverage measurement appears to be significantly different from zero only in the second 
decade of the sample period. In the panel data models however, this leverage measurement has 
a stronger level of significance in the first sub-period. The square of beta, though having 
consistent signs as previous results, lost its significance in most models in the subsamples. The 
relatively high standard errors in the smaller sample size could be the cause of this 
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disappearance of significance. But our general conclusion still remains impact: leverage and 
beta seem to be relevant pricing factors for bank stock excess returns. 
 
Table IX 
Robustness check in sub-samples 
The table reports the coefficients of the full regression models in two sub-periods. Fama-MacBeth 
regressions and panel data regressions are reported separately. The panel data models include both 
bank and year fixed effects. For the Fama-MacBeth regressions R2 and sample size are not available. 
For the panel data regressions, R2 is the overall model R2. *** means significant at 1% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. 
1987-1997 1998-2007 1987-1997 1998-2007
Equity/TA -3.452 -8.031*** -0.440** -0.109*
(-1.08) (-2.65) (-2.541) (-1.876)
ȕ -0.208*** -0.109** -0.789 -0.989*
(-2.40) (-2.18) (-1.125) (-1.953)
ȕ2 0.789 0.221 1.098 0.608*
(1.45) (1.326) (1.493) (1.889)
Ln (TA) -0.227 -0.268*** -4.733*** -3.134***
(-1.22) (-7.479) (-6.262) (-10.284)
E/P 0.527*** 0.384*** 1.139*** 0.776***
(4.09) (9.376) (6.526) (11.534)
BE/ME 0.437*** 0.386*** 1.460*** 0.620***
(2.15) (8.794) (5.594) (7.125)
Constant 2.170 3.562*** 70.840*** 40.637***
(0.75) (6.362) (6.253) (9.162)
Bank fixed effects - - Yes Yes
Time fixed effects - - Yes Yes
R2 na na 0.101 0.083
N na na 5597 14842
Fama-MacBeth regressions Panel data regressions
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter takes the first step in filling in the gap in the existing asset pricing literature 
regarding the banking industry. The “mainstream” literature has mainly focused on the non-
financial sectors because the typical value ranges of some variables are very different in the 
financial sector. The highly limited asset pricing literature that examines bank or financial 
stocks often assumes the validity of the non-financial literature and applies the pricing factors 
found to be important in the non-financial sectors directly in the financial stocks. As we have 
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reviewed in this paper, the theories of financial intermediation and banking economics seem to 
suggest that some variables, shown to be negligible in the non-financial stocks, are likely to be 
relevant to the performance of bank stocks. Therefore, it becomes conceivable that some 
deviation from the existing literature may emerge if we specifically focus on the banking 
industry and independently extract and examine the asset pricing implications of what the 
banking literature has to offer. 
Based on an extensive review of the banking literature, we examine the pricing effect 
of bank leverage and bank size on bank stock excess returns. While leverage has been shown 
to be inconsequential in the context of non-financial stocks, our results in the 1987-2007 
period suggest a consistent and statistically strong positive relationship between leverage and 
bank stock returns. Banks that are highly leveraged, or have weaker capital strength have 
higher returns. This relationship is strong in both univariate models and in multivariate models 
that control for other bank characteristics and risk profile. This suggests that the investors of 
bank equity may have inadvertently exacerbated the buildup of high leverage in banks prior to 
the 2008/2009 financial crisis by giving the signal through bank stock returns that high 
leverage is more desirable. Bank size measured by total assets, on the other hand, has a 
significantly negative impact on bank stock returns. Large banks typically have lower excess 
returns than their smaller counterparts. This could be seen as the evidence for the 
diversification discount observed by Laeven and Levine (2007) where large and diversified 
financial conglomerates are worth less as a whole than the sum of their components if torn 
apart. Also interesting is that unlike in the non-financial world where market capitalization as 
a size proxy is an important pricing factor, bank stock returns do not seem to respond to total 
market capitalization. It is the total assets that have the significant relationship with bank stock 
returns. 
The existing asset pricing literature for banks or financial firms typically neglects beta 
as a pricing factor because it has been shown in the non-financial firms that beta seems 
irrelevant. Our results in the banking sector demonstrate a strong and convex non-linear 
relationship between bank stocks returns and beta. Bank stock excess returns initially 
decreases with the increase of beta, but picks up again once beta becomes sufficiently small. 
This convex pattern is consistently strong in most model specifications. Therefore, unlike in 
the non-financial world where beta is shown to be negligible, the performance of bank stocks 
is likely to bear a close relationship with beta. 
All in all, the punch line of this paper is that many established asset pricing factors in 
the non-financial industries may have limited applicability to stocks of the banking industry. 
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The meaningful decomposition or prediction of bank stock returns may benefit from the 
theories of financial intermediation and banking economics. We demonstrate in this paper that 
leverage, size and beta might be important pricing factors for U.S. bank stock excess returns at 
least for the 1987 to 2007 period. 
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Chapter 3  
Banks, hedging, and derivatives 5 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Banks’ involvements in the derivatives markets have been considerably asymmetric with 
respect to trading and hedging activities. Compared with the value of derivatives used for 
trading, the value of derivatives held by banks for hedging is much lower. In addition, the 
pattern of growth in the value of hedging derivatives shows relatively lower growth rates but 
is more volatile than derivatives held for trading. Figure 1 below, adopted from OCC (2005), 
compares the level and pattern of growth of the notional amount of interest rate derivatives 
held by banks for hedging and trading purposes. The figure shows that the total notional 
amount of interest rate derivatives held by insured U.S. commercial banks approaches $100 
trillion at the end of 2005, up from about $20 trillion at the beginning of 1997. However, only 
a small fraction of the 2005 amount ($2.6 trillion) is used for hedging purposes where the 
commercial banks hold the derivatives as end-users. In terms of growth, the change in value of 
derivatives used for hedging is nowhere near the derivatives used for trading. During our 
1997-2005 sample period, the derivatives held for hedging purposes grew by 73 percent, in 
sharp contrast to the almost 400 percent of growth in the derivatives held for trading. At the 
cross-sectional level, banks appear not to consistently use derivatives for hedging. They 
increase, decrease, maintain, or eliminate altogether their derivatives positions for hedging in 
consecutive periods. This more volatile development in the banks’ involvement in derivatives 
for hedging contrasts the more monotonically increasing pattern of growth seen in trading 
derivatives. The current literature so far has not offered a detailed account on the factors that 
drive bank’s utilization of derivatives for hedging and the changes therein.  
This chapter fills the aforementioned gap by empirically investigating two questions. 
First, what makes a bank hedge with derivatives in certain periods, but not in others? To 
answer this question, we construct a panel data set that comprises all U.S. bank holding 
companies (BHCs) that have used interest rate or credit derivatives during the period from 
1997 to 2005. We use a combination of BHC balance sheet items and macroeconomic factors 
to answer the question whether or not a BHC hedges with either interest rate or credit 
derivatives. We find that banks are more likely to be hedgers with interest rate derivatives 
                                                        
5
 This chapter is based on Mahieu and Xu (2008). 
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when loan commitment, demand deposit, ROE, size and credit spread are higher; higher 
interest rate and term spread reduce the likelihood of a BHC being a hedger with interest rate 
derivatives. Higher transaction deposit, larger size and the engagement in the trading of credit 
derivatives induce banks to become hedgers with credit derivatives.  
Second, we investigate how the changes in a bank’s derivatives holdings can be 
explained. In order to preserve the maximum amount of information in the data, particularly in 
the BHCs that have only occasionally used derivatives for hedging and hence are sparsely 
populated in their derivatives related variables, we construct a discrete variable in our 
unbalanced panel dataset that corresponds to the directions and magnitudes of adjustments in 
the derivatives position on a quarterly basis. The first difference in the BHC balance sheet 
items and macroeconomic factors are then used to explain the ordered discrete outcomes in 
this panel data setting. The key findings include that the increases in Tier-I capital, size, 
interest rates and credit spreads lead to more hedging with interest rate derivatives. Increases 
in term spreads reduce such hedging activities. For credit derivatives we find that these 
instruments are more likely to be used for hedging when a bank engages in securitization and 
in the trading of credit derivatives. Our results therefore also fill in the gap in the literature that 
is mostly silent on the mechanisms underlying the changes in banks’ existing derivative 
positions held for hedging.  
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Figure 1. The Volume and Growth of Interest Rate Derivatives. The figure, adopted from the Bank Derivative 
Report (OCC 2005), shows the aggregate notional amount of interest rate derivatives held by U.S. insured 
commercial banks for trading and hedging purposes. The numbers on the Y-axis are in trillions and are quarterly 
observations. 
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Furthermore, the literature suggests that the use of derivatives for hedging is 
advantageous for banks in that derivative contracts enable banks to reduce their risks without 
having to deny, cancel, or renegotiate their loan arrangements with customers and thereby help 
banks to maintain their normal lending policy and customer relation (Allen and Santomoro 
1998, Purnanandam 2007). Hedging with derivatives also allows banks to constantly adjust 
their risk exposures resulting from major banking services such as the commitment 
arrangements (Ho and Saunders 1983). Therefore, it is interesting to see the relationship 
between banks’ hedging with derivatives and their financial intermediation function such as 
on- and off- balance sheet loan making activities. 
The key findings that emerge from the analyses can be summarized as follows. First, 
the various categories of loan play little role in the use and modifications of both interest rate 
and credit derivatives. However, the increase in unused loan commitment contract 
significantly increases the likelihood that banks hedge with interest rate derivatives, which 
supports the suggestion by Ho and Saunders (1983) that banks can hedge the interest rate and 
take-down risks associated with loan commitment with financial derivatives since the fees 
paid by borrowers for these commitment cannot completely compensate such risks. The effect 
of loan commitment on the credit derivative is negative though insignificant, which lends 
weak support to Boot and Thakor (1991) and Avery and Berger (1991) in that loan 
commitment may reduce the credit exposure of banks and the need to hedge such risk.  
Second, the increases in the size of banks measured by total asset result in higher 
probability that banks hedge with interest rate and credit derivatives. This is consistent with 
the suggestion that larger banks enjoy economies of scale, which result in a better cost-benefit 
tradeoff in the use of derivatives compared with smaller banks.  Size also captures the 
accumulated systematic risk that grows with the scale or scope of banks but cannot be 
eliminated by their internal risk reduction methods such as underwriting standards, due 
diligence and diversifications (Allen and Santomero 1998). As to the micro-adjustments, larger 
increases in size make it more likely that a bank uses more interest rate derivatives to hedge 
but mildly reduces the hedging activity with credit derivatives.  
Third, hedging with interest rate derivatives is significantly dampened by the increase 
in interest rate and term spread. This dampening effect of interest rate is consistent for banks 
with either negative or positive maturity gap. Since the rise in interest rate reduces the absolute 
market value of the maturity gap, this finding suggests that banks’ hedging decision is not 
influenced by the sign of the maturity gap. Rather, as long as the assets and liabilities are 
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mismatched, the movement in interest rate would result in active responses by banks in 
hedging with interest rate derivatives.  
Fourth, the use of derivatives for hedging is likely to coexist with other risk reduction 
techniques. The use of loan sale is a complement to the increased use of interest rate 
derivatives, while securitization is likely to accompany credit derivatives.  
Fifth, increases in the Tier-I risk capital significantly increase the likelihood that banks 
hedge and augment their hedging with interest rate derivatives. We argue that this is because 
Tier-I capital effectively captures shareholders’ interest in a bank. Managers acting for the 
benefit of shareholders would hedge more to protect shareholder value when such value is 
larger.  
Finally, banks that engage in the trading of credit derivatives tend to hedge more with 
credit derivatives since banks usually lay off the risks they take up in trading by entering into 
offsetting derivative contracts.   
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We review the literature and formulate 
research questions in Section 3.2. After describing the data, the definition and construction of 
variables, and the empirical methodology in Section 3.3, we present the base model in Section 
3.4 and its results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 shows the model for the investigation of the 
model subtle changes in derivatives, followed by its results in Section 3.7. The last section 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Bank characteristics, macroeconomic factors, and the use of derivatives for hedging 
 
The bank specific characteristics we examine include size, various categories of loan, loan 
commitment, maturity gap, profitability, the liquidity of BHC balance sheet, Tier-1 risk capital, 
various measures of deposit, and other risk management techniques available to banks 
including loan sale and securitization. We also include in our conditioning set such 
macroeconomic factors as interest rates, the volatility of interest rates, term spread and credit 
spread. In this section we review the literature in the related topics and formulate research 
questions that we focus on in this paper. We occasionally discuss several characteristics 
together in view of their similarities. 
 
3.2.1 Size 
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The size of a bank has been shown to positively affect their derivative usage (see Gorton and 
Rosen 1995, Carter and Sinkey 1998, Minton et al 2006, Purnanandam 2007). Such effect is 
attributed to the economy of scale enjoyed by large banks and their rich human as well as 
financial resources in establishing the internal operating and control system for derivative 
engagement (Carter and Sinkey 1998, Purnanandam 2007). Regulators also agree that the 
current concentration of derivative engagement at large banks is appropriate in view of the 
sophistication and talent needed for derivative transactions to be handled in a safe and sound 
manner (OCC 2005). Therefore, large banks are more likely to hedge with derivatives. 
Does this also mean that as banks grow larger the likelihood of using derivatives for 
hedging increases? Or, will a bank increase its existing derivative holding for hedging 
purposes as it grows in size? It is conceivable that the hedging decision of banks is determined 
by other more subtle activities such as the types of loans made and/or macroeconomic 
movements. Therefore, it is interesting to see the relation between size and the likelihood of 
hedging with derivatives after controlling for other bank specific and macroeconomic factors. 
This incremental explanatory power of the size factor is conceivable considering the various 
types of risks faced by banks. Allen and Santomero (1998) classify three categories of risk 
faced by banks, namely, 1. risks associated with normal banking function such as loan making, 
2. risks that are not to the advantage of banks to bear and to be transferred to others, and 3. 
risks that must be bore by banks themselves. All of these categories of risk imply a 
relationship between the size of a bank and the need for hedging with derivatives. More 
specifically, the cumulative systematic and idiosyncratic risks associated with loans may not 
be entirely captured by the amount of loan. While idiosyncratic risk could be eliminated by 
internal policies including, as Allen and Santomero (1998) specify, underwriting standards, 
due diligence procedures, and portfolio diversification, systematic risk must be hedged. As a 
consequence and considering the opaque nature of the risk structure of bank loans, the 
increase of loans does not necessarily increase the idiosyncratic risk which, in the extreme 
case where risk of loans is entirely idiosyncratic, may make conditioning on loans irrelevant to 
the risk profile of a bank and to the study on the need for hedging. However, as banks grow 
larger and make more loans, the cumulative systematic risk must then be captured by the size 
of the banks. As to the second category of risk in Allen and Santomero (1998) and also 
Diamond (1984), banks should hedge non-value adding risks, or the risks banks have no 
comparative advantage in bearing. Examples of these risks include interest rate risk and 
exchange risk that the general market understands well and banks have no relative advantage 
over other market participants in bearing them. These risks are similar with the systematic risk 
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of loans and may be associated with other bank assets. Such risks, giving rise to the need for 
hedging, shall also be related, at least partially, to the size of the banks in addition to other 
bank balance sheet items depending on the unobservable idiosyncratic-systematic risk 
structure of the bank assets. The third category of risk in Allen and Santomero (1998) 
encompasses the intrinsic opaqueness and complexity of bank assets as well as potential 
agency problems between management and other stakeholders. All these risks further deepen 
the need for banks to hedge. While not directly measuring these risks and assuming these risks 
grow with the size of banks, we can expect a positive relationship between the size of a bank 
and the use of derivatives for hedging while controlling for other bank balance sheet items. 
 
3.2.2 Bank loans 
 
3.2.2.1 On-balance sheet loans and macroeconomic risks 
 
Bank loans as the assets of banks are risky investments made by the bank in various 
areas, ranging from commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, to loans to individual consumers. 
These loans also typically have longer maturity than the liabilities of banks. In other words, 
the assets of banks have longer maturity and therefore higher interest rate sensitivities than 
liabilities. In the mean time, depending on the borrowers, bank loans also bear various degrees 
of credit risk, the risk that the borrower defaults on the loan. 
We choose to focus on interest rate and credit risk because among the various 
categories of risks the financial intermediaries encounter in their deposit taking and loan 
making activities, interest rate risk and credit risk are probably the most fundamental and 
pervasive to banks. More specifically, interest rate risk arises when there is maturity 
mismatches between banks’ assets and liabilities, while the probability of borrowers defaulting, 
partially or fully, on loans gives rise to credit risk. Both categories of risk, though inherent in 
the financial intermediation process, adversely affect the operation of individual banks, 
particularly the loan making activities of banks. Interest rate uncertainty gives rise to 
refinancing risk when the maturity of assets is longer than liabilities, and to reinvestment risk 
when the maturity of assets is shorter than liabilities. Both may induce banks to shy away from 
illiquid asset and invest more in interest rate sensitive assets such as bonds and treasury bills. 
Credit risk may cause banks to reduce loan to relatively more risky business, and in the most 
extreme case, causes credit crunch. Noting that the loan making activities of banks to 
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relatively illiquid and risky assets where asymmetric information is a more severe problem are 
the most valuable banking function, and noting that illiquid and risky loans bring more profit 
to banks, interest rate risk and credit risk, to the extent of being unpredictable or in excess of 
what banks are willing to take, interrupt the economic functioning and normal operation policy 
of banks. 
One way to manage these risks is to increase or decrease the holding of assets that give 
rise to the interest rate or credit risk. Such operation would involve the acquisition of new 
assets, i.e., making new loans, or the premature sales of existing assets, e.g., loans to corporate 
clients, which entail high transaction costs, high value reduction due to the illiquidity of these 
assets, and the interruption of the lending policy as well as damage to the relationship with the 
corporate clients (Allen and Santomero 1998). As a risk management instrument, derivatives 
provide banks additional opportunity to manage their risk exposures. Hedging these risks with 
financial derivatives, which do not involve the counterparty of the loans, therefore becomes 
more sensible (Duffee and Zhou 2001, Purnanandam 2007).   
The above review suggests that banks’ decision on hedging with derivatives may be 
related to their loan making activities. Brewer, Minton and Moser (2000) find a positive 
relationship between banks’ use of interest rate derivative for hedging and the making of C&I 
loans. Interest rate derivative also seem to insulate commercial banks from monetary policy 
shocks and help them maintain their lending volume (Purnanandam 2007). Purnanadam shows 
that the cumulative impact of monetary policy shocks on loan level is much smaller for 
derivative-user banks. Implicitly these studies assume that the use of derivatives for hedging is 
one of the reasons banks are able to issue more loans. Our approach differs from theirs in that 
we assume the loan making activities of banks result in the necessity to hedge. This 
assumption should be more reasonable since not until the loans are made can banks accurately 
determine their hedging need and actions on derivative positions. It is interesting to see if the 
increased use of derivatives is driven by the loan making activities of banks. The relevance of 
this issue is that one controversy concerning hedging with derivatives is the fear of systemic 
risk in which the counterparty of the derivatives became unable to honor the contract and this 
inability escalates to other related or unrelated parties.  This is particularly relevant to banks 
since the failure of one large bank may have substantial consequences on the whole industry 
due to the concentration of derivative activities in large banks (Gorton and Rosen 1995). A 
recent article in The Economist expressed a similar concern among regulators and practitioners: 
 
“The rise of the derivatives market has coincided with very low default 
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rates. Were defaults to rise, the ability of the markets to absorb losses 
(and clear trades) might be severely tested.” 6 
 
If systemic risk occurs, the liquidity creation of banks would also be hampered if banks rely 
too much on derivatives to neutralize the risks of their loans. In other words, if the derivative 
use for hedging by banks is driven by their loan growth, this could be taken as a sign that 
banks are transferring the risks intrinsic to their financial intermediation function to the 
derivative market and thereby signaling their inability to (completely) absorb the risks using 
their balance sheet. Then were the solvency of the derivative market to deteriorate, the 
availability of bank liquidity may also diminish. 
 
3.2.2.2 Loan commitment 
 
The loan commitment agreement is an important off-balance-sheet (OBS) loan making activity 
by banks. The quarterly Survey of Terms of Business Lending by the Federal Reserve7 shows 
that around 80% of all C&I loans is made under commitment contracts during our 1997-2005 
sample period. Due to the contingencies during the period between the establishment of the 
commitment contract and the actual takedown of the commitment, interest rate risk and credit 
risk may arise.  Interest rates may vary dramatically and the creditworthiness of the 
counterparty may deteriorate, which will render the terms in the original contract more costly 
to serve.8   
     Financial derivatives may be a solution to the risks that arise post loan-commitment 
contracting. In particular, after the establishment of the commitment contract, banks could 
enter into an interest rate and/or credit derivative position upon the observation of new interest 
rate or credit condition as an effort to minimize the risks given rise by the interaction between 
the new movements and the terms specified in the loan commitment. Ho and Saunders (1983) 
suggest that hedging with interest derivatives the open loan commitment contract must be 
constantly adjusted as a response to the ever changing interest rate and the resulting change in 
                                                        
6
 See “What keeps bankers awake at night?” The Economist, February 3rd, 2007. 
7
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/ 
8
 Even though the interest rate in the commitment contract can be specified as floating with spot loan rate, 
such as LIBOR, (in fact most loan commitment contracts are with floating rate (Shockley and Thakor 1997), 
the basis risk, the difference between the LIBOR and the cost of the fund banks use to honor the 
commitment, still can not be totally eliminated. As to the credit risk, the “adverse material change in 
conditions clause” in the loan commitment contract that entitles the bank to cancel or re-price the 
commitment contract can hardly be relied on in practice due to the possible legal claims resulted from the 
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loan price as well as the uncertain quantity of potential takedowns by the counterparty. 
Although we did not find any study that directly investigates the relation between derivative 
use and the loan commitment, literature does offer theories and evidence on the relation 
between loan commitment and banks’ risk exposure. Clark and Siems (2002) show a positive 
association between loan commitment and the operating and interest expenses as well as the 
opportunity cost of bank equity capital (required rate of return multiplied by the market value 
of equity). They also show that derivative use reduces the above costs for U.S. commercial 
banks. Boot and Thakor (1991) and Avery and Berger (1991) however demonstrate a negative 
association between loan commitment and bank risk exposure. Their arguments include the 
rationing by banks that grants loan commitment contract to only creditworthy borrowers and 
the spontaneous risk control by banks on their own in view of the potential escalation of risk 
brought by the commitment contract. Note that these two studies focus on the credit risk 
exposure brought by the loan commitment while the study by Clark and Siems examine the 
interest rate risk. In light of these studies, interest rate and credit derivative can be used by 
banks to, for example, reduce the increased costs associated with honoring the commitment 
without having to renegotiate the terms therein. We contribute to the empirical literature by 
explicitly studying the relation between loan commitment and the need for hedging with 
interest rate and credit derivatives. 
 
3.2.2.3 Bank loans and bank liquidity 
   
In the literature on underinvestment, hedging with derivatives has been shown to alleviate the 
potential underinvestment problem of only those firms that have weak cash position (Gay and 
Nam 1998, Deshmukh and Vogt 2005). Firms that have investment opportunities but strong 
cash position tend to have lower derivative engagement. This indicates the necessity of 
incorporating the strength of firms’ cash or liquid asset in the study of the relation between 
their derivative use and investment activities. Applied to banks this means that the investment 
activities of banks, i.e., the loan making activities, and the resulting need for hedging may be 
contingent upon the amount of liquid asset in a bank, i.e., cash, federal funds and other liquid 
securities.   
The liquidity of bank balance sheet may be an important determinant of derivative 
policy for two reasons. First, when external financing is sufficiently expensive, firms with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
damage to the counterparty (Saunders and Cornett 2006, page 367). 
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weak position in cash or other liquid asset are more prone to liquidity shocks and suffer from 
underinvestment problem (Froot et al 1993, Gay and Nam 1998, Deshmukh and Vogt 2005). 
To the extent that hedging with derivatives helps protect the liquidity position, there might be 
a relationship between the change in the liquidity measure of bank balance sheet and their 
subsequent decisions on derivatives. For example, in times of deteriorating credit condition, 
banks may suffer from loan loss and a reduction in their holding of liquid assets. Such event 
may be accompanied by a drop in derivative holdings as banks exercise or sell their derivative 
contract in an effort to make up for the drop in liquid assets. As such, there should be a 
positive association between derivative use and the liquidity measures of a bank. Second, 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) show that banks’ holding of liquid assets will increase when the 
liquidity condition of the commercial paper market deteriorates and becomes unaffordable for 
corporations to obtain financing. That is, investors move their funds from the commercial 
paper market to banks when the credit conditions in the market become too risky. Gatev and 
Strahan conclude that such re-intermediation effect creates a natural hedging for banks on the 
balance sheet by increasing the liquid asset of banks when these assets are mostly needed as 
during market liquidity shocks that push firms to banks for refinancing their expiring 
commercial papers. In other words, the re-intermediation effect can be seen as a substitute for 
other hedging instruments such as derivative. The resulting relation between the growth of 
liquid asset and derivative usage should be negative. We try to clarify these contradictory 
issues in the existing literature by incorporating measures for liquid asset in our modeling.   
 
3.2.3 Maturity gap and interest rates 
 
 
In the case of interest rate risk, another complication is brought by the part of the loans that are 
not matched with corresponding source of financing and its relation with the interest rate risk. 
This is known as the maturity mismatch or maturity gap problem. Maturity gap is defined as 
the difference between a bank’s nominal assets and nominal liabilities that are sensitive to 
interest rate movement. Generally speaking, what causes trouble is when the amount of 
interest rate sensitive assets is lower than the amount of interest rate sensitive liabilities. This 
asset shortage will render a bank economically insolvent when interest rate rises such that the 
market value of the liabilities rises above the market value of the assets and the value 
difference exceeds the value of equity capital in the meantime. This however does not mean 
that asset abundance is advantageous to banks. Flannery and James (1984) show that the stock 
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market asks for higher returns the higher the maturity gap, positive or negative, which support 
their hypothesis that maturity gap partially determine the interest rate sensitivity of financial 
institutions stock returns. This means that in the valuation of financial institutions stocks 
investors consider the absolute value of the maturity gap rather than its sign. Hedging activity 
with derivatives has been shown to reduce the interest rate sensitivity of savings and loans 
associations’ stocks returns after controlling for maturity gap (Schrand 1997). These findings 
collectively suggest that the study of the hedging activity by banks against interest rate risk 
with interest rate derivatives must also take into account the maturity gap of banks’ balance 
sheet. The impact of interest rate risk on the need for hedging may be mediated by the 
magnitude and signs of maturity gap. We study this question by including maturity gap and 
then splitting the sample into two halves according to the signs of the mean maturity gap.   
    Purnanandam (2007) further suggests that maturity gap is also one method of hedging 
banks’ interest rate risk, besides derivatives. He shows that derivative non-users tend to 
actively manage their maturity gap when faced with rising interest rate while derivative users 
appear nonchalant.  Therefore, the inclusion of maturity gap in the conditioning set may also 
be motivated by the potential substitution effect on the use of interest rate derivatives.   
 
3.2.4 Bank profitability 
 
The literature generally shows a negative relation between profitability and the hedging 
behavior for non-financial firms (see e.g. Nance et al 1993,) and financial entities (see 
Purnanandam 2007 on interest rate derivative, and Minton et al 2006 on credit derivative). 
More profitable banks appear to have stronger financial strength against adverse shocks and 
are remote from financial distress, which reduce the likelihood for hedging. Yet the above two 
papers on financial institutions exclusively use profitability scaled by total asset of banks in 
their modeling. We expand the perspective by studying relation between other measures of 
profitability and the use of derivatives for hedging. The motivation is that the various 
measures of profitability have different emphasis and therefore divergent appealing to 
different groups of audience. Return to total asset (ROA) is useful in the study of the overall 
efficiency of a bank in using its asset. Return to equity (ROE) is particularly important to 
shareholders and is related to the charter value of a bank. The ratio of net interest income to 
total asset (interest margin), another popular measure of bank profitability, focuses on the 
interest-income generating ability of banks. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996) both 
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suggest that the motivation for hedging may be different for different stakeholders. We 
therefore study these profitability measurements separately to improve the relevance to 
various interested audience.   
 
3.2.5 Bank deposits 
 
Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2005) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) show that the 
inflow into transaction deposits, as long as not highly correlated with the demands from 
borrowers, creates a natural hedging against bank risk exposure, in much the same mechanism 
delineated in Gatev and Strahan (2006). Specifically, the flight to quality by investors during 
crisis transfers funds from the commercial paper market to bank deposits, which in turn 
enables banks to meet the increased liquidity demand from the loan commitment contracts 
during crisis and liquidity shortage in the commercial market. As such, the flow to deposits 
provides a natural hedging for banks to cover their liquidity needs, a potential substitution for 
derivatives. Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2006) also demonstrate a negative effect of total 
deposit ratio on the use of credit derivatives.   
Considering the different degrees of liquidity associated with the various types of bank 
deposits however, there is a need to clarify the relation between deposits and hedging with 
derivatives more explicitly. In particular, in a descending order of withdrawal risk, demand 
deposits follow transaction deposits, which are then followed by savings and time deposits 
(Saunders and Cornett 2005). High levels of withdrawal risk reduce the liquidity of the deposit 
from the banks’ perspective and in turn reduce the potential ability of deposits to substitute 
other hedging instruments such as derivatives. We study several measures of deposits to clarify 
this issue. 
 
3.2.6 Tier I risk capital and other risk management instruments 
  
The risk-adjusted capital requirement such as the Tier 1 capital in the Basel II framework is 
intended to serve as safety cushion against various contingencies. Banks with stronger capital 
position are arguably more capable of surviving interest rate or credit shocks. In this sense, the 
capital reserve of banks and other risk management policies such as derivatives may be 
substitute for each other. The theoretical works by Froot et al (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) 
support such conjecture. They show that by engaging in risk management banks could be more 
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capable of making risky loans whilst reducing capital holdings as a cushion against risks. This 
means controlling for the risk profile of bank loans, there ought to be a negative association 
between bank capital and the use of other risk management instruments such as derivatives. 
Empirical research has studied instruments such as loan sales and securitization as alternative 
means of managing risks. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) show that banks more actively 
involved in the loan-sale market hold less capital, thereby supporting the theory. Minton, Stulz 
and Williamson (2006) demonstrate a significantly negative association between Tier1 capital 
ratio and the likelihood of credit derivative use. Interestingly they also show that loan sales 
and securitization are significantly positively associated with the credit derivative use, which 
implies the coexistent and complementary relationship between these risk management 
instruments and derivatives but a substitution relation with the Tier-1 capital. We extend the 
literature by studying if the rise in Tier I capital contributes to the reduced use of derivatives. 
We also study if other risk management instruments, i.e., loan sales and securitization, are 
positively related to the increased use of derivatives for hedging.   
 
3.2.7 Macroeconomic factors 
 
The changes or modifications of banks’ decision on hedging with derivatives are ultimately 
mandated by the dynamics of the macroeconomic environment that is constantly evolving. The 
interest rate and credit risk to some extent arise from the modification of monetary policy and 
the resulting movement in interest rate and credit conditions in the market, which in turn alter 
the asset-liability structure of banks and give rise to the duration mismatch and credit exposure. 
To control for the movements of the macroeconomic environment, we focus on interest rate, 
term spread, and credit spread. We use 3-month Treasury bill rate to measure interest rate. In 
our robustness test, we adopt the Federal Funds rate as the alternative measure of interest rate. 
While the T-Bill rate is commonly regarded as the risk-free cost of capital that is a benchmark 
to public borrowing, the fed funds rate captures the cost of capital of inter-bank borrowing 
most relevant to banks. The Fed funds rate is also the primary instrument for the Federal 
Reserve to guide monetary policy. Therefore, the Fed funds rate is a viable alternative to the T-
Bill rate as a measure of interest rate. We also include the volatility of interest rate in our study. 
As will be explained later, we use the volatility cleansing procedure of Schwert (1989) to 
capture the unexpected part of the interest rate volatility. 
The term spread between short term and long term interest rate captures the market 
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expectation of the movement of the future interest rate. For example, an upward sloping term 
structure, or a positive term spread, means the market expects the short term interest rate to 
increase in future. Such an expectation and the change in this expectation may alter banks’ 
need for hedging. For example, expecting a rising interest rate in the near future, a bank with 
more interest rate sensitive liabilities may enter into derivative position today to lock in a 
lower interest rate in an effort to offset the adverse impact of a higher rate on the value of the 
bank. The difference between the 1-year and 10-year U.S. T-Bill rate measures the term spread. 
In an effort to retain the part of the term spread that is not correlated with the short-term 
interest rate, we use the residual of the regression of term spread on a constant and the interest 
rate measure, the 3-month T-Bill rate, in the actual estimation. 
Credit spread measures the additional premium the market requires for bearing the risk 
that the counterparty defaults. Credit spread is taken to be the spread between the 3-month 
commercial paper rate for highly rated (AA) nonfinancial borrowers and the 3-month T-bill 
rate (Gatev and Strahan 2006). However the credit spread of corporate bond also has interest 
rate component (see Duffee 1998 for the encompassing relation between T-bill yield and 
(non)callable bonds, Colline-Dufresne et al 2001 also shows such a relation though mild, 
Bakshi et al 2006 shows a much stronger relation for investment grade bonds). To refine the 
measurement and extract only the credit risk component, we use the residual of the regression 
of the credit spread on a constant and the 3-month T-bill rate.   
 
3.3 Data 
 
3.3.1 Sample, data, and variables 
 
Using the database of bank holding companies (BHCs) maintained by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, we construct a sample of all BHCs that hedged with interest rate or credit 
derivatives during the 1997 to 2005 period. These data are collected using the FR Y-9C report, 
which is the BHC equivalent of Call Report for the commercial banks (Minton, Stulz and 
Williamson 2006). Specifically, BHCs provide detailed information on their balance sheet 
items as well as off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities on a consolidated basis. The variables used 
in this study, their definition and construction are shown in Appendix. Two characteristics of 
the respondent panel are worth noticing. First, asset requirement in the FR Y-9C report 
narrows the sample to BHCs with total consolidated assets of $500 million or more (or BHCs 
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meeting certain criteria regardless of size). Second, when such BHCs own or control, or are 
owned or controlled by, other BHCs, only the top-tier holding companies must file this report 
for the consolidated holding company organization. As a result of these reporting requirements, 
the starting point of our sample is the relatively large BHCs on a consolidated basis. We 
choose a sample starting point of 1997 only because it is the first year BHCs are required to 
report their engagement in credit derivatives. The data are available on a quarterly basis.    
We match the quarterly observations on BHCs with macroeconomic factors in the 
corresponding quarter. Specifically, the two alternative measures of interest rate, the 3-month 
T-Bill rate and the overnight fed funds rate, are taken from the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors statistical releases H.15. The 1-year and 10-year T-Bill rates are from the same 
source. The 3-month commercial paper rates for highly rated (AA) nonfinancial borrowers 
come from the commercial paper section of the statistical release by the Fed.   
Note that we form an unbalanced sample with all available information. That is, a BHC 
needs to have at least two quarterly observations over the whole sample period to be included. 
This means we do not exclude BHCs that went bankrupt or merged or were acquired by other 
firms. The justification for this sample selection criterion is that BHCs arguably had financial 
distress or other value-depressing problems before disappearing from the whole sample. 
Though not explicitly modeled9, financial distress is one of the factors that influence firms’ 
hedging decisions (see e.g., Smith and Stulz 1985). Including them in unbalanced panel 
preserves valuable information as to the relation between a BHC’s financial condition 
manifested on its balance sheet and its action on hedging with derivatives. 
Also important to notice is that the reporting requirements call for the disclosure of the 
true derivative exposure of a BHC. Specifically, if a BHC bought protective derivative 
contract on its own behalf and also extended protection to others, these two sets of derivatives 
are required not to be netted. Contracts subject to bilateral netting arrangements are also 
required to be reported without netting.   
 
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table I provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. In this table we compare the level of 
derivatives held for hedging and other balance sheet items among four samples: the whole 
sample, the BHCs that use interest rate derivatives for hedging, the BHCs that hedge with 
                                                        
9
 See Purnanandam (2007) for the explicit modeling on financial distress and the use of interest rate 
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credit derivatives, and BHCs that hedge with both interest rate and credit derivatives. Note that 
since it is rarely the case that banks that hedge with credit derivative do not hedge with interest 
rate derivatives, the third and fourth groups are very similar. Also note that there are 
considerable variations in the use of interest rate and credit derivatives for hedging as 
measured by the standard deviations. In addition to studying such variations among BHCs this 
paper also investigate the within-BHC variations. The table also shows some other interesting 
comparisons: compared with the overall sample, banks that hedge with credit derivatives are 
much larger, have lower Tier-I capital ratio, lower interest income, more C&I loans, less 
deposits, much larger negative maturity gap and much higher unused commitment contract. 
All these differences seem to suggest BHCs that hedge with credit derivatives are more risky 
but apply less alternative methods or instrument for risk management.   
Not shown in the table, the notional amount of interest rate derivatives held by all 
BHCs at the end of our sample period (2005Q4) equals 30% of the aggregate of their total 
assets. This percentage increases to 34% in the case of credit derivatives. At the beginning of 
our sample, the first quarter in 1997, these figures are 31% for interest rate derivatives and 
0.2% for credit derivatives. The growth of these derivatives at the micro-level is also of 
interest. Over several consecutive periods in our sample, a BHC may increase or decrease their 
holding of interest rate or credit derivative. As to the macroeconomic variables, bear in mind 
that the term spread and credit spread are residuals of the regression of the original series on a 
constant and the 3-month T-Bill rate. They do not necessarily mean that the original mean term 
spread and credit spread are negative. The T-Bill rate volatility is calculated using the Schwert 
(1989) methodology10. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
derivative for hedging. 
10
 Specifically, we follow a three-step procedure in estimating the volatility of interest rate. (1) Estimate a 
12th order autorgression for the rates, including dummy variables to allow for different monthly mean 
returns, using all data available for the series. (2) Estimate a 12th order autoregression for the absolute 
value of the errors from step 1, including dummy variables to allow for different monthly standard 
deviations. (3) The dependent variable in step 2 is an estimate of the standard deviation of the interest rate 
for t. The fitted value from step 2 estimates the conditional standard deviation of the interest rate given 
information available before t. 
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3.4 To use or not to use derivatives: the binary models 
 
To answer the question why banks hedge with derivatives in certain periods but not in others, 
we implement the fixed effect logit model with binary outcomes in a panel data setting to 
study the relationship between the BHCs’ status of being derivative user or nonuser for 
hedging and the BHC characteristics and macroeconomic factors discussed above. This 
methodology is based on Chamberlain (1980). Specifically, our dependent variable takes on 
two values: 
 
yit = 1  if BHC i uses derivatives in quarter t, 
yit = 0  if BHC i does not use derivatives in quarter t. 
 
In a panel data setting, the underlying latent model takes the form y*it = x’itȕ + Įi + İit, where 
Įi is the BHC specific intercept and İit is the unobserved disturbances. We observe yit =1 if y*it 
>0 and yit =0 otherwise. As in Chamberlain (1980) we specify zi = Ȉtyit, the sum of yi for the 
whole sample period, as the set of sufficient statistics for the conditional likelihood function. 
In other words, zi, the number of quarters when a BHC used derivatives, is used to eliminate 
the BHC specific constant term Įi from the likelihood function. Therefore, our conditional 
likelihood functions, one for each BHC, contain the sufficient statistics zi and the parameters ȕ, 
as well as xit and Įi, in the conditioning set. The joint likelihood function of all BHCs over the 
sample period is then maximized with respect to the common ȕ.  
 
For example, suppose a BHC used derivative for hedging only once during its 36 
quarters covered by the sample period. Then there are 36 alternative quarters when the use of 
derivative may occur. Suppressing the Įi, xit and ȕ terms in the conditioning set and assuming 
a logit distribution, the conditional probability for this BHC must be one of the following: 
 
Prob (1, 0, 0, …, 0 | Ȉtyit = 1) = D
e ii
xx )(' 36,1 −β
 
 
Prob (0, 1, 0, …, 0 | Ȉtyit = 1) = D
e ii
xx )(' 36,2, −β
 
Â 
Â 
  64 
Â 
Prob (0, 0, 0, …, 1 | Ȉtyit = 1) = D
1
, 
             where D = 1)(')(')(' 36,35,36,2,36,1, ++⋅⋅⋅++ −−− iiiiii xxxxxx eee βββ . 
 
Analogously, the cases where 1< Ȉtyit < 36 can be obtained by altering the terms in the 
nominators to include the corresponding combinations of xit terms. As can be seen from this 
example, the heterogeneity terms Įi no longer influence the outcomes of yit. Also note that for 
those BHCs, whose zi = 0 or T, meaning that they did not use derivative or used derivative 
during the entire sample period, the conditional distribution function is degenerate. These 
observations do not contribute to the conditional likelihood and therefore are excluded from 
the estimation.  Intuitively, for these BHCs the probability of being derivative user or nonuser 
is known with certainty and therefore does not depend on the explanatory variables.   
The Chamberlain (1980) approach allows us to draw inference regarding the 
interaction between BHCs decision on derivative and the firm specific and macroeconomic 
explanatory variables. Effectively, the likelihood that one BHC uses derivatives for hedging in 
some quarters is equated to a function of the explanatory variables corresponding to those 
derivative-using quarters and the nonderivative-using quarters. Therefore, we will know what 
difference in the BHC specific characteristics and/or macroeconomic factors results in the 
higher likelihood of being a derivative user.   
We estimate the model coefficients for the use of interest rate derivative and credit 
derivative separately. We include all qualified observations by implementing the model in an 
unbalanced panel. Specifically, we do not put constraint on the number of quarters a BHC 
must be present in our sample. As long as there is a switching of status of being derivative user 
or not in the available quarters, a BHC is included in our estimation. In so doing, we retain the 
maximum amount of information the sample has to offer. 
 
3.5 To use or not to use derivatives for hedging: results of the binary model 
 
In order to facilitate a convenient overview on our results and comparison with the findings in 
the literature, we summarize the signs and levels of significance of variables in other studies 
and ours in Table II. 
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Table II 
Comparison of findings: hedging with interest rate and credit derivatives 
This table compares the major findings in the literature on the determinants of the use of interest rate 
derivatives (panel A) and credit derivative (panel B) for hedging with the findings in this paper. The 
estimation of the ordered multinomial fixed-effect panel logit model (the last column) uses the first 
difference in the explanatory variables. We present the signs and the significance levels of the variables 
modeled in the literature and in this paper. The sign “+” means the found relationship is positive. The 
sign “–“ means the found relationship is negative. “Mixed” means that the signs may differ depending 
on the conditioning set. A blank cell means the corresponding variable is not covered in the study. 
Significance level: *** means significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. If the 
significance levels are different in different conditioning sets, we report the lowest one. Please refer to 
Appendix for the description and construction of variables. 
 
Brewer, Minton and Moser 
(2000)
Purnanandam 
(2007)
Methodology Cross-sectional based on 
Chamberlain (1982, 1984)
Pooled logit Binary fixed-effect 
panel logit based on 
Chamberlain (1980)
Ordered multinomial fixed-
effect panel logit based on 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters (2004)
Unused loan commitment + + *** -
Total loan ratio + +
C&I loan ratio + ** - -
Other loan ratio + +
Total deposit ratio - * - *** - 
Demand deposit ratio + *** +
Transaction account ratio - +
Liquid asset ratio - *** mixed +
Tier 1 capital ratio + +***
Equity ratio +
NPA ratio mixed -
C&I loan charge-off -
Maturity gap ratio + *** - -
ROA + -
ROE + *** -
Interest margin + -
Total asset growth +
Size + ** + *** + ***
Loan sale dummy + *** + ***
Securitization dummy - -
Trade interest rate derivative
dummy
- *** -
T-Bill rate - *** - *** + ***
Volatility of T-Bill rate - - ** -
Term spread - *** - *** - ***
Credit spread - *** + *** +***
Employment growth +
Number of observations 14181-18017 8439 13100 17400
Panel A: Determinants of interest rate derivatives
This paper
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Table II Continued 
 
Methodology Panel and cross-section Pooled logit Binary fixed-effect panel
logit based on
Chamberlain (1980)
Ordered multivariate fixed-
effect panel logit based on
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters (2004)
Unused loan commitment - - +
Total loan ratio - *** - -
C&I loan ratio + *** mixed - -
Other loan ratio mixed - *** mixed +
Total deposit ratio - - *** - +
Demand deposit ratio - *** - +
Transaction account ratio + *** + ** +
Liquid asset ratio + mixed - -
Tier 1 capital ratio - ** + + -
Equity ratio -
NPA ratio + mixed - -
Maturity gap ratio - + -
ROA + - +
ROE - - -
Interest margin - *** - *** - * -
Size + *** + *** + *** -
Loan sale dummy + *** + mixed -
Securitization dummy + *** + *** + + **
Trade credit (this paper)
or other derivatives
(Minton et al 2006)
dummy
+ *** + *** + *** + ***
T-Bill rate - *** - +
Volatility of T-Bill rate + + -
Term spread - *** - -
Credit spread mixed - +
Sample period
Number of observations 294 - 529 54400 1071 1612
1999-2003 1997-2005
Panel B: Determinants of credit derivatives
Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2006) This paper
 
 
 
3.5.1 Hedging with interest rate derivatives 
 
We summarize and analyze the results from fixed effects logit model with binary outcomes. As 
aforementioned, these results answer the question why a bank hedge in some quarters with 
derivatives but not in others.  
As can be seen in the fourth column in Table II Panel A and also in Table III the 
relationship between various categories of on-balance sheet loans and the likelihood of 
hedging with interest rate derivative is consistently weak. None of the loan to total asset ratios 
is statistically significant. However, the ratio of unused loan commitment to total asset is 
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statistically significant and positive.  
Together the coefficients of these loan-related variables suggest that it is not the on-
balance sheet loans but the off-balance sheet loan commitment arrangements that determine if 
a bank uses interest rate derivative to hedge in some quarters but not in others. This is 
consistent with the theoretical suggestion by Ho and Saunders (1983). It seems that banks 
need additional protection against the risks brought by the increased level of loan commitment, 
which may not be completely compensated by the fees charged on these off-balance sheet 
instruments. Our findings suggest that banks tend to transfer their off-balance sheet rather than 
on-balance sheet loan risk to other parties via interest rate derivative. Given the fact that about 
80 percent of C&I loans are made through loan commitment, the insolvency in the interest rate 
derivative market may well result in credit crunches in the C&I loan market as banks may fail 
to fulfill previously established commitment contracts or request the renegotiation of the terms 
in the contracts. In the mean time, the existing loans should not be adversely affected. What 
deserves attentions for the borrowing companies is the refinancing of these loans or 
commercial papers through the established commitment arrangements.   
     As shown in the Table III, the various measure of deposit enters the model separately.  
The effect of total deposit appears to be significantly negative, which support the natural 
hedging mechanism in Gatev and Strahan (2006); the coefficients of demand deposit are 
comparably significant but positive. The transaction account does not seem to have a 
meaningful influence. Deposits that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
may offer a natural hedging for the cash flows of banks (Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan 2005, 
Gatev and Strahan 2006). The flight-to-quality motivation of the investors during bad times, 
which results in the credit market for firms to shrink due to high risk, also produces cash 
inflows for banks as investors move their funds to bank deposits, thereby naturally hedging the 
shortfall of funds in funds as firms now turn to banks for financing. Since total deposit can be 
decomposed into demand deposit, transaction account and various categories of time deposit, 
and savings and money market accounts, our results imply that the substitution effect between 
deposit and derivative mainly comes from deposits other than demand deposit. Considering 
the characteristics of demand deposit, such results are not surprising. Demand deposit is 
subject to high withdrawal risk and the cost of non-interest bearing reserve requirements. This 
means that demand deposit is an unreliable and expensive source of financing for banks. The 
same also holds for the transaction accounts, though to a lesser extent due to the interest 
paying ability and minimum balance requirement normally imposed on depositors by banks. 
Money market account, savings account and time deposit all have less withdrawal risk than 
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demand deposit and transaction account and therefore should be a more reliable source of 
financing. 
The spread between the risk-free interest rate and the AA non-financial commercial 
paper rate, our measure of the credit spread, significantly increases the likelihood of a BHC 
hedging with interest rate derivatives. The commercial paper market is a substitute source of 
financing for companies besides bank loans. In usual times, companies increasingly find the 
commercial paper market offering more favorable rates for their financing needs. However, as 
the condition in commercial paper market tightens and the spread of commercial paper above 
treasury bills shoots up, companies would find refinancing their expiring commercial papers 
impossible and resort to banks, in particular their unused bank loan commitment contract for 
the rescue (Gatev and Strahan 2006). This is also one of the risks accompanied with loan 
commitment envisioned by Ho and Saunders (1983). Banks in this situation may face sudden 
takedowns on their loan commitments and the associated liquidity shortage. With this 
knowledge, it should come with no surprise that the increase in the credit spread makes it 
more likely for banks to hold derivative protections.     
The management of the maturity gap ratio, as an on-balance sheet hedging alternative 
to the off-balance sheet hedging with interest rate derivative (Purnanandam 2007), has a 
consistently negative, albeit insignificant, impact on the likelihood of hedging with interest 
rate derivatives.  Given the negative mean gap ratio in our sample, the reduction in the asset 
shortfall provides weak substitute for the interest rate derivative as a hedging instrument. Such 
a weak relation may be because the adjustments to assets, i.e., the reduction of existing loans 
or acquisition of new ones, are not as easy as entering into a derivative contract.   
The level and volatility of interest rate and the term spread between short and long 
term interest rate all have significantly negative impact on the likelihood of hedging with 
interest rate derivative. We suggest that the interest rate variables must be considered together 
with the negativity of the gap ratio in our sample that is also in the conditioning set. Given a 
mean asset shortfall in our sample, an increase in the interest rate will reduce the market value 
of this shortfall and push the maturity gap closer to zero, which in turn reduces the need for 
hedging. Such an interpretation raises another question: will the effect of interest rate 
movement be different should the sample mean gap be positive?
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Table IV and V answer the above question. We split the sample into two parts, one with 
the BHCs that have positive mean gap ratio and another with negative mean gap ratio over the 
sample period, and apply the same econometric modeling. Clearly the effect of the level of 
interest rate movement has the same effect on the likelihood of using interest rate derivatives 
in both sub-samples. The coefficients are consistently and significantly negative. Apparently, 
what matters to the risk management of banks is the magnitude of the gap rather than the sign. 
The increases in interest rate will also reduce the positive gap to a smaller figure closer to zero. 
As maturity gap approaches zero, the need for a bank to hedge reduces. This explains why we 
have the same result as Purnanandam (2007) who uses the absolute value of the maturity gap 
measure. Similarly, Schrand (1997) finds that hedging with interest rate derivative always 
move maturity gaps, positive or negative, closer to zero and thereby reduces banks stock 
interest rate sensitivity. Purnanandam deduces that the negative impact of interest rate on the 
likelihood of derivative use may result from banks closing their previous derivative contracts 
in a rising interest rate environment to meet loan demands.     
However, our analysis in the two sub-samples reveals a difference in the effect of the 
volatility of interest rate on the likelihood of derivative use. While the impact of the monthly 
standard deviation of the interest rate consistently has negative signs, such negative impact is 
statistically significant for those BHCs that have a negative mean gap ratio as shown in Table 
V. How could this phenomenon be explained? As the volatility of the interest rate increases, 
the value of the gap also becomes more volatile, which can be translated into higher interest 
rate risk. It is possible that the conjecture by Purnanandam (2007) also applies here. Banks 
may exercise their derivative holdings in times of rising interest rate risk and realize the 
compensation from these derivative contracts for their liquidity shortfall. Such a tendency 
should be stronger for banks with a negative gap ratio. Another possible explanation is that the 
price for the derivative contract, e.g., the up-front fees for options, may become unaffordable 
in times of high risk. The banks with a negative gap ratio are more likely to exercise the 
derivative contracts and therefore may face even higher obstacles in entering such a protective 
arrangement. 
The spread between the one-year and 10-year Treasury bill rate appears to significantly 
reduce the likelihood of banks using interest rate derivatives for hedging. This significance 
should also be considered together with the conditioning on the gap ratio.  
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Theoretically, maturity gap is the difference in the weighted maturity of long- and 
short- term assets versus liabilities. Since the data is not detailed enough to construct the exact 
measure for maturity gap, we follow Flannery and James (1984) to use the difference between 
the dollar value of assets subject to re-pricing within one year and the dollar value of liabilities 
to be re-priced within the same the period. The effect of this approximation is that we now 
effectively measure the gap between short term assets and short term liabilities with the same 
maturity, whose sensitivity to interest rate movement shall be the same. As a result, the 
movement in interest rate would have the same effect on the discount rate applied to both the 
assets and liabilities approximated by our measurements. As a consequence of this inevitable 
approximation, the part of maturity gap that results from the mismatch between short term 
liabilities and long term assets is not being conditioned upon. The impact of the remaining part 
of maturity mismatch on the likelihood of derivative use appears to be picked up by the term 
spread. 
Loan sales and securitization have been studied in the context of credit risk transfer 
(see Kiff, Michaud and Mitchell 2002 and Minton, Stulz and Williamson 2006) and are shown 
to be alternatives to derivatives when the lemon problem and relationship lending are not of 
concern. To the extent that loan sales and securitization alter the bank’s balance sheet structure 
and reduces the interest rate exposure of assets by removing some loans from the balance 
sheet, they can also be the alternative to interest rate derivatives in satisfying the bank’s 
hedging needs. Implicitly here is that the presence of loan sales and securitization also 
indicates the opportunity or necessity of a bank to reduce its interest rate or credit risk 
exposure. Our results show that the dummy variable of loan sale has a significantly positive 
relation with the likelihood of hedging using interest rate derivatives. This should be 
understood as saying that banks/quarters that use loan sale corresponds closely to the 
situations where the need for hedging using interest rate derivative is also present, which result 
in the parallel use of derivatives and loan sales in those bank/quarters. Securitization however 
does not appear to offer meaningful explanatory power.   
The measures of profitability we investigate include return on asset, return on equity 
and interest margin (the ratio of net interest income to total asset). Although all measures have 
positive signs, only ROE appears to be statistically significant. Such a strong and positive 
impact of ROE on the likelihood of hedging with derivatives can be seen as saying that as the 
bank becomes more valuable to the shareholders, the need to preserve such profitability, or the 
charter value of the bank, increases which in turn results in more hedging activity. 
Nonperforming assets only demonstrate a weak positive relation on the hedging activity of 
  77 
banks.   
 
3.5.2 Hedging with credit derivative 
 
Table VI reports the estimation output for the likelihood of hedging with credit derivatives. 
This likelihood primarily and consistently depends on two factors, the size of the bank and if 
the bank participates in the trading of credit derivatives. These are consistent with the 
literature on the use of credit derivative for hedging that shows that large banks are the 
predominant user of credit derivatives (see e.g., OCC 2005, and Minton, Stulz and Williamson 
2006). Also consistent with the literature are the negative impact of interest margin and total 
deposit ratio, and the positive effect of securitization on the use of credit derivatives (Minton, 
Stulz and Williamson 2006). Loan commitment appears to have small albeit consistently 
negative coefficients. This finding lends some support to the conjecture that loan commitment 
reduces the risk of banks (Boot and Thakor 1991) in that if loan commitment reduces the risk 
exposure of banks, the need to engage in hedging with derivatives should decrease.   
     Yet we are unable to confirm other findings in the paper by Minton Stulz and 
Williamson. In particular, we did not find a trace of positive impact of loan measures11 on the 
use of credit derivatives; the effect of loan sales is inconsistent in signs across different 
conditioning sets and never significant. Among the possible reasons for this disparity, the 
different sample period and modeling methodology may be the most important.   
                                                        
11
 In the paper by Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2006) various categories of loans are scaled by total loans. 
In our study, we use total asset for the scaling purpose. However, our results still hold if we use total loans 
to scale C&I loans and other loans.   
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3.6 The adjustment in hedging with derivatives as ordered multinomial responses 
 
With the above binary estimation we answered the question why a BHC hedges with 
derivatives in some periods but not in others. A disadvantage of the above methodology is that 
being forced to consider only those BHCs that switch their derivative-use status at least once 
we had to discard those cross-sections that have used derivative for the entire sample period 
and lost valuable information. Furthermore, with binary choice we cannot observe the fine-
tuning of derivative holdings by BHCs and its underlying determinants. In other words, we 
cannot answer the question what makes BHCs increase or decrease their derivative hedging 
from the previous periods, or keep their derivative hedging unchanged. To shed lights on these 
more detailed activities, we further our analysis with an ordered multinomial model.  In 
particular, we specify the following five categories of derivative adjustments by BHCs 
corresponding to different actions taken on their current derivative engagement from the 
previous quarter. Let Dt denote the notional amount of a BHC’s derivative holding,  
 
yit = 1 if Dt-1 = Dt = 0 
  2 if Dt-1 > Dt = 0 
  3 if Dt-1 > Dt > 0 
  4 if Dt-1 = Dt > 0 
  5 if Dt > Dt-1  0 
 
Note that there is a clear ordering in these mutually exclusive specifications. While the 
ordering is not in terms of the actual notional amount, we can interpret them as follows: from 
1 to 5, the need or perceived benefit of hedging with derivatives increases. Note that we do not 
distinguish between the two cases where a BHC either increases its derivative holding from nil, 
or increases its existing derivative holding. It is hard to argue which has a higher ranking; but 
compared with the other four alternatives both cases represent the strongest willingness or 
benefit to use derivative for hedging. With this ordered multinomial specification, we not only 
more explicitly model the specific nature of actions taken on the derivative position of the 
BHCs on a quarterly basis, but also expand the sample to include those BHCs that use 
derivatives for their whole available sample period. As in the binary case, we use an 
unbalanced panel in an effort to preserve all information we have. Note that since the 
dependent variable now has reference to the previous quarter, we use the first difference of the 
explanatory variables in the estimation. The later interpretation will then be in terms of the 
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impact of the magnitude of the changes in the BHC specific variables and the macroeconomic 
factors from the previous quarter on the adjustment of derivatives held for hedging from the 
previous quarter.   
The conditional likelihood functions now include the sum of the number of quarters 
when a BHC adopts each one of the five mutually exclusive adjustment alternatives in the 
conditioning set. In other words, the new likelihood function is conditioned on, in additional to 
the explanatory variables and the coefficients in ȕ, five sums, one for each of the five 
adjustment alternatives specified above. Like in the binary case, we are only interested in 
those BHCs that have altered their derivative position at least once. That is, at least two of the 
five alternatives in yit must appear in all available T for a BHC to be included. This means we 
include all BHCs that have derivative holdings in at least one of the quarters during our 
sample period. Note that even if a BHC used derivative in only one quarter, there would be 
two values in yit. For example, if a BHC used derivative only in t, then yi, t = 4 because from t-
1 to t, the derivative holding increases; then yi,t+1 = 2, because its derivative holding decreases 
to zero during the period from t to t+1. The model specification can now be formulated as 
 
           yit = dk ļ sid y*itsid+1                                    (1) 
where y*it = Xit ȕ+ Įi + İit 
 
In our specification, dk = 1 to 5, representing the different degrees of change in the 
engagement in derivatives for hedging purpose. Si is the threshold for a bank-quarter 
observation to correspond to a particular dk value. The value of Si is specific to BHC and 
invariable across the time dimension for a BHC. This threshold is regulated by the underlying 
latent y*it, which is a function of Xit, the vector of explanatory variables we chose and Įi that 
captures the BHC specific fixed-effect. İit has the logistic distribution and is assumed to be 
unobserved factors uncorrelated with xit. Note we can specify either Įi or Si to be BHC specific, 
or both. The point is because of the presence of the BHC specific effect the threshold for 
various dk differs across BHCs.   
The challenge in estimating this specification is that compared with the classical 
Chamberlain (1980) specification on the conditional logit model, specification (1) require 
multiple threshold parameters and the joint probability of yit = dk, i, t =1 … dk, i, t =T for all dk 
values. The inclusion of the joint probability would involve the BHC specific effect appearing 
in multiple occasions in the conditioning set for the likelihood function, which cannot be 
eliminated by the Chamberlain methodology. In particular, the likelihood function now 
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becomes 
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This likelihood function has the sum of yi equal a particular dk value for all dk values over the 
available T
 
that are observed in the yit series. Therefore, the BHC specific parameter appears in 
each of the cases where a different dk value appears. The Chamberlain (1980) methodology 
however can not distinguish more than two alternatives. The consequence is that the 
knowledge on the number of times all possible dk value occurred as reflected in yit does not 
allow us to uniquely separate one set of yit that corresponds to a dk value from the sets of yit 
that correspond to all other dk values12.   
To solve the problem, we adopt the extension by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) 
on the Chamberlain (1980) model into the ordered multinomial case. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters (2004) solve this issue by introducing a new parameter in the likelihood function Cit 
and transform the multivariate model into a binary one. Cit is a matrix composed with rows of 
binary variables that equals to one if the observed yit is larger than a particular dk value. If all 
dk values are used, we have a maximum of four rows in the matrix, representing those yit that 
are larger than 1, than 2, than 3, and than 4, respectively. The number of columns depends on 
the number of quarters a BHC has observations. For example, if we observe a yit sequence for 
a BHC that has three quarterly observations, or yit = {1, 2, 5}, the transformed sequence will 
become C’it = { }' k t,i,C = °¿
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, which correspond to yit>1, yit>2, yit>4.  (The index 
K is the number of the values dk can take, or K=5). Now, the original yit series is transformed 
into three binary variables. Apply this transformation to all BHCs, we transform all 
observations into binary variables and expand the dependent variable by either T, the available 
quarters of observations for a BHC, or K-1=4, corresponding to yit>1 to yit >4, whichever is 
the lowest. The conditional likelihood function for each BHC now, depending on what values 
of dk appear in the observed yit series, becomes 
 
                                                        
12
 Note that if there are only two observations available for a BHC, the ordered multinomial specification 
collapses to a binary case where the Chamberlain (1980) methodology can also be applied. 
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The Cit in specification (2) is one of the columns in the matrix Cit, which encompasses the 
transformed dependent variable for all appeared Dk values. That is, specification (2) says that 
there is one likelihood function that corresponds to a particular transformation. The sufficient 
statistics now is the number of occurrence of one after transforming the yit series according to 
a particular Dk. Assuming a logistic distribution, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters show that the 
probability function, adapted to our case, can be written as: 
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P is the likelihood function, which no longer depends on the BHC specific Į. The numerator is 
the likelihood of the observed sequence of yit, after a particular transformation. The 
denominator is the likelihood of all possible sequence of yit, which encompasses all four 
possible transformations, provided the corresponding dk values are observed. In the estimation 
however, only one transformation is applied to a BHC. The objective is to maximize the 
likelihood function with respect to the common coefficient vector ȕ, whilst allowing different 
BHCs to have different conditioning set in terms of the transformation and the resulting 
sufficient statistics. To this end, the maximum likelihood estimator of ȕ with the minimal 
variance is estimated using the Chamberlain (1980) methodology13. 
 
3.7 Results from Panel data analysis with ordered multinomial outcomes 
 
3.7.1 The adjustment of interest rate derivatives held for hedging 
 
We use the methodology of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) to answer the question what 
changes in the bank balance sheet structure and macroeconomic factors make it more likely 
that banks increase or decrease their hedging with derivatives. Table VII A reports the results. 
                                                        
13
 We thank Paul Frijters for providing us with the computer program used in Ferrer-i-Carboneel and 
Frijters (2004). 
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Note that with the new methodology we are able to expand the sample size by 4000 
observations reflecting the fact that we now include banks that have used interest rate 
derivatives for the whole sample. In the case of interest rate derivatives, one surprising finding 
is that higher levels of change in Tier I risk capital appears to increase the likelihood of banks 
to increase interest rate derivatives for hedging. The Tier I risk capital specified by Basel II 
accord is designed to provide a good level of cushion against the shocks on bank liquidity 
resulted from various categories of risk, e.g., credit risk, market risk and operational risk. To 
this end, there doesn’t appear to be a relation between Tier I capital and interest rate risk and 
the need to use interest rate derivatives. However, since the calculation of Tier I capital is 
based on book value, the movement in interest rate may create considerable gap in Tier-I 
capital measured with market value (Saunders and Cornett 2005 page 573). That is, the market 
values of the components of Tier I capital being various categories of equity capital crucially 
depend on the difference between the market values of assets and liabilities. As interest rate 
rises, the market value of the assets would drop more than liabilities, which in turn reduces the 
market value of the Tier I capital. Such a development would not show in book value. In the 
most extreme case, the bank may become economically insolvent due to the rise in interest 
rate reducing the market value of assets to such an extent that the market value of the equity is 
wiped out. In addition, since Tier I capital also represents the shareholders’ interest, the higher 
the Tier I capital the higher the stake the shareholders have in the bank and the more risk 
averse they would be. The likelihood for hedging therefore increases. This is consistent with 
Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) in the sense that shareholder/manager chooses a 
hedging strategy to maximize firm value. This is also consistent with Stulz (1996) in that firms 
hedge to reduce downside risks.   
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     Similar with the results in the study on the binary outcomes, size appears to be 
significantly positive. However the interpretation here is that larger increases in the size of a 
bank increase the likelihood to hedge more with interest rate derivatives. Specifically, for 
example, the increase in size of a bank also increases the likelihood of the bank to use more 
interest rate derivatives for hedging, in the direction from 1 to 5 in our dependent variable 
formulation14. The theory by Allen and Santomero (1998) also applies here. As banks grow at 
a bigger pace the systematic risks also accumulates faster, which increase the need for banks to 
transfer these risks to the market.     
     More noticeably, the interest rate variable now becomes significantly positive. Coupled 
with the results from the study on binary outcomes, this means while high interest rate state 
reduces the need to hedge with interest rate derivative, larger increases (decreases) in interest 
rate increase (decrease) the magnitude of such need.   
 
3.7.2 The adjustment of credit derivatives held for hedging 
 
The adjustments in the hedging activity with credit derivatives as shown in Table VIII appear 
to primarily depend on the dummy variables for securitization and the participation in the 
trading of credit derivatives. The presence of securitization indicates the existence of assets 
whose risks may be laid off in the financial markets. In other words, the existence of 
securitization implies that there are credit risks on the bank balance sheet the financial markets 
are willing and capable of taking over. These risks seem also give rise to the necessity to 
hedge with credit derivatives. Or the use of securitization and credit derivatives are likely to be 
applied at the same time for the same purpose, i.e., to lay off credit risks to the financial 
market. 
                                                        
14
 For each BHC, a significantly positive covariate shifts part of the probability mass from the region 
corresponding to the first rank to the fifth and thereby increases likelihood of the occurrence of higher 
ranking events.  Exactly which region is increased unfortunately cannot be determined.  In addition, 
the region thresholds also differ among individual BHCs as a result of the specification in equation 1.   
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The involvement in the trading of credit derivatives means the banks take on some 
risks that the counterparties default. This is true when banks sells protection for a fee and 
when acting as intermediaries between two other firms. These risks are normally hedged by 
entering into other derivatives. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the increased use of 
credit derivatives for hedging is positively affected by these trading activities.   
 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter we examine the use of interest rate and credit derivative for hedging by U.S. 
bank holding companies (BHCs). We put particular emphasis on the contribution of banks’ 
loan making activities, both on- and off- balance sheet, to the likelihood of use of derivatives 
for hedging purposes. In particular, we investigate in a panel data setting how the variations in 
various categories of loans in a comprehensive panel of BHCs determine the likelihood of 
hedging with interest rate and credit derivative activities. We also examine to what extent 
interest rate and credit risks, the fundamental sources of the need for a BHC to hedge, explain 
the use of derivatives for hedging. We are motivated by the dramatically deepening 
involvement of banks in the derivative market for hedging and our limited knowledge 
regarding the relation of such involvement with banks’ liquidity creation function, i.e., loan 
making activities. 
     We found that while the on-balance sheet loans have little to do with banks 
engagement in interest rate and credit derivative, the increase in the off-balance sheet loan 
commitment appears to significantly increase the likelihood of a bank to become an interest 
rate derivative user for hedging. We also demonstrate the significant dampening effect of 
interest rates and term spread on the likelihood of hedging with interest rate derivatives. We 
explain this phenomenon by considering the interaction between the maturity gap and interest 
rates movements. As interest rate rises, the market value of any maturity gap becomes smaller 
which reduces interest rate risk exposure and the need for hedging. 
     The use of credit derivatives is mainly determined by banks’ engagement in the trading 
of credit derivatives. Size and the ratio of transaction account also play a role in determining if 
a bank becomes a derivative user or not for hedging. More profitable banks, as measured by 
interest margin, are less likely to be a derivative user for hedging. 
     One limitation of our study is that we do not explicitly study the potential relation 
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between IR derivative use and credit derivative use. Schrand and Unal (1998) argue that the 
management of credit risk and interest-rate risk is intermingled. Rather than viewing each 
source of risk separately, financial institutions should engage in joint risk management. 
Schrand and Unal suggest that credit risk can be managed through the selection of various 
interest-sensitive assets (e.g., loans) based on the likelihood of default while the interest-rate 
risk associated with interest-sensitive assets can then be managed through the use of 
derivatives or duration matching or both. While we do not explicitly model the potential joint 
determination of derivative use for interest rate and credit risk, we do explicitly incorporate 
various BHC balance sheet features in the likelihood function of derivative use. In addition, to 
the extent that the same explanatory variable is important in contributing to the likelihood of 
the use of IR derivative and the use of credit derivative, we implicitly show the (dis)similarity 
and connection between their determining mechanisms.   
 
Appendix: Variables and their construction 
 
This appendix lists the variables we used in the empirical study and their construction. All 
bank holding companies data items are from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies FR Y-9C filings maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. All 
items are available on a quarterly basis. The sample period starts in 1997 Quarter 1 and ends 
2005 Quarter 4. The interest rate, term spread and credit spread items are found on the 
historical statistical release by the Federal Reserve Board or Governors.   
 
Dependent variables 
 
Interest rate derivatives held for hedging: discrete variable that is based on the values of the 
variable BHCK8725 (before and incl. 2000 + BHCK8729). These items report the notional 
amount of interest rate derivatives held for hedging purposes15. 
 
Credit derivatives held for hedging: discrete variable that is based on the value of the 
variable BHCKa535. These items report the notional amount of credit derivatives on which 
the reporting banking holding company or any of its subsidiaries is the beneficiary. 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Size: natural logarithm of total asset BHCK2170. 
 
Tier-1 capital ratio: Tier 1 capital BHCK8274 divided by total asset. 
 
ROA: return on asset. Net income BHCK4340 divided by total asset. 
 
                                                        
15
 See Data dictionary part II on http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/bhc_data.cfm. 
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ROE: return on equity. Net income divided by total equity BHCK3210. 
 
Interest margin: Net interest income BHCK4074 divided by total asset. 
 
Total loan ratio: Total loan BHCK2122 divided by total asset. 
 
Total C&I loan ratio: the sum of total U.S. C&I (commercial and industrial) loan BHCK1763 
and total non-U.S. C&I loan BHCK1764, divided by total asset. 
 
Total other loan ratio: total loan – (total C&I loan + loan to foreign banks BHCK1296 + loan 
to foreign government and institutions including central banks BHCK2081), then divided by 
total asset. 
 
Liquid asset ratio: (Non-interest bearing currency & coin BHCK0081 + interest bearing 
balances in U.S. offices BHCK0395 + interest bearing balance in non-U.S. offices BHCK0397 
+ funds agreed to resell BHCKB989 + held-to-maturity securities BHCK1754 + available for 
sale securities BHCK1773) / total asset. (The item BHCKB989 had the code BHCK1350 in 
years from 1997 to 2001.) 
 
Total deposit ratio: the sum of interest bearing deposits in domestic BHDM6631and foreign 
BHFN6631 offices and non-interest bearing deposits in domestic BHDM6636 and foreign 
BHFN6631 divided by total asset. 
 
Demand deposit ratio: demand deposit BHCB2210 divided by total asset. 
 
Transaction account ratio: the sum of transaction accounts BHCB3187 BHOD3189 divided 
by total asset. 
 
Gap ratio: maturity gap divided by total asset. Maturity gap is calculated as follows: Short 
term deposit liability to be re-priced or mature within on year + the portion of long-term 
liability to be re-priced within one year) - earning assets to be re-priced or mature within one 
year.   
 
Non-performing asset ratio: the sum of loans, leases and other assets past due 90 days or 
more still accruing BHCK5525 and non-accruing BHCK5526 divided by total asset. 
 
Unused commitment ratio: (Credit card line BHCK3815 + commitments to fund commercial 
real estate, construction, and land development loans not secured by real estate BHCK6550 + 
other unused commitment BHCK3818) / total asset. 
 
Loan sale dummy: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the variable Loan or lease held for 
sale BHCK5369 is larger than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Securitization dummy: dummy variable that takes value 1 if either of the variable 
BHCK3534 (pass-through) or BHCK3535 (other) is larger than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Interest rate: 3-month Treasury bill rate. 
 
Interest rate volatility: the monthly standard deviation of the 3-month Treasury bill rate after 
adjustments using the Schwert (1989) methodology (see footnote 9). 
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Term spread: the residual of the regression of the difference between 10 year Treasury bill 
rate and one year Treasury bill rate on interest rate and a constant. 
 
Credit spread 1: the residual of the regression of the difference between 3-month AA non-
financial commercial paper and 3-month T-Bill rate (Paper bill spread) on interest rate and a 
constant. 
 
Credit spread 2: the residual of the regression of the difference between AAA corporate bond 
rate and BAA corporate bond rate on interest rate and a constant. 
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Chapter 4 
Equity Capital, Market Power and Bank Liquidity Creation 16 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The European banking industry has a number of special features that deserve examinations. 
First, the European financial markets are considered bank-based systems (see, e.g., Allen and 
Gale (2000), Allen et al (2006)) where banks are the major liquidity providers for business. Yet 
whether or not European banks indeed outperform their U.S. counterparts, which are thought 
to operate in a market based financial system, remains an insufficiently addressed question. 
Second, the competitive landscape of the European banking sector has gone through dramatic 
changes in the past couple of decades following regulatory developments. In particular, the 
Second Banking Directive adopted by European Union (EU) in 1995 allowed banks to freely 
operate in other EU countries by setting up branches or directly offering a full range of 
banking services. These regulations have implications on both the level of competition of the 
banking sector as a whole and the competitive position of individual banks in particular. How 
the liquidity creation activities of banks relate to these competition issues remains unclear. 
Next, the attitudes towards banking stability held by European and the U.S. governments are 
quite different. While it is a firm belief in Europe, founded on the many rescues orchestrated 
by European governments of their domestic banks and a more socialist ideology, that banks in 
Europe will not be allowed to fail so that depositors would suffer losses, bank failures in the 
U.S. take place more often17. Such a contrast in regulatory ideologies raises the question 
regarding the role of banks’ own equity capital as a cushion against bank failures or banking 
risks in general. The empirical substantiation of this issue has profound policy implications on 
                                                        
16
 This chapter is based on Berger et al (2009). 
17
 According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, there were 24 bank failures in U.S. in the period 
from October 2000 to 2004, which is the longest overlapping period we can find with our sample. While 
there is no such a comprehensive list of bank failure for Europe, the authors are not aware of a 
comparable number of European bank failures. In the 1980s, there were more than 1400 savings and 
loans institutions and 1300 banks that failed in the U.S., a magnitude unimaginable in Europe. It is also 
interesting to note that during the subprime crisis and the ensuing global financial crisis, there are 68 
bank failures in U.S. in 2008 and the first half of 2009. In Europe however, Northern Rock in the U.K. is, 
to the best of our knowledge, the only bank that is allowed to fail. The governments of Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, etc., have all played direct role in rescuing endangered 
banks and, in the case of Fortis Bank, have cooperated across national borders. 
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bank capital regulation. Finally, the EU is composed with a group of countries with widely 
diverse institutions. In particular, the coverage of deposit insurance, the strength of creditor 
protection, and legal origins all find themselves a wide spectrum in EU. The direct impact of 
these factors and the impact of these factors possibly interacted with other factors on bank 
liquidity creation are also directly examined or controlled for in this paper. 
In order to address the above research questions, we construct a unique dataset of 
banks for all 25 EU countries with detailed balance sheet data. As in Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), we measure liquidity creation for each individual bank by aggregating bank balance 
sheet items weighted by their liquidity characteristics. Specifically, we adopt the principle that 
€1 of liquidity is created when €1 of liquid liability is used to finance €1 of illiquid asset, and 
€1 of liquidity is destroyed if €1 of illiquid liability is used to finance €1 of liquid asset. We 
classify all bank balance sheet items into three classes, liquid, semi-liquid, and illiquid, based 
on the criteria how easily they can be converted into cash. Next, we assign weights to each of 
the classes. Liquid items are given a weight of 0.5, semi liquid items receive zero weight, and 
illiquid items receive a weight of -0.5. Finally, we sum all weighted items together to arrive at 
the amount of liquidity the bank creates. We take into account both on- and off- balance sheet 
items to embody the theories that banks create liquidity both with on-balance sheet operations 
(see e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993) and via instruments off-balance sheet (see e.g., 
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002). Our dataset contains the majority of banks in each individual 
country, which allows us to measure the level of concentration of a particular banking market 
as well as the market share of each individual bank in the market. We also distinguish between 
the old EU countries (hereafter EU15) and the newly admitted EU countries (hereafter 
Ascending EU), as well as between large and small banks. These distinctions help us 
disentangle possible institutional and structural differences between different groups of 
countries and banks.  
Overall, our liquidity creation measure confirms that the financial system in EU is 
more of a bank-based system than in the U.S., as evidenced by a much higher ratio of liquidity 
creation to GDP in EU than in U.S.  Equity capital is found to have strong and negative 
association with liquidity creation, especially for all small banks and large banks in EU15. 
Market share is consistently beneficial to liquidity creations except for small banks in 
Ascending EU. These results are generally robust to the control of creditor rights, bank 
ownership, and legal origins. 
We motivate our empirical studies by the following theoretical frameworks. First, the 
success of bank liquidity creation is determined not only by banks’ investment but their source 
  97 
of financing as well (Berger and Bouwman (2009)). Banks only create liquidity when they 
finance illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. If the European financial systems are indeed 
bank-based, it then may be the case that European banks have more illiquid and risky loans on 
the asset side of their balance sheets. In the meantime, the protection of banks by European 
governments are recognizably stronger than in U.S. (Benink and Benston 2005), which may 
render the liability side of bank balance sheet more illiquid as depositors do not require as 
much ability to withdraw their deposits in distress, i.e., to run on their banks. Therefore, the 
success of European banks in liquidity creation depends on whether illiquid assets outweigh 
illiquid liabilities. Note that our approach differs from the usual measurement of bank 
activities that are built on the amount of credit extended to the private sector or the ratio of 
total bank credit or total bank assets to a nation’s GDP. Our measurement of liquidity creation 
complements the literature by also taking into account the nature of the source of funding and 
thereby enabling a holistic comparison of financial systems, e.g., with the U.S. evidence in 
Berger and Bouwman (2009). 
Using the Berger-Bouwman liquidity creation measure, we document the amount of 
liquidity created by European banks over time. The more developed EU15 are the 
predominant contributors to this collective amount. The share of the Ascending EU is small 
but growing faster. In order to judge the importance of bank financing and to compare with the 
existing literature on U.S., we scale liquidity creation by GDP for the overlapping sample 
period between our European sample and the U.S. sample in Berger and Bouwman (2009). We 
find that the collective liquidity creation amount of U.S. banks18 during the 1998-2003 period 
is between 25% and 29% of GDP. In our European sample the range of the ratios is between 
74% and 101%, implying a much more important role of banks in the European economies19.  
Our next theoretical framework comes from the bank equity literature. We examine the 
role of equity capital in bank liquidity creation in light of two streams of theories that point to 
the opposite directions. On the one hand, Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) maintain that a 
fragile bank capital structure mainly composed with liquid deposit is essential for bank 
liquidity creation by forcing the bank to commit to the monitoring and collection of loans and 
                                                        
18
 The liquidity creation data by U.S. banks between 1993 and 2003 can be found in the website of Christa 
Bouwman.  
19
 In the existing literature (see, e.g., Allen et al 2006), bank loans are shown to be around 
110% of GDP in EU and 60% in U.S. By overlooking the liability side of bank balance sheet 
and the liquidity nature of all balance sheet items, these percentages overstate the importance 
of bank liquidity creation in the mentioned regions and underestimate the gap between EU and 
US in the importance of bank financing. 
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passing on the gains to the depositors. Equity capital that reduces fragility would reduce the 
commitment of banks towards depositors and hence their ability to create liquidity. Gorton and 
Winton (1995) suggest that illiquid equity capital could crowd out liquid deposits and thereby 
make the liability side of the banking sector balance sheet less liquid. In other words, a less 
liquid composition of bank liability part hinders bank liquidity creation. On the other hand, 
equity capital may be beneficial to bank liquidity creation due to its ability to absorb risks. 
Diamond (1984) and Froot and Stein (1998) suggest that banks must hold some equity capital 
of its own to weather the unexpected losses given rise by idiosyncratic risks such as credit 
risks. Since banks create liquidity when financing risky and illiquid loans, i.e., loans with high 
level of idiosyncratic risks, holding higher level of equity capital becomes essential for banks 
in liquidity creation. More capital, in this line of reasoning, could enhance liquidity creation. 
However, we also recognize that the general attitude of European government towards their 
banks is more protective. It is a strong belief in Europe that governments will not allow banks 
to fail and depositors to suffer losses (Benink and Benston (2005)). The government protection, 
implicit or explicit, can be a substitute for equity in risk absorption. In other words, banks are 
better off holding less equity capital given a stronger government guarantee. As a consequence, 
the role of equity in risk absorption and in facilitating liquidity creation could be curtailed. 
Overall, the theoretical prediction of the role of equity capital in bank liquidity creation in 
Europe suggests a negative relationship. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that equity has a significantly negative 
relationship with bank liquidity creation for all European banks with the only exception of 
large banks in Ascending EU where the negative relationship is insignificant. Based on these 
findings, particularly the finding that the role of equity is also strongly negative for the 
liquidity creation by small banks which have less opportunity to reduce risks by diversification 
or hedging and hence should benefit from equity capital in risk absorption, we argue that 
government guarantee dominantly substitutes the risk absorption role of equity in Europe. 
Given such an institutional context, the imposition of capital regulation such as the minimum 
capital requirement in the (revised) Basel II framework is likely to adversely affect bank 
liquidity creation in Europe.  
Third, the competition literature is also crucial to the examination of European banking 
sector. Since the adoption of the Second Banking Directive in 1995, European banks are 
allowed to operate in other EU countries by setting up branches or directly offering a wide 
range of banking services. In order to know the effectiveness of the Second Banking Directive, 
it is of significant policy relevance to examine how the market share of individual banks and 
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the competitive landscape of a banking sector affect liquidity creation. The existing 
competition literature provides contradictory predictions for the relationship between 
competition, market power and liquidity creation. On the one hand, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
suggest that high level of market concentration makes it more likely that small and risky 
borrowers can obtain bank loans because banks in more concentrated market can more easily 
inter-temporally smooth interest charges on the loans. On the other hand, the structure-
conduct-performance theory in banking suggest that market power is likely to adversely affect 
bank liquidity creation because banks in a less competitive environment are less likely to adapt 
their service range and price structure to the needs of their customers and thereby reducing the 
demand of banking services (see e.g., Berger and Hannan (1989, 1991) and Hannan (1991)).  
We find that the market shares of individual banks have significantly positive 
relationship with liquidity creation, except for small banks in Ascending EU. Market 
concentration is beneficial to liquidity creation by small banks in EU15 but is detrimental to 
liquidity creation by large banks in Ascending EU. These results suggest that controlling the 
overall level competition, banks with stronger market power create more liquidity, therefore 
consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1995). In the meantime, depending on the institutional 
context and the size of the banks, the level of market concentration formed by all banks in the 
market also affects liquidity creation by individual banks. We further investigate the impact of 
institutional context on liquidity creation next. 
The central messages from the first half of the paper include that holding more equity 
capital reduces bank liquidity creation, larger market share enhances liquidity creation, and 
market concentration may or may not affect liquidity creation depending on the region and 
bank size. Some of these results, particularly the last one, suggest that institutional context 
may also affect liquidity creation. More specifically, the diversity of the European countries 
may raise the question whether our findings are due to the true impact of the level of 
concentration of country’s banking sector, not due to other institutional factors. The second 
half of the paper addresses two alternative explanations. First, we examine the different levels 
of creditor protection amount EU countries. In our sample of European countries, EU15 
countries typically have stronger creditor protections than Ascending EU and small banks are 
more inclined to operate in countries scored higher in creditor protection. Since the credit 
protection we use measure the rights that lenders have against the borrowers in such event as 
default or breach of contract covenants, it has conceivable implications on bank liquidity 
creation. The existing literature typically found that banks operating in countries with stronger 
creditor rights issue more loans than in countries with weaker creditor rights (Djankov et al 
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2007). We extend this relationship to our study of liquidity creation and, more importantly, to 
the joined impact of creditor rights and market concentration on liquidity creation. The 
inclusion of the interaction between creditor rights and market concentration is motivated by 
the consideration that the power brought to banks by greater level of market concentration 
may depends on the protection the banks enjoy in disputes with borrowers. In countries with 
poor creditor protection, banks may not be able to successfully exercise contractual terms 
despite the market power they have brought by high concentration. 
We found that in EU15, the interaction between creditor rights and market 
concentration has significantly positive impact on liquidity creation. The interaction term 
however is significantly negative in Ascending EU for the liquidity creation by small banks. 
This is consistent with the finding that stronger creditor protection in developing countries 
may create inefficiency and injustice (Djankov et al (2003)), which, in our context, may 
reduce liquidity creation. Small banks in Ascending EU may be particularly prone to such 
inefficiency and injustice because unlike the large banks in their country they lack economic 
or political cloud. 
Next, we examine if our results are driven by bank ownership. Banks that have foreign 
operations may have more opportunity to diversify their portfolios among a wider customer 
base, which in turn may reduce risks and improve liquidity creation. However, foreign banks 
may not have as much knowledge about the local market and customers as the domestic 
competitors, which may force them to rely on standardized and liquid loans instead of 
relationship lending and in turn reduce liquidity creation.  
All our previous results regarding market concentration and creditor rights as well as 
their interaction generally remain robust to the inclusion of foreign ownership. Our results on 
ownership show that foreign banks operating in the Ascending EU, large and small, create 
more liquidity. Small foreign banks that operate in EU15 however create less liquidity. 
However, the significantly negative sign of the interaction term between foreign ownership 
and market share for large banks in Ascending EU signals that large foreign banks with large 
market share in the local market in Ascending EU create less liquidity. These results suggest 
that foreign banks that operate in the less developed banking market of the Ascending EU 
have advantages over the local competitors in liquidity creation. However, in the more 
developed EU15 banking market, small foreign banks are less capable than their local 
competitors in creating liquidities. In the meantime, if large foreign banks operating in 
Ascending EU also have large market share, they would reduce the liquidity position in the 
economy. These results may also imply that the effect of the Second Banking directive that 
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intends to improve Europe-wide competition in the banking sector may be asymmetric and 
more beneficial to Ascending EU because the presence of foreign banks improves the liquidity 
position of their economy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes a few key 
features of the European banking sector. Section 4.3 lays down the theoretical framework. We 
describe our data sources, data collection criteria and methods, and the features of our datasets 
in the next section. Section 4.5 reports and analyzes the baseline regression results. Section 4.6 
explores potential alternative explanations. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 The European banking market 
 
In this section we briefly discuss three key features of the European banking market that are 
relevant for this paper.20 First, European governments have traditionally played crucial role in 
the maintenance of financial stability, the rescue of endangered bank, and even the operation 
of banks. For example, during the Nordic banking crisis, both the Swedish and Finnish 
governments took control of the troubled banks (Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). French 
government provided extensive assistance to Crédit Lyonnais in the 1990s during its financial 
trouble and the subsequent restructuring (Coleman 2001). As a result of the precedence of 
government interventions and also the more socialist ideology, the common perception in 
Europe is that the governments will not allow banks to fail so that depositors would not suffer 
losses (Benink and Benston 2005). There could be two consequences to such an ideology. On 
the one hand, banks may undertake risky investments or reduce their capital holding to take 
advantage of the government guarantee. Hence equity capital would become an even more 
expensive source of financing due to its reduced necessity. In the meantime, depositors, 
knowing that they will be bailed out by the government if banks fail, would not have 
incentives to monitoring their banks. In addition, depositors feeling more secure about their 
deposits may opt for more illiquid type of deposit accounts such as time deposits rather than 
demand deposits because they do not require the ability to withdraw quickly during crisis. 
Both consequences may have implications on bank liquidity creation. 
Second, the dominance by large banks in the European banking sector is more severe 
than in US. As will be shown later, the amount of liquidity created by large banks (banks with 
                                                        
20
 Here it is sufficient to depict the general picture of the European banking market. A more detailed, 
country-level description is beyond the scope of this paper. Allen et al (2006) provides an excellent survey 
in this regard. 
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above € 1 billion total assets) is 20 to 30 times the amount created by small banks. In the US 
sample in Berger and Bouwman (2009), the difference is less than 10 times.  Larger banks 
are more capable of diversify risks among a wider product range and a broader customer base, 
which may improve their ability to creating more liquidity. Larger banks may also enjoy 
stronger market power brought by bigger market share and higher degree of market 
concentration. As we will review in the next section, both market share and market 
concentration may improve or obstruct liquidity creation. The different characteristics of large 
and small banks also make it necessary to investigate them separately. 
Finally, the EU is composed with countries of great varieties. We make the distinction 
between a more developed group composed with EU15 (also including Switzerland), and a 
less developed group consisting of the 10 newly admitted Ascending EU countries. The first 
group is characterized by stronger economies, longer history of institutional establishment, 
and also longer history of regulation adaptation such as the Second Banking Directive, etc. 
Many of the Ascending EU countries are ex-communist sovereigns with underdeveloped 
social and financial institutions. As we will later show that the EU15 countries have more 
powerful banks in the sense that most liquidity in Europe is created by banks in this group of 
countries. The separate treatment of these two groups of countries is necessary to disentangle 
the possible impact of economic and institutional environment on bank liquidity creation. 
 
4.3 Theoretical frameworks 
 
In this section we discuss the theories relevant to our examination of the European banking 
market. In particular, four schools of thoughts are closely related to our study of bank liquidity 
creation in a market as diversified as the European Union. The first is the quantification of 
liquidity creation. The second stream of theories relates to market competition and an 
individual bank’s market power and their effects on liquidity creation. The third is the effect of 
bank equity capital on liquidity creation and how this effect may differ in different institutional 
contexts. Finally, we review the literature on the possible interaction between institutional 
conditions of a country and banking sector competition and the effect of this interaction on 
bank liquidity creation. 
 
4.3.1 Quantification of liquidity creation 
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The theory of financial intermediation suggests that banks create liquidity by transforming 
liquid liabilities such as demand deposits into illiquid investment such as loans to enterprises 
(see e.g., Diamond 1984, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, and Boyd and Prescott 1986). 
Therefore, when quantifying the amount of bank liquidity creation, Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) suggest that the liquidity characteristics of all bank balance sheet items, assets and 
liabilities alike, needs to be appropriately accounted for. The Appendix to this chapter gives 
more details on the liquidity creation measurement we adopt from Berger and Bouwman 
(2009). In particular, we classify all bank balance items into three classes, liquid, semi-liquid, 
and illiquid, based on how easily they can be converted into cash at fair value. Examples of 
liquid assets include cash and government bills; a prominent example of liquid liability is 
demand deposits. Illiquid assets may be loans to corporations, and illiquid liabilities may be 
subordinated debt and bank equity. Banks only create liquidity when they finance illiquid 
assets with liquid liabilities. In other words, the determination of the success of European 
banks in liquidity creation should take into account both the assets side and liability side of 
their balance sheets.  
If European banks indeed are the main source of funding for companies as suggested 
by Allen and Gale (2000) and Allen et al (2006), it then may be the case that these banks have 
more illiquid and risky loans on the asset side of their balance sheets. In the meantime, 
European governments have traditionally been more protective of their banks in the sense that 
it is a widely held belief that European governments will not let their banks fail and their 
citizens suffer losses due to bank failure (Benink and Benston 2005). European governments 
have also orchestrated many rescues of their ailing banks21. In such a regulatory environment, 
the source of financing of European banks may also be more illiquid than their U.S. 
counterparts since depositors do not require as much ability to withdraw their deposits in 
distress, i.e., to run on their banks. Therefore, the comparison of European banks with their 
U.S. counterparts in liquidity creation after taking into consideration both bank’s assets and 
source of funding depends on whether illiquid investments outweigh illiquid liabilities. Note 
that our approach differs from the usual measurement of bank activities. In the existing 
literature, the effectiveness of bank liquidity creation is mainly measured by the amount of 
credit extended by the banking sector to the private sector. The comparison of financial 
systems also normally uses the ratio of total bank credit or total bank assets to a nation’s GDP. 
Our liquidity creation measure complements the existing one by also taking into account the 
                                                        
21
 See, e.g., Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995) for reviews of the Nodic bank rescue, and Coleman (2001) for 
the assistance given by the French government to Crédit Lyonnais. 
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nature of the source of funding and thereby moving one step further in establishing a holistic 
comparison of financial systems that also considers the liability side of bank balance sheet. 
 
4.3.2 Market power, market concentration, and liquidity creation 
 
Since the formation of the European Union, Europe-wide legislations have been 
adopted to foster a more competitive common European market that allows member states as 
much freedom in other member states as in the domestic market. One example of such 
legislation is the Second Banking Directive adopted by EU countries in 1995. Under this 
directive, European banks are allowed to operate in other EU countries by setting up branches 
or directly offering a wide range of banking services. In addition, several major European 
countries have gone through extensive reform of their banking industry under the premise of 
enhancing competition and improving banking efficiency22.  
The existing literature however provides contrasting theoretical as well as empirical 
grounds regarding the role of competition and market power in banking efficiency. On the one 
hand, Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest that market concentration helps improve bank 
liquidity creation by allowing the banks to retain customers and inter-temporally compensate 
the initial cost incurred in gaining the customers with the profit obtained at a later stage when 
the customers are locked in23. Petersen and Rajan also show that being more capable of 
locking in customers over longer period of time in such a market environment, banks are more 
likely to issue loans to small and risky borrowers. Therefore, banks create more liquidity in 
more concentrated market where the likelihood of movements of borrowers between banks is 
reduced. Bharath et al (2007) further show that banks with larger market share are more likely 
to be chosen by the borrowers for future loans and other information-sensitive banking 
business. 
On the other hand, the structure-conduct-performance theory in banking (see, e.g., 
Berger and Hannan, 1989) suggest that high concentration is likely to adversely affect bank 
liquidity creation because banks in a less competitive environment are less likely to adapt their 
service range and price structure to the needs of their customers and thereby increasing their 
own profitability but possibly reducing the attractiveness of banking services, which in turn 
                                                        
22
 See, e.g., Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) for a review and analysis of the French banking reform, 
and Perez (2001) for Spanish banking reform. 
23
 Berlin and Mester (1999) also show that banks are able to smooth out loan pricing over multiple loans in 
relationship lending. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) suggest that market power allows banks to charge 
excessive interest rates on borrowers for loans. 
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reduces bank liquidity creation. Hannan (1991) further suggests that interest rate charges on 
loans increase with market share and market concentration, implying higher prices for 
borrowers and lower demand for bank loans. 
Meanwhile, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Hannan (1991) show that high level of 
market concentration makes it less likely that banks would increase deposit rates while larger 
market share results in stronger likelihood that banks would decrease deposit rates. These 
results suggest that on the liability side of bank balance sheet weaker competition in the 
banking sector and stronger market power of individual banks may reduce the attractiveness of 
bank deposits. From the perspective liquidity creation, the impact of the price rigidity of 
deposit rate depends on if and where the depositors transfer their deposits after the bank 
reduces deposit rates. If depositors react to the adverse movement of deposit rates by 
transferring funds from time deposits to demand deposits, for example, to become ready to 
transfer the funds again to places with higher returns, then the liquidity creation measurement 
of the bank would be improved (albeit temporarily) because the bank now has more liquid 
composition of funding. If however, depositors stick to their original deposits despite the 
lower interest rates or they switch to bank equity, price rigidity on deposits will not reduce 
liquidity creation or even improve it because the liability side of bank balance sheet becomes 
more illiquid.  
We investigate the relevance of the existing theories in European banking sectors by 
including in our regressions both the degree of market concentration and the market share of 
individual banks. If stronger market power benefits liquidity creation, as in Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) and Bharath et al (2007), we would expect positive relationships between market share, 
market concentration and liquidity creation. If the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis 
dominates, stronger (weaker) market share and high (low) market concentration would both 
reduce (improve) liquidity creation. In addition to the examination of the impact of market 
share and market concentration on the collective liquidity creation measure, we also separately 
look at the asset and liability components of the liquidity creation measure. While the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis suggests the potential negative impact on both the 
borrowers and the depositors, it is not entirely clear how the positive effect on borrowers 
suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1995) above would affect depositors. By separately 
examining the asset and liability components of the liquidity creation measure, we can tell if 
the impact of market power and market concentration on liquidity creation is through assets or 
liability, or both channels.  
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4.3.3 Bank equity capital and liquidity creation 
 
There are two major schools of theories regarding bank equity capital and liquidity creation. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009) we call the first school the “fragility-crowding out” 
theory, which suggests a negative relationship between equity capital and liquidity creation, 
and the second “risk-absorption” theory, which suggests a positive relationship. Specifically, 
in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) the role of a bank is to represent a group of depositors and 
collectively channeling funds, in the form of deposits, to companies with positive NPV 
projects that need funding, and then monitoring the borrowers and collecting the loans. In this 
process, the bank, in its constant interaction with the borrower, can acquire private information 
on the nature of the borrower’s business and the quality or creditworthiness of the borrower. 
This information gives the bank an advantage over depositors in assessing the profitability and 
future viability of the borrower. This information advantage however gives rises to an agency 
problem. The bank has the incentive to increase its own profitability at the cost of the 
depositors by asking a bigger share of the interest income and thereby threatening to withhold 
monitoring or loan collecting effort. Knowing such a possibility, the depositors would be 
reluctant to entrust their deposits with the bank in fear of the bank abusing their funds and 
trust at a later stage. Knowing the potential actions by the depositors if the bank withholds 
effort, the bank will commit to the depositors in the first place by having a fragile capital 
structure that mainly consists of liquid deposits so that the bank would risk losing all funding 
if it attempts to withhold depositors. Equity capital reduces the fragility of bank capital 
structure and increases the bargaining power of the bank and therefore reduces the credibility 
of its commitment to the depositors. Knowing the reduced commitment, the depositors would 
not provide as much funding to the bank. The liquidity creation function of banks therefore is 
reduced by equity capital. 
Gorton and Winton (2000) suggest that in the whole economy there is a fixed total 
amount of deposit plus equity capital at any time. The increased equity capital must come 
from reduced deposit. In other words, equity capital can only grow by “eating into” deposits. 
In the process of crowding-out, the liquidity position of the whole economy decreases because 
there is more illiquid equity capital and less liquid deposit. Therefore, the financial fragility 
and crowding-out theories both suggest that equity capital has negative impact on liquidity 
creation. 
On the other hand, Diamond (1984) and Froot and Stein (1998) suggest that the role of 
bank equity capital is to mitigate risks that cannot be diversified. Specifically, banks, in 
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collecting deposits and channeling these deposits to entrepreneurs who need the fund for risky 
investments, face two categories of risks, systematic risk such as interest rate risk or exchange 
risk, and idiosyncratic risk such as credit risk. The key distinction between these two risk 
categories is that the former is well understood by the financial market and can easily be 
transferred away with such financial instruments as forward or future contracts, which are 
accessible at fair prices due to the many market participants that deal with them. The 
idiosyncratic type of risks however cannot be convincingly communicated to the general 
market. For example, the risk of a borrower to default or be downgraded, i.e., credit risk, can 
only be learned by banks in their regular interactions with the borrower over certain period of 
time. This knowledge is private to the bank in the sense that other market participants cannot 
know the true nature of the borrower without an established relationship and long-term 
interaction with the borrower. In other words, if the bank decides to share with other market 
participants their knowledge about a borrower, there is no way for others to verify the shared 
knowledge at little costs. Therefore, the idiosyncratic type of risks cannot be easily hedged in 
the financial markets and there are few standard financial instruments that a bank can buy to 
reduce credit risk exposure at fair prices24. In order to mitigate these risks, a bank must hold 
some equity capital of its own.  
Therefore, there is a direct relationship between bank equity capital and its ability to 
issue loans that have idiosyncratic risk components. The more equity capital a bank has, the 
more risky loans it would be able to issue. The reverse is also true. The more idiosyncratically 
risky loans a bank has, the more equity capital it has to hold. In this line of reasoning, there 
should be a positive relationship between bank equity capital and liquidity creation. 
However, equity capital is necessary when there is a need for banks to meet financial 
obligations in time of unexpected losses. If the banks have other fallbacks to rely on for 
absorbing the losses, the role equity capital would be diminished. In Europe, as suggested by 
Benink and Benston (2005), stronger government guarantees, explicit or implicit, can be 
considered substitute for equity capital. Benink and Benston also observe that banks in EU 
have traditionally held much less capital than their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, taking all 
theories together, we expect that the relationship between equity capital and liquidity creation 
is negative in Europe. 
 
                                                        
24
 Even though there has been a rapid growth in the credit derivative market, most standardized credit 
derivative products are only for the very large public companies for which analyst coverage is abundant. 
Other credit derivatives are mostly over-the-counter custom made contracts that are established case-by-
case. 
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4.3.4 Institutional context and bank liquidity creation 
 
Even though we try to disentangle the impact of institutional context on liquidity creation by 
running regressions separately for different bank size and country groups, there may be other 
factors that pollute the results. In particular, banks that operate in countries with stronger 
creditor protections are shown to issue more loans (Djankov et al 2007). The strength of a 
country’s creditor rights is important to bank credit because banks may become reluctant to 
issue risky or illiquid loans when they expect difficulties in settling dispute or default. This 
reluctance may come in the shape of higher interest charge on or direct refusal of applications 
for risky loans, which would reduce liquidity creation. Accordingly, in our investigation of 
bank liquidity creation, we add creditor rights and legal origin to our baseline models to see if 
these institutional factors offer additional explanatory power.  
Moreover, the inclusion of creditor rights is also helpful to ascertain that our results for 
the relationship between market power, market concentration and liquidity creation is not due 
to the influence of creditor rights. It is conceivable that banks operating in countries with weak 
creditor protection have to have high concentration so that the possibly higher legal costs in 
contract enforcement can be averaged out among broader customer base and wider product 
range brought by collective market strength. In this situation, the combination of higher 
market concentration and lower creditor rights may facilitate liquidity creation. Equally likely 
is the tendency that higher market concentration is formed in countries with stronger creditor 
rights. Stronger market position may only translate into profitability when the creditors are 
protected against the losses brought by the harmful behavior of the borrowers. If the creditors 
know that they cannot recoup their lending smoothly from default borrowers or borrowers that 
breach contracts, they may be unwilling to expand their market position to include more 
relatively high-risk businesses in the first place, which in turn reduces the likelihood of high 
market concentration and more liquidity creations. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to address the causality between creditor rights and market concentration, the above 
conjectures mean that there may be some interactions between the two. Therefore, we will also 
include the interaction term between creditor rights and market concentration in our model and 
it seems to be an empirical question how creditor rights interact with market concentration in 
liquidity creation. 
Additionally, the interaction between creditor rights and market concentration may 
have different impact on liquidity creation depending on the types of countries. Djankov et al 
(2003) suggest that stronger creditor rights in developing countries may create inefficiencies 
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and injustice. The reason is while the variable used to proxy creditor rights mostly measures 
the existence of certain legislatures that specify the legal rights of the creditors, it does not 
measure how easily the legislatures can be enforced (see Djankov et al 2007). In developing 
countries, the legal infrastructure may be less efficient in realizing the more complete set of 
creditor protection program and may therefore render the legal proceedings more cumbersome 
and costly to follow through. Therefore, in the developing Ascending EU countries, it is likely 
that high market concentration and stronger creditor rights can reduce liquidity creation 
because the banks with larger market shares may more often have to deal with the 
cumbersome legal procedures, which cost bank resources and hamper liquidity creations.  
 
4.4 Data 
 
To construct a dataset that has detailed balance sheet items for all banks, we started with the 
February 2008 version of Bankscope data downloaded from Wharton Research Data Service 
(WRDS) for all 25 EU countries plus Switzerland. Bankscope data can be accessed either 
directly via a browser based interface or WRDS. The advantage of the former is that the data 
may be more up-to-date, while the later access provides more data format and is much easier 
to download. However, WRDS may not be synchronized with Bankscope and has less up-to-
date data.  After downloading the data, we find in the early 2008 version, observations for 
2006 are only very sparsely populated. For some countries, the year 2005 also cannot be 
considered consistently populated. Take Germany, the largest economy in Europe, as an 
example.  In year 2004, Bankscope has 1376 banks for Germany but in 2005 the number 
dropped to 608. All other aggregate banking asset items also dropped dramatically. This is 
unlikely to be the realistic pattern but may be due to the delay in database construction. (We 
confirmed with Bureau van Dijk, the owner of Bankscope, that there is indeed a considerable 
time lag between the browser-based access to Bankscope and the WRDS). Similar 
inconsistencies exist in many countries in the data. In particular, the data before 1998 and after 
2004 appear to be very different from the period during the period in terms of number of banks. 
Therefore, we keep the data for the period from 1998 to 2004 to maintain the consistency of 
the sample coverage. 
Next, we address the duplication issue in the downloaded Bankscope data. For some 
banks, the original Bankscope data has duplicated entries in four ways. First, both the 
consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data are included for banking groups and/or 
  110 
banks operating in multiple countries. We keep only the unconsolidated data because we need 
to measure the amount of liquidity creation and the level of competition within the countries’ 
banking industry. Therefore, the overseas operations of multinational banks cannot be included, 
and the consolidated balance sheets that include the operations of the subsidiaries of the 
banking groups are not suitable. The use of unconsolidated balance sheet entries that 
separately account for subsidiaries and country-level units is appropriate. Second, banks that 
merged with or acquired other banks are duplicated in Bankscope prior to the combination. 
For example, if A and B merged, Bankscope may include A, B and the pro forma combined 
new company prior to the actual merger. After the merge, only the resulting new bank exists.  
We delete the pro forma entries from our database. Third, the insurance subsidiary of some 
Bankassurance companies, such as Fortis and ING, are also listed in Bankscope. We delete 
these entries to focus only on banking operations. Finally, in 2003 25  the European 
Commission demanded the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
Bankscope data reflects this regulatory change by listing both the balance sheet data under 
IFRS and under the original accounting standards (primarily the national GAAP) for some 
bank/countries. This duplication is particularly prevalent in year 2004 and in the new EU 
countries. It also happens that the duplication is present for some banks for the entire sample 
periods. As a solution, we delete all duplicated entries according to the following principle.  
If the duplication exists for the entire sample period, we keep the entries under IFRS; if only in 
a limited number of years are there duplicated entries under IFRS, we keep the entries under 
the original accounting standards consistent with the rest of the sample period. In our later 
econometric models, we will take into account the difference in accounting standards. 
 
4.4.1 Construction of the bank-level balance sheet data 
 
As can be seen in the earlier sections, our liquidity creation measures require very detailed 
bank level balance sheet data. Unfortunately the level of detail provided by Bankscope data is 
insufficient for most countries/years. In particular, the deposit items are almost always 
incorrectly aggregated into the item Other Deposits (DATA6030) while in reality, the deposits 
are spread over such items as demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits, etc.. Since 
deposits are the major source of financing for most banks and the correct classification of 
them is crucial to correctly construct our liquidity creation measure. The original Bankscope 
                                                        
25
 See European Commission Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003(2) and its subsequent amendments.  
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data cannot be directly used in its raw form.  
We solve this lack of detail by complementing the Bankscope data with manually 
collected bank balance sheet data from the annual reports. We assembled detailed balance 
sheet data from the audited annual reports for some of the largest banks in each country. The 
number of banks on which we collected data depends on the number of banks and the level of 
banking asset concentration in that country’s banking sector. For countries such as UK where 
there are more even distribution of banks among different size classes, we manually collected 
data for more banks, six banks in the case of UK. For other countries, such as Switzerland, 
where large banks predominate, we manually collected data for fewer banks, two banks in the 
case of Switzerland. However, six is the maximum number of banks we manually collected 
data for in all countries, and two the minimum.   
In collecting data from the annual reports, a further challenge is to find the values of 
the balance sheet items of banks operating in multiple countries at the domestic country level. 
This is because we need to measure the level of concentration and competition for a country’s 
banking sector. Counting in multinational banks’ operations in foreign countries will distort 
the competitive landscape of the domestic banking sector, and also overstate the amount of 
liquidity created by these banks in their resident countries. The balance sheets of our chosen 
banks offer various degrees of disclosure regarding their operations at the country-level.  
These different degrees of disclosure and our method of tackling with them can be grouped 
into the following situations:  
 
Situation A: if the banks disclose detailed country-level balance sheet/income statement 
information, we just use them.  
 
Situation B: banks may disclose only their country-level distribution of total assets. We then 
use the ratio of country-level total assets to consolidated total assets to calculate other items of 
the balance sheet. Specifically, we multiply the ratio of country-level assets to consolidated 
total assets by all other consolidated balance sheet items to arrive at the country-level figures 
of these items. 
 
Situation C: Banks may disclose only their country-level distribution of total income/revenue. 
We then use the ratio of country-level total income to consolidated total income to deduce all 
items of the balance sheet. 
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Situation D: Some banks disclose the distribution the number of employees and/or branches 
they have at the country-level. If none of situations A to C above turns out to be true, we use 
the ratio of the number of employees/branches in a country to the total number of 
employees/branches to calculate the amount of all balance sheet items in that country. 
 
Situation B to D may be present at the same time, or, in other words, banks that do not 
disclose all of their country-level balance sheet items may disclose more than one of the 
following items: country-level assets, country-level income, and/or distribution of overseas 
employees/branches. If more than one of these quantities are available, we calculate the 
average of these available ratios to arrive at the final ratios to be used for producing the whole 
balance sheet. Note however that in most cases, these different ratios are reasonably close to 
each other, with differences within 5%. 
In all the above four situations, it also sometime is the case that the country-level 
disclosures are available for less than the whole sample period. In that case, we will use the 
average of the ratios of the available years to fill in the missing years. 
With these methods, we gathered country level balance sheet data for 101 banks for the 26 
countries in our sample. Then we integrate these manually collected data in different ways into 
the downloaded Bankscope data to compile two sets of data that we will use for the main 
analyses and the robustness check. These datasets are: 
 
Data set 1: Main data set:  
 
Component 1: data for the hand-collected 101 banks; 
Component 2: original BankScope data for other banks, adjusting only the deposits items if 
necessary26.  
 
Data set 2: Robustness check data set: 
 
The original BankScope data for all banks, adjusting only the deposits items if necessary26. 
 
Additionally, in the above two data sets there are about 500 observations that have total 
off-balance sheet items higher than total assets in value. 75% of these observations belong to 
                                                        
26
 In some countries such as Belgium the original Bankscope is already detailed enough for the deposit 
items. In these countries we do not adjust for deposit items. 
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small banks, i.e., banks with less than € 1 billion total assets, and none of these observations 
come from the banks for which we manually collected data. Since it is well-known that small 
banks are much less active in the use off-balance sheet products and very unlikely to have 
such large exposures to them, we treat the OBS items of these observations as outliers and 
replace them with the average of the rest of the national sample. However, the regression 
results without these adjustments remain qualitatively the same. 
 
4.4.2 Adjusting for country and year differences 
 
The balance sheet items manually collected from the annual reports and those coming from 
Bankscope have different units and currency of denomination. The real values of these figures 
also differ across the sample period due to inflations. In order to make these figures 
comparable across all countries and years, we convert them into billions of euro using nominal 
exchange rates collected from the European Central Bank or national central banks. We then 
adjust for inflation using the GDP deflators collected from the World Bank for each country 
and year.   
 
4.4.3 Summary statistics 
 
Table I below presents the amount of liquidity creation, measured by our Cat Fat measure, of 
the 26 countries in the sample in 1998 and 2004, and the pattern of development over time. 
Table II presents the summary statistics of all other variables. We split our sample into large 
banks (TA above € 1 billion) and small banks (TA below € 1 billion). In 1998, the three 
countries whose banking sectors create the most liquidity on balance sheet are, in descending 
order, UK, France and Germany. In 2004, the banking sectors in these three countries still 
create the most liquidity, but the order changed to France, UK and Germany. Like the US 
banks in Berger and Bouwman (2009), large banks are the predominant liquidity creators in 
Europe as well, except for the new EU countries where large banks rarely exists, and small 
banks play more important roles, which can sometimes collectively create more liquidity than 
large banks.  In terms of quantity, the new EU countries fall far behind the more developed 
ones in liquidity creation.  In year 2004, all 10 new EU countries collectively create € 123 
billion, a mere 1.4% of all liquidity created by the 28 countries in that year. In earlier years, 
that ratio is even lower, at around 0.8%.   
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Graphs (not shown) of country-level liquidity creation over time demonstrate that the 
growth of liquidity creation also shows very distinct patterns among countries. While the new 
EU countries mostly witnessed steady growth (Czech Republic, Malta and Romania are the 
exceptions in this group), the more developed countries show a more diverse picture. While 
liquidity creation in countries such as the Netherlands and Spain grow smoothly, Germany and 
Switzerland see their banks create less liquidity than in history. Other countries show either a 
more horizontal line or a more zigzagged pattern. 
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Equity capital and liquidity creation 
 
As we discussed in the previous section, the financial fragility-deposit crowding out theories 
suggest that bank equity would reduce liquidity creation while the risk absorption theories 
suggest otherwise. We also reviewed that the institutional context of European banks where 
government guarantees are stronger may reduce the risk absorption role of equity. To test 
which of these forces dominate, we regress the Cat Fat liquidity creation measure on equity 
capital level, market power, and other control variables, controlling for bank and year fixed-
effects. The regression is done in the whole sample and in the sub-samples of large and small 
banks in EU15+Switzerland and Ascending EU separately. All explanatory variables, except 
the dummy variables, are lagged by one year. We examined alternative model specifications 
by varying the number of explanatory variables included and by varying the type of fixed 
effects included. The results of these alternative model specifications (not tabulated) show that 
our main results are robust. 
As can be seen in Table III, the regressions of the whole samples show that the ratio of 
equity capital to total assets is strongly negatively associated with liquidity creation for both 
large and small banks. The regressions of the sub-samples of EU15 and Ascending EU further 
demonstrate that the negative relationship is significantly negative in all sub-samples with the 
only exception for large banks in Ascending EU. The coefficients imply that for large banks in 
EU15 with a 1% higher in equity capital ratio create about 0.55% less liquidity of total assets. 
In the case of small banks, a higher equity capital ratio of 1% is associated with less liquidity 
creation of 4.6% (2.6%) of total assets in EU15 (Ascending EU). The negative relationship 
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between equity capital and liquidity creation for small banks is consistent with the findings in 
the U.S. sample by Berger and Bouwman (2009), which suggests that the financial fragility-
crowding out theories also dominates in small banks in Europe. However, for large banks, our 
finding of a significantly negative relationship between equity and liquidity creation contrasts 
with the positive relationship in U.S. (Berger and Bouwman 2009).  
 
Table III 
Regression results for Bank Liquidity Creation 
This table reports the regression results for European banks using the whole sample, the sample of the 
developed EU15 and Switzerland, and the sample of developing or Ascending EU counties, respectively. 
The samples of large and small banks are treated separately. The dependent variable is the ratio of cat fat 
liquidity creation measure to total assets. A banks/year observation is defined as large (small) if the total 
assets is equal or above (below) € 1 billion. The definitions of the explanatory variables can be found in 
Table II. All explanatory variables used are lagged by one year. The sample is unbalanced and covers the 
period from 1998 to 2004. Reported t-statistics in the parenthesis are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Large banks Small banks
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Cap Ratio -0.524*** -0.546*** -0.137 -0.467*** -0.462*** -0.264***
(-4.034) (-4.212) (-0.304) (-10.382) (-9.330) (-3.032)
Market share 0.441*** 0.574*** 0.385** -0.094** 106.911*** -0.016
(4.101) (3.581) (2.452) (-2.143) (8.507) (-0.200)
Market concentration -0.024 -0.015 -0.635*** 0.200*** 0.244*** -0.249
(-0.459) (-0.285) (-3.080) (9.260) (12.383) (-1.548)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.143 0.149 0.407 0.292 0.379 0.173
Observations 7049 6798 251 14541 13929 612
 
 
 
 
Such a contrast for large banks could be explained by the difference in the institutional 
context between Europe and U.S. banking sector. In European countries the explicit or implicit 
government guarantee for domestic banks is much stronger and in many occasions in history 
has been substantiated by concrete examples. In the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s, 
the governments of all affected countries played vital roles in the rescue and restructure of 
their ailing banks (Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). In the most recent sub-prime crisis and the 
ensuing global financial meltdown, countries such as the UK, Germany, and the Benelux 
countries have been active in preventing their home banks from bankruptcy. These strong and 
consistent government actions are in sheer contrast to the U.S. where there has not been 
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consistent precedence that government will prevent financial institutions from failing. In fact, 
during the Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, thousands of banks and S&L 
institutions failed. The strong government guarantees in Europe can be considered protection 
for depositors, a role similar to equity capital. Therefore, holding equity capital becomes less 
necessary and those that do are shown in our results to create less liquidity. This strong 
negative relationship is most likely because equity capital is a more expensive source of 
financing. The more equity a bank holds the higher its cost of financing would become and 
hence the higher the hurdle rate of return it must earn from making loans. Banks with higher 
hurdle rates and the resulting higher interest charges may have less willingness to lend and 
also drive the borrowers to borrow less or not at all, which in turn reduce liquidity creation.  
The absence of a comparably strong and negative relationship between equity and liquidity 
creation for large banks in Ascending EU could be explained by the fact that these banks are 
mostly foreign owned (see Table VI). The guarantee provided by the local governments may 
not be relevant to these banks.  
Our findings of a strong and negative relationship between bank equity and liquidity 
creation is particularly relevant to policy-makers in the consideration of capital regulation. 
During the aftermath of the subprime crisis and the ensuing global financial market meltdown, 
regulators such as the Bank for International Settlements actively form new regulatory 
paradigm aiming at strengthening bank’s capital base (see, e.g., BIS 2009). Our results suggest 
that such regulations could be harmful for bank liquidity creation and slow down economic 
recovery if the government cannot convincingly show that they will not attempt to rescue 
banks from failure. Such an attempt is unlikely to be successful given the past consistent 
government intervention in banking distress.  
 
4.5.2 Results: market power and liquidity creation 
 
In the regressions reported in Table III, the significantly positive coefficients of the market 
share of individual banks in the sub-sample of large banks in both EU15 and Ascending EU 
are consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1995). As risky loans load positively and more heavily 
on liquidity creation, the stronger ability of bank with high market power to grant such loans 
translates into a strongly positive relationship between market share and liquidity creation.  
For the sub-sample of small banks, Table III shows that market share helps liquidity 
creation only in EU15. In Ascending EU however, the effect of market share on liquidity 
creation is statistically nonexistent. Such a contrast also renders the examination of the whole 
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sub-sample of small banks, without splitting the country groups, inaccurate. In the regression 
of the whole sample, market share even has a significantly negative coefficient. The 
contrasting signs of market share suggest that the abilities of small banks to retain customers 
by gaining more market share and inter-temporally compensating interest income, as in 
Petersen and Rajan (1995), are likely to be absent in Ascending EU.  
In the baseline regressions reported in Table III, we also investigate the impact of the 
competitive landscape of the banking market on the liquidity creation by individual banks. We 
calculate the Herfindahl index of the domestic banking sector every year based on the cat fat 
liquidity creation measurement and include this index in the model as a measurement of the 
degree of concentration of the banking market. Compared with the concentration measurement 
typically applied in the existing literature that are based on bank assets, loans, or deposits 
alone, our Herfindahl index based on the cat fat liquidity creation measurement should be 
more suitable in judging the level of competitiveness of the whole spectrum of banking 
activities, both loan making and deposit taking. Unlike market share of individual banks, 
market concentration affects all banks in the market. Hannan and Berger (1991) also suggest 
that both market share and market concentration are likely to affect the pricing behavior of 
deposits by banks. 
As can be seen in Table III, market concentration is harmful for liquidity creation by 
large banks in Ascending EU but helps liquidity creation by small banks in EU15. These 
results complement the market share of the individual banks included in the regressions by 
controlling the competitive environment of the whole banking market. The results for large 
banks in Ascending EU suggest that holding the market power of individual banks constant, 
the more concentrated the banking market, the less liquidity the banks create. In other words, 
banks in a more concentrated market create less liquidity despite their market share. Such 
result can be seen as consistent with the prediction of the Structure-conduce-performance 
theory that banks in highly concentrated environment are more rigid in pricing setting or more 
likely to set prices that are to the disadvantage of the borrowers and/or depositors, which in 
turn reduces the attractiveness of banking product and liquidity creation. As to small banks in 
EU15, market concentrate enhances liquidity creation, which is on top of the benefit of larger 
market share.  
 
4.5.3 Asymmetry between asset and liability 
 
    The structure-conduct-performance theory suggests that market power and market 
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concentration have asymmetric impact on the asset and liability parts of the bank balance sheet. 
The benefits of larger market share such as the inter-temporal smoothing of interest charges in 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) may or may not be found in the liability part. To address the 
potential asymmetric relationship of the asset and liability parts of the liquidity creation with 
these competition measures, we disaggregate the Cat Fat liquidity creation measure into the 
asset and liability components and calculate the market share and market concentration based 
on these components only. Specifically, in Table IV the Asset (Liability) is the sum of all items 
listed in Appendix that can be classified into the asset (liability) side of the balance sheet, also 
weighted by 0.5, 0 or -0.5 according to their liquidity profile. Market share and Market 
concentration are then calculated with the new Asset (liability) component amount in a 
country/year. 
As can be seen in Table IV, the market share of individual banks has significantly 
positive association with liquidity creation for both assets and liability component for all bank 
size and country group, further strengthening the suggestion by Petersen and Rajan (1995) but 
also extending their findings to the liability side of bank operations. The coefficients for 
market concentration and the interaction between market concentration and creditor rights are 
however not as uniform. For large banks, the only significant interaction is found in EU15 for 
the liability part. Stronger market concentration of the banking operation on the liability side 
coupled with stronger creditor protection in this region significantly improved the liquidity 
profile of the liability side of balance sheets. This finding seems to be consistent with Hannan 
and Berger (1991) in that market concentration tends to reduce the rate banks offer to deposits, 
which likely makes interesting-bearing deposits such as time-deposits (a more illiquid type of 
deposits) less attractive and forces depositors to move to demand deposits (a liquid type of 
deposits). Such an exchange between deposit types effectively improves the liquidity profile of 
the whole deposit type of bank financing. More strikingly, such an effect appears to be 
stronger in countries with better creditor protection. This finding may be explained in the same 
way as the negative impact of creditor rights on liquidity creation by small banks in Ascending 
EU. Specifically, stronger creditor protection as proxied in our regression by legal formalism 
may create excessive legal burdens for banks creditors in the event of bank failure. These 
burdens in turn increase the reluctance of investors in illiquid liabilities such as subordinated 
debt or bank equity and move to other more liquid liability items. The possibly 
counterintuitive fact that such a substitution takes place in EU15, where government 
protection for banks is stronger, may be explained by the tendency of government to rescue 
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only depositors rather than equity holders of endangered banks 27 . Effectively, such a 
substitution also improves the liquidity profile of bank liability side of balance sheet. 
For small banks, the regressions show that the interaction term is significantly positive 
for EU15 for both asset and liability components. The significant interaction term of the 
liability part can be explained in the same way as for large banks in EU15 above. The 
interaction term is also significantly positive for the asset part, meaning that small banks 
operating in highly concentrated market with stronger protection may feel more confident 
about investing in illiquid and risky loans, which in turn improves the liquidity profile of their 
asset side of balance sheet. In Ascending EU, the interaction term is significantly negative for 
the asset part and positive (albeit insignificant) for the liability part. As we argued before, in 
light of the suggestions by Djankov et al (2003) that better creditor protection in developing 
countries may result in inefficiency and injustice, banks investments in illiquid assets could be 
hampered by the potentially cumbersome and unfair legal proceedings. Coupled with heavier 
market concentration, the likelihood of encountering such legal burdens may increase, 
furthering reducing the incentive of banks to make illiquid loans. This effect is only relevant 
for small banks possibly because of their weaker economic and political bargaining power. 
 
4.6 Alternative explanations: 
 
The conclusions we have made so far include that bank equity capital is strongly negatively 
associated with liquidity creation, market power strongly contributes to liquidity creation, and 
market concentration helps or hinder liquidity creation depending on the size of banks and the 
group of countries. Even though we have included in our regression so far control variables 
that cover deposit insurance, macroeconomic environment and accounting method, there are 
other institutional factors that may compound with our existing findings. In particular, we 
address in this section creditor rights and foreign ownership. 
                                                        
27
 During the rescue of Fortis Bank by the government of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 
2008, equity holders are essentially wiped out. The association of angered former Fortis shareholders 
resort to legal procedure to try to recover their investment from the Finance ministries of Belgium and 
the Netherlands. For more than a year, the association could not even find out if the governments will 
provide an explanation or not, let alone financial compensations. 
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4.6.1 Creditor rights, market concentration, and liquidity creation 
 
As we argued in Section 4.3.4 that the power brought to banks in highly concentrated market 
may depend on the creditor rights of a country. Specifically, it has been shown that banks in 
countries with stronger creditor rights collectively issue more loans to the private sector 
(Djankov et al 2007). The effect of market power may be conditional on the strength creditor 
protection in a country. Highly concentrated market and the associated market power may not 
be materialized if weak creditor protection prevents the banks from recouping part of their 
losses in the event of default or contract breach, which effect increases the expected loss of the 
banks and reduces banks’ willingness to deal with risky borrowers. In addition to settling 
default event, banks may also encounter other loss-generating events during the course of a 
loan if their creditor rights are weak. 
We examine the potential impact of creditor rights on liquidity creation by including 
both the creditor right itself and its interaction with market concentration. Also included are 
the dummy variables that control for the legal origins of the sample countries. We do not 
interact creditor rights with individual bank’s market share because all banks in a country face 
the same level of creditor protection. The interaction between market share and creditor rights 
therefore does not capture additional variation between banks in a country. As shown in Table 
V, creditor rights indeed play a significant role in bank liquidity creation. Note the coefficients 
of the interaction term is significantly positive for both large and small banks in EU15, which 
supports our conjecture that it is indeed the combination of stronger market power and higher 
level of creditor protection that jointly contributes to bank liquidity creation. As can be seen in 
the summary statistics in Table II, EU15 countries on average have higher scores in creditor 
rights than the Ascending EU. Our results in EU15 there support the findings by Djankov et al 
(2007) that banks operating in countries with better creditor protection create more liquidity. 
On the contrary, the coefficients of the interaction term in the regressions for 
Ascending EU are either non-existence in the case of large banks or significantly negative for 
small banks. The results for small banks imply that holding market share and market 
concentration constant banks operating in countries with stronger creditor rights create less 
liquidity. Such a seemingly counterintuitive result may be explained by looking at what 
exactly we used in the regression as the proxy for creditor rights.  
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Table V 
Disentangle competition from institutional factors 
This table reports the results of regression with the inclusion in the models reported in Table III of creditor 
rights, the interaction of creditor rights and market competition, and legal origins. Also included in the 
regressions is the full set of control variable listed in Table II, year dummies and bank fixed effects, and a 
constant. The coefficients for the control variables are not reported for brevity. The regressions are 
separately run for European banks using the whole sample, the sample of the developed EU15 and 
Switzerland, and the sample of developing or Ascending EU counties. The samples of large and small banks 
are also treated separately. The dependent variable is the ratio of the Cat Fat liquidity creation measure to 
total assets. A banks/year observation is defined as large (small) if the total assets is equal or above (below) 
€ 1 billion. The definitions of the explanatory variables can be found in Table II. All explanatory variables 
used are lagged by one year. The sample is unbalanced and covers the period from 1998 to 2004. Reported 
t-statistics in the parenthesis are clustered at the bank level. Reported t-statistics in the parenthesis are 
clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Large banks Small banks
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Cap Ratio -0.534*** -0.554*** -0.149 -0.451*** -0.448*** -0.275***
(-4.077) (-4.240) (-0.313) (-9.936) (-9.396) (-2.673)
Market share 0.532*** 0.562*** 0.593*** -0.091** 108.751*** 0.016
(4.612) (3.491) (3.645) (-2.052) (7.826) (0.148)
Marke concentration -0.267** -0.249** 0.149 -0.073 -0.088* 3.477***
(-2.388) (-2.105) (0.074) (-1.576) (-1.902) (4.703)
Creditor rights -4.433*** -3.403*** -9.675 -6.431*** -8.748*** 23.339***
(-3.962) (-2.846) (-0.650) (-6.613) (-7.956) (3.541)
Creditor rights * Market concentration 0.116** 0.122* 0.000 0.072*** 0.120*** -1.754***
(2.021) (1.855) (0.000) (2.682) (4.769) (-5.176)
English legal origin 6.619* 4.184 (Dropped) -7.867** -6.867* (Dropped)
(1.847) (1.172) (-2.367) (-1.934)
French legal origin 9.067*** 8.861*** -3.730 -10.389*** -12.649*** -13.752
(5.166) (4.144) (-0.448) (-7.822) (-8.048) (-1.395)
Nordic legal origin 4.015 2.547 (Dropped) 13.700*** 6.806*** (Dropped)
(0.854) (0.501) (6.495) (2.991)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.181 0.183 0.483 0.317 0.386 0.178
Observations 6721 6503 218 14237 13686 551
 
 
 
As explained in Table III, the variable we used to measure the strength of a country’s creditor 
rights is an aggregate score that integrates four accounts of legal institutions relevant for 
debtors financial claims against the borrowers. Essentially, these institutions can be seen as the 
existence of certain legal procedures that debtors can rely on when there are financial disputes. 
Djankov et al (2003) suggest that the existence of formal legal procedures in less developed 
countries could actually result in inefficiency and injustice. Our finding of a negative impact 
on liquidity creation by stronger creditor rights may be explained by the adverse effect of the 
legal formalism in the less developed Ascending EU. The fact that the effect is particularly 
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strong for small banks but absent for large banks could be explained by the relatively weak 
economic or political significance enjoyed by small banks, which could make them more 
vulnerable than large banks to cumbersome or unfair legal procedures. 
 
 
4.6.2 Foreign ownership 
 
We have hinted before that the majority of large banks in Ascending EU are foreign-owned. In 
this subsection, we formally substantiate this issue. To this end, we gathered detailed bank-
level ownership data for our European sample for a sub-sample period from 1998 till 200228.  
As can be seen in Table VI, among the four groups of distinguish, large banks in Ascending 
EU is the only one that demonstrates consistent foreign dominance. As we argued before, the 
liquidity creation by foreign banks may be different from local banks because banks that have 
presence in different countries may be more capable of diversifying risks among broader 
customer base and therefore creating more liquidity. On other hand, foreign banks may not 
have as much knowledge about the local market as the local competitors, which could force 
them to resort to arm’s length lending rather than relationship lending and hence reduce their 
liquidity creation. 
In order to clarify the real effect of foreign ownership, we include in our regressions a 
dummy variable that equals 1 in a bank is owned by foreigners. We also include an interaction 
terms between foreign ownership dummy and individual banks’ market share. The interaction 
term helps further answer the question if foreign owned banks with higher market share 
behave differently in liquidity creation. It also addresses the doubt that if our previous findings 
on market share is driven by ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28
 We are grateful for Ugo Panizza for providing us the data he together with Alejandro Micco and Monica 
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Table VI 
Distribution of foreign ownership 
This table presents the number of domestically versus foreign owned banks for a sub-sample covering 1009 
to 2002. All years have two entries: a value of 0 means foreign ownership is below or equal to 50%; a value 
of 1 means the percentage of foreign ownership is above 50% implying that the bank is owned by foreigners. 
The sample is split between EU15+Switzerland and the Ascending EU countries, and then further split 
between large banks (total assets equal or above 1 billion Euro) and small banks (total assets below 1 billion 
Euro). 
Year >50% Foreign owned (1=Yes) Frequency>50% Foreign owned (1=Yes) Frequency
1998 0 631 0 2392
1998 1 103 1 147
1999 0 673 0 2109
1999 1 119 1 135
2000 0 705 0 2318
2000 1 138 1 138
2001 0 719 0 2199
2001 1 144 1 126
2002 0 706 0 1723
2002 1 143 1 117
1998 0 5 0 57
1998 1 13 1 25
1999 0 4 0 48
1999 1 19 1 25
2000 0 5 0 57
2000 1 23 1 33
2001 0 9 0 63
2001 1 22 1 43
2002 0 11 0 48
2002 1 23 1 45
EU15 + Switzerland
Large banks Small banks
Large banks Small banks
Ascending EU
 
 
Table VII reports the regression results. Our previous results on market share all 
survived. In all cases, individual banks’ market share significantly contributes to liquidity 
creation. These results do not appear to be driven by foreign ownership. Yet the inclusion of 
foreign ownership yields some additional insights. Foremost is the significantly negative sign 
for the interaction between market share and foreign ownership for large banks in Ascending 
EU. This means as the market share of large foreign banks in Ascending EU grows bigger, 
they create less liquidity. For small foreign banks operating in Ascending EU on the other 
hand, the effect of market share does not interact with ownership. Foreign ownership appears 
to be strictly beneficial for liquidity creation. Together these contrasting results for Ascending 
EU countries between large and small banks suggest it is likely that the expansion by large 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Yanez used in Micco et al (2007).  
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banks in Ascending EU is mainly into the provision of standard and liquid banking product 
that do not improve liquidity creation. Small banks on the other hand are more likely to rely on 
relationship lending even when they expand to other country, which improve their liquidity 
creation. Alternatively, since we measure the size of banks based on their country level 
operations (e.g., if a large banks’ foreign assets in a country is below € 1 billion, then it is 
considered a small bank in that country), our results can also be interpreted as saying that a 
bank creates more liquidity abroad when it’s foreign presence is small, but creates less 
liquidity when its market power is sufficiently large. 
For EU15 countries, small foreign owned banks, or the small-scale operation by 
foreign banks, create less liquidity than their domestic counterparts. This result suggests that 
the customers of small banks in the more developed EU15 are more inclined to deal with the 
domestic lenders possibly due to the information advantage of these lenders regarding the 
local customers. 
 
 
4.7 Robustness check with Alternative sample using minimum adjusted Bankscope data 
 
The sample we used till this point is a combination of Bankscope data and manually collected 
bank balance sheet data. We deem the manual data collection effort necessary because it 
alleviates the lack of details in Bankscope data required for building the Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) preferred liquidity creation measurement. We illustrate this point in Table VIII where 
we run the regressions using the original Bankscope data adjusted only for the deposit items 
with the average deposit ratios of the corresponding deposit items from the manually collected 
banks. The results show that while the results for Cap Ratio are consistent with our previous 
results, the results for Market Concentration are different particularly for Ascending EU. This 
means our manually collected data contribute to the correct establishment of the relationship 
between liquidity creation and market concentration. 
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Table VII 
Regressions of liquidity creation also controlling for foreign ownership 
The regressions models reported in this table are built on those in Table III. Additional regressors include a 
dummy that equals 1 when more than 50% of the total assets of a bank/year is foreign owned, and the 
interaction of this dummy and market share. Also included in the regressions is the full set of control 
variable also present in the models in Table III and IV, year dummies and bank fixed effects, and a constant; 
the coefficients for these variables are not reported for brevity. The regressions are separately run for 
European banks using the whole sample, the sample of the developed EU15 and Switzerland, and the 
sample of developing or Ascending EU counties. The samples of large and small banks are also treated 
separately. The dependent variable is the ratio of the Cat Fat liquidity creation measurement to total assets. 
A banks/year observation is defined as large (small) if the total assets is equal or above (below) € 1 billion. 
The definitions of the explanatory variables can be found in Table II. All explanatory variables used are 
lagged by one year. The sample is unbalanced and covers the period from 1998 to 2004. Reported t-statistics 
in the parenthesis are clustered at the bank level. Reported t-statistics in the parenthesis are clustered at the 
bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Large banks Small banks
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Whole
Sample
EU15 +
Switzerland
Ascending
EU
Cap Ratio -0.202* -0.182 -0.969 -0.456*** -0.435*** -0.300**
(-1.799) (-1.602) (-1.490) (-6.305) (-5.661) (-2.316)
Market share 0.433*** 0.524*** 1.381*** 0.383 85.306*** 1.463**
(3.477) (2.603) (4.219) (0.705) (7.192) (2.274)
Foreign owned 1.310 -0.337 22.181*** -2.813* -5.492*** 8.433**
(0.856) (-0.209) (3.250) (-1.762) (-2.652) (2.516)
Foreign owned * Market share -0.134 0.316 -1.213*** 0.008 25.287 -0.639
(-0.986) (1.132) (-3.568) (0.014) (0.805) (-1.003)
Marke concentration -0.780*** -0.738*** 6.175 -0.264** -0.118 3.862
(-4.192) (-3.857) (0.865) (-2.224) (-0.922) (1.539)
Creditor rights -8.840*** -6.818*** 45.536 -6.499*** -6.198*** 19.023
(-5.257) (-3.875) (0.728) (-4.507) (-3.602) (1.428)
Creditor rights * Market concentratio 0.246*** 0.233** -2.134 0.156*** 0.127*** -1.536*
(2.753) (2.566) (-0.762) (3.546) (2.751) (-1.651)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.265 0.271 0.557 0.298 0.358 0.212
Observations 2869 2780 89 8062 7777 285
 
 
 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate bank liquidity creation using a unique and comprehensive dataset 
that covers the majority of banks in EU for the period between 1998 and 2004. First, we 
quantify the amount of liquidity created by EU banks by aggregating bank balance items 
weighted according to their position on the balance sheet and their liquidity characteristics. 
Illiquid assets and liquid liabilities positively contribute to liquidity creation while liquid 
assets and illiquid liabilities reduce liquidity creation. We take into account both on- and off-
balance sheet items. Our results corroborate with the literature on financial system comparison 
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that suggests European economies rely more on bank financing. The amount of liquidity 
created by European banks as a percentage of GDP is much higher than banks in the U.S.  
Next, we investigate the relationship between bank equity can liquidity creation and 
thereby shed lights on the potential impact of the recent shift in regulatory focus on 
strengthening bank capital base. Our results show that increased bank equity capital would 
substantially reduce bank liquidity creation by all banks across Europe. The reason is the 
history of consistent government intervention and protection during banking crisis and the 
resulting ideology that banks will never be allowed to fail.  
 
Table VIII 
Robustness check —Bankscope database with minimum adjustment 
This table reports the results of robustness checks using the original Bankscope data only adjusted for the 
deposit items based on the manually collected data. Also included in the regressions is the full set of control 
variable also present in the models in Table III, year dummies and bank fixed effects, and a constant. The 
coefficients for the control variables are not reported for brevity. Results are separately reported for 
European banks using the whole sample, the sample of the developed EU15 and Switzerland, and the 
sample of developing or Ascending EU counties. The samples of large and small banks are also treated 
separately The dependent variable is the ratio of the cat fat liquidity creation measure to total assets. A 
banks/year observation is defined as large (small) if the total assets is equal or above (below) € 1 billion.  
The dummy variable accounting equals one if the bank/year observation is under the IFRS accounting rules. 
The definitions of other explanatory variables can be found in Table II. All explanatory variables used are 
lagged by one year. The sample is unbalanced and covers the period from 1998 to 2004. Reported t-statistics 
in the parenthesis are clustered at the bank level. Reported t-statistics in the parenthesis are clustered at the 
bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Large banks Small banks
Whole 
Sample
EU15 + 
Switzerland
Ascending 
EU 
Whole 
Sample
EU15 + 
Switzerland
Ascending 
EU 
Cap Ratio -0.577*** -0.586*** 0.053 -0.456*** -0.466*** -0.349***
(-3.985) (-4.020) (0.083) (-10.776) (-10.304) (-3.649)
Market share 0.247*** 0.289** 0.242 0.393** 52.834*** 0.757***
(2.842) (2.263) (1.571) (2.150) (5.296) (3.332)
Marke concentration -0.006 -0.045 0.486 -0.095*** -0.148*** 0.109
(-0.116) (-0.916) (0.864) (-3.501) (-5.265) (0.434)
Creditor rights -3.454*** -3.416*** -7.728 -6.562*** -9.379*** -7.701**
(-3.337) (-3.228) (-1.230) (-7.768) (-9.883) (-2.103)
Creditor rights * Market concentration -0.006 0.035 -0.123 0.100*** 0.150*** -0.105
(-0.132) (0.710) (-0.402) (3.647) (5.342) (-0.732)
Deposit insurance -0.833*** -0.817*** -1.660*** -0.631*** -1.091*** 0.091
(-4.208) (-3.747) (-2.849) (-4.768) (-7.683) (0.324)
R2 0.183 0.182 0.446 0.438 0.489 0.169
Observations 6490 6308 182 13985 13511 474
 
 
 
Additionally, we show that the market share of individual banks substantially 
contributes to liquidity creation. We take this as evidence on the stronger ability possessed by 
banks with larger market share to retain customers and inter-temporally smooth interest 
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charges so that risky and illiquid loans can find financing to start with. More investments in 
these loans in turn increase bank liquidity creation. 
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Appendix: Construction of liquidity creation measure and data items 
The Cat Fat liquidity creation measure is calculated according to the following formula: 
 
Cat fat = 0.5*illiquid assets (cat) + 0*semi-liquid assets (cat) – 0.5*liquid assets 
    + 0.5*Illiquid Guarantees 
     +0.5*liquid liabilities + 0*semi-liquid liabilities – 0.5*illiquid liabilities – 0.5*equity 
 
where each of the individual components can be grouped and further decomposed as follows: 
 
ASSETS: 
 
Illiquid assets = (Total Customer Loans 5190 – Loans to Municipalities or Government 5100 
– Loans to Banks 5170)  
+ Other Investments 5540  
(+ Total Non Earning Assets 5620 – Cash and Due from Banks 5580)  
+ Total Fixed Assets 5660 
 
Semi-Liquid assets = Loans to Municipalities or Government 5100 
+ Loans to Banks 5170 
+ Deposits with Banks 5350 
+ Due from Central Banks 5360 
+ Due from Other Banks 5370 
+ Due from Other Credit Institutions 5380 
+ CDs 5520 
+ Non-Listed Securities 5430 
 
Liquid assets = (Total Securities 5470 – Non-listed Securities)  
+ Treasury Bills 5490 
+ Other Bills 5500 
+ Bonds 5510 
+ Cash and Due from Banks 5580 
+ Equity Investments 5530 
 
LIABILITIES: 
 
Liquid liabilities = Demand Deposits 5920 
+ Savings Deposits 5925 
+ Deposits with Banks 6060 
+ Commercial Deposits 6050 
 
Semi-Liquid liabilities = Time Deposits (5930 5940 5950 5970 5980 
+ Municipalities or Government Deposits 6010 
+ Other Deposits 6030 
+ Total Money Market Funding 6160 
 
Illiquid liabilities+ Equity = Total Other Funding 6240 
+ Total Loan loss and Other Reserves 6280 
+ Other Liabilities 6285 
+ Total Equity 6400 
 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET GUARANTEES: 
 
Illiquid Guarantees = Total Contingent Liabilities 7110 
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Chapter 5  
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Commercial banks have always been of great public and academic interests. More so than 
before, in recent years, they have increasingly become a point of focus, concern, and debate. 
At the time of this writing, the subprime crisis and the subsequent global financial meltdown 
put banks and financial institutions in general under the spotlight and scrutiny of the general 
public and policy-makers. Undoubtedly, commercial banks are crucial to the wellbeing of the 
individuals and the general economy of the modern society.  
 This dissertation examines three topics that are centered on commercial banks and are 
of interest to different groups of stakeholders of these financial institutions. Chapter 2 has the 
shareholders of commercial banks as the intended audience. It investigates the excess stock 
returns of banks in a cross-sectional setting using the popular methodology of Fama and 
French (1992). Unlike the limited amount of existing literature focusing on bank stock returns, 
this paper does not assume the validity of the pricing factors found to be important in the non-
financial sectors. Instead, pricing factors are largely independently extracted from the 
literature of financial intermediation and banking economics. The results show, maybe 
unsurprisingly, that leverage and beta, pricing factors found to be irrelevant to non-financial 
sectors, are important to bank stock returns. Leverage is strongly positively related to bank 
stock returns, and beta demonstrates a convex relationship with bank stock returns. Finally, 
size, measured by total assets rather than capitalization, has a strong and negative relationship 
with bank stock returns. All in all, the results of this chapter suggest that the investigation of 
stock returns of banks or financial institutions can benefit from the theories oriented towards 
these sectors rather than heavily relying on the asset pricing literature of the non-financial 
sectors. 
 Chapter 3 examines the use of interest rate and credit derivatives by banks for hedging 
purposes. This chapter is motivated by the rapid growth of the derivative markets and the 
concerns with the heavy involvement of banks in these complex markets and products. By 
investigating the drivers behind the (increased) use of derivatives by individual banks, this 
chapter answers the question, among others, whether banks’ loan making activities are closely 
tied with derivative markets. If so, any problem in the derivative market would also have 
severe consequences on the economy because borrowers would not be able to receive funding 
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from banks given the reliance of banks on derivatives for risk mitigation. 
 To this end, Chapter 3 uses as the sample the data covering all U.S. banks that have 
hedged with derivatives for the period from 1997 to 2005 and document in details the 
relationship between derivative usage and a wide collection of bank characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors. The results show that for interest rate derivatives, it is not the on-
balance sheet loans that drive banks to use derivatives. Rather it is the off-balance sheet 
unused loan commitment contracts that make banks more likely to be derivative users. The 
consequence of such a relationship is that if derivative market becomes insolvent, borrowers 
would not be able to rely on their established but yet unused source of bank financing for 
funding needs. This could be a severe problem because at least in the U.S. more than 80% of 
commercial and industrial loans are made through loam commitment arrangements. The 
problems in the derivative market could easily be translated into the starving of funding for the 
real economy. 
 Regarding credit derivatives, the most interesting findings include that the trading and 
hedging of credit derivatives are strongly correlated with each other and that hedging with 
credit derivatives and securitization are likely to increase at the same time.  
 Chapter 4 has the broadest scope of all chapters in this dissertation. This chapter covers 
the banking sectors of all EU countries and investigates a couple of questions with crucial 
policy relevance. Using a unique sample that includes the majority of banks in all EU25 
countries and Switzerland, this chapter demonstrates a strong and negative relationship 
between bank equity capital and bank liquidity creation. This is an important consideration 
policy-makers need to take into account when reformulating the next generation of capital 
regulation framework. After the subprime crisis, regulators such as the Bank for International 
Settlements have proposed to revise the current Basel 2 framework and put stronger emphasis 
on banks to hold more capital. The results of chapter 4 suggest that the proposed regulatory 
focus may have the unwelcoming side-effect of reducing bank liquidity creation, which may 
slow down economic recovery and growth. 
 Another interesting finding in Chapter 4 is the relationship between liquidity creation 
and the competitive landscape of the banking sector. This chapter shows that whether or not 
concentration is beneficial to liquidity creation depends on the institutional context of a 
country. In particular, higher degree of market concentration or stronger market power of 
banks is beneficial when the creditor protection of a country is strong. Otherwise, market 
concentration would reduce liquidity creation in countries with weaker creditor protection.
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l)EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON THE STOCK RETURNS, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
LIQUIDITY CREATION OF BANKS
This thesis consists of three studies that respectively investigate the stock returns, risk
management, and liquidity creation of banks. Chapter 2 focuses on the cross-section of
expected bank stock returns and shows that leverage and beta are important for pricing
bank stocks in the United States. During the two decades prior to the subprime crisis,
banks with high leverage have high stock returns. Beta appears to have a convex
relationship with bank stock returns. This chapter generally suggests that bank stocks
seem to respond to a different set of pricing factors than other industries. 
Chapter 3 examines the drivers behind banks’ use of derivatives for hedging. Covering
virtually all banks in the U.S. that have used derivatives, one key finding of this chapter is
that off-balance sheet loan commitment contracts, rather than on-balance sheet loans,
determines the use of derivatives for hedging. Since loan commitment contracts are the
primary channel of bank financing for commercial and industrial borrowers, the
implication of this finding is that the illiquidity of the financial market would make it
difficult for firms to refinance their existing loans, which is consistent with the
observation during the subprime crisis.
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the liquidity creation of banks in the European Union (EU)
and its relationship with equity capital, market power, and institutional context. Using a
unique and comprehensive sample of EU banks, this chapter shows that the impact of
stronger capital base on bank liquidity creation is significantly negative. This means that
capital regulations such as the Basel II Accord are likely to curtail banking activities and
slow down economic recovery and growth in EU. Next, this chapter shows that stronger
creditor rights coupled with stronger market power reduces bank liquidity creation in
developing EU countries, and vice versa for developed EU countries. This finding suggests
that due to less developed legal infrastructure, stronger creditor rights could be
counterproductive in facilitating bank liquidity creation in developing countries.
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